Opinion
No. 788 C.D. 2012
06-19-2013
Jeffrey A. Wright, Appellant v. Lower Salford Township Municipal Police Pension Fund, Lower Salford Township Board of Supervisors, Lower Salford Township Municipal Police Pension Fund Trustees and Standard Insurance Company
ORDER
NOW, June 19, 2013, upon consideration of the application for relief filed by Standard Insurance Company, which we treat as an application for reconsideration of our order of April 9, 2013, and to which no answer was filed, the application is granted.
The opinion and order filed April 9, 2013 are vacated.
The attached opinion and order are entered.
BY THE COURT:
/s/_________
DAN PELLEGRINI,
President Judge BEFORE: HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY SENIOR JUDGE FRIEDMAN
Jeffrey A. Wright appeals from the April 4, 2012, order of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County (trial court), which: (1) granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by the Lower Salford Township Municipal Police Pension Fund, the Lower Salford Township Board of Supervisors (Board), and the Lower Salford Township Municipal Police Pension Fund Trustees (together, Township Defendants); and (2) granted the motion for summary judgment filed by Standard Insurance Company (Standard). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
Because Wright settled his claim against Standard in 2009, Wright does not challenge the entry of judgment in Standard's favor. Thus, the parties have stipulated that that portion of the trial court's April 4, 2012, order is not at issue in this appeal.
On January 23, 1996, Wright sustained a knee injury while working as a police officer for the Lower Salford Police Department (LSPD). Following knee surgery, Wright returned to duty at various times, sometimes at full-duty capacity and sometimes at light-duty capacity. Despite his efforts to continue working as a patrol sergeant, Wright eventually became unable to perform his job duties. His last day of work was March 12, 2002. At a public meeting on May 16, 2002, the Board unanimously voted to honorably discharge Wright from the LSPD.
On April 17, 2002, one month before Wright's honorable discharge, the Pennsylvania legislature amended the Municipal Police Pension Law, Act of May 29, 1956, P.L. (1955) 1804, as amended, 53 P.S. §§767-778, commonly known as Act 600. The 2002 amendment, commonly known as Act 30, added a mandatory disability pension for permanent service-connected injuries, as follows:
Act of April 17, 2002, P.L. 239.
In the case of the payment of pensions for permanent injuries incurred in service, the amount and commencement of the payments shall be fixed by regulations of the governing body of the borough, town, township or regional police department and shall be calculated at a rate no less than fifty per centum of the member's salary at the time the disability was incurred, provided that any member who receives benefits for the same injuries under the Social
Security Act . . . shall have his disability benefits offset or reduced by the amount of such benefits.Section 5(e)(1) of Act 600, 53 P.S. §771(e)(1). Before the enactment of Act 30, municipalities were not required to pay police officers a disability pension; Act 30 amended Act 600 to create such an obligation.
On January 6, 2003, eight months after Wright's honorable discharge, the Board amended the Lower Salford Code by adopting Ordinance 2003-2 (Ordinance), which incorporated Act 30's requirements. The Ordinance states:
In the case of the payment of pensions for permanent injuries incurred on or after April 17, 2002, the amount of the payments shall be calculated at the rate of 50% of the member's salary at the time the disability was incurred, provided that any member who receives benefits for the same injuries under the Social Security Act . . . shall have his or her disability benefits offset or reduced by the amount of such benefits. Determination of eligibility of disability benefits shall be based on the eligibility of benefits payable for permanent injuries incurred in service under the Township's long-term disability policy and shall be payable commencing at the later of termination of benefits under the long-term disability policy as a result of attaining the maximum age under the disability policy or upon the officer's attainment of his superannuation retirement date.(Lower Salford Code §29-3(B).)
In May 2006, Wright filed suit against the Township Defendants, seeking a disability pension calculated at 50% of his former salary, retroactive to May 16, 2002. The Township Defendants timely filed an answer and new matter. After the close of the pleadings, the Township Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings.
On April 4, 2012, the trial court granted the Township Defendants' motion. The trial court determined that Act 30 was not self-executing because its plain language mandated further legislative action by the local governing body. The Board did not adopt Act 30's provisions until January 2003, well after Wright's honorable discharge. Therefore, the trial court concluded that the Township Defendants were not obligated to pay Wright a disability pension. Wright timely appealed to this court.
A statute is self-executing if it is "mandatory in nature and require[s] no further legislative action in order to become effective." Success Against All Odds v. Department of Public Welfare, 700 A.2d 1340, 1351 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997).
Our scope of review of an order granting judgment on the pleadings is limited to determining whether the trial court committed an error of law or whether questions of material fact remain such that the case should have gone to the jury. Tobias v. Halifax Township, 28 A.3d 223, 225 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 47 A.3d 849 (2012).
On appeal, Wright asserts that the trial court committed an error of law in determining that Act 30 was not self-executing. We need not reach this question, however, because we conclude that material issues of fact exist that precluded the entry of judgment on the pleadings.
The trial court determined that Act 30 did not apply to the Township Defendants until the Board adopted the Ordinance incorporating Act 30's requirements in January 2003, which post-dated Wright's discharge. However, the Ordinance states that it applies to "payment of pensions for permanent injuries incurred on or after April 17, 2002." (Lower Salford Code §29-3(B) (emphasis added).) Therefore, regardless of whether Act 30 was self-executing, the text of the Ordinance suggests that it applies retroactively to permanent injuries incurred "on or after" Act 30's effective date. The trial court, however, did not address this issue.
(See also Lower Salford Code §29-3(C) (stating that the amendment relating to pensions for families of police officers killed in the line of duty is "[e]ffective April 17, 2002").)
There is also a disputed factual issue regarding the date of Wright's "permanent" injury. Wright claims that although his initial knee injury occurred in 1996, his injury did not become permanent until May 16, 2002. According to Wright, the Board's vote to honorably discharge him was the first official determination that he was permanently disabled and could no longer work. The Township Defendants claim that the date of Wright's only service-connected injury was January 23, 1996, and his last day of work was March 12, 2002. Both of these events pre-dated Act 30 and the Ordinance. Again, the trial court did not address this issue.
In its opinion, the trial court noted that "[Wright's] honorable discharge is an implicit determination that Wright incurred a 'disability,' but neither the police department nor the township expressly determined when the disability occurred." (Trial Ct. Op. at 2.) --------
We conclude that the foregoing factual issues are material to the determination of whether Wright is entitled to the disability pension he seeks. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting the Township Defendants' motion. See Pfister v. City of Philadelphia, 963 A.2d 593, 597 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (stating that judgment on the pleadings cannot be entered when material issues of fact are in dispute).
Accordingly, we affirm the entry of judgment in favor of Standard, reverse the entry of judgment in favor of the Township Defendants, and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.
/s/_________
ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
ORDER
AND NOW, this 19th day of June, 2013, the April 4, 2012, order of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County entering judgment in favor of the Lower Salford Township Municipal Police Pension Fund, the Lower Salford Township Board of Supervisors, and the Lower Salford Township Municipal Police Pension Fund Trustees is reversed. Judgment in favor of Standard Insurance Company is affirmed. This matter is remanded for further proceedings, and jurisdiction is relinquished.
/s/_________
ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge