97 Ala. 575, 12 So. 75. Bare possession is sufficient to entitle to a recovery against wrongful interference. 62 Ala. 369; section 2454, Code 1907. The description conveying all the assets to the Stockton Lumber Company was sufficient to pass for legal title. 203 Ala. 118, 82 So. 132. As to authorities on plaintiff's title by adverse possession, see 84 Ala. 560, 3 So. 475, 5 Am. St. Rep. 393; 78 Ala. 37; 129 Ala. 195, 29 So. 800; 92 Ala. 571, 9 So. 332; 168 Ala. 200, 53 So. 174; 190 Ala. 566, 67 So. 234; 200 Ala. 299, 76 So. 65; 195 Ala. 8, 70 So. 261; 201 Ala. 534, 78 So. 888; 202 Ala. 430, 80 So. 814; 171 Ala. 626, 54 So. 549. Harry T. Smith Caffey, of Mobile, for appellees.
Perry v. Lawson, 112 Ala. 480, 20 So. 611; Southern R. Co. v. Hayes, 150 Ala. 212, 43 So. 487. These holdings are in accord with many of our cases which hold that deeds void for various reasons were nevertheless sufficient to give color of title to possession taken under them. Several of those cases are cited in Wright v. Louisville N. R. Co., 203 Ala. 118, 82 So. 132. See Odom v. Averett, 248 Ala. 289, 27 So.2d 479; Bell v. Pritchard, 273 Ala. 289, 139 So.2d 596; Albright v. Creel, 236 Ala. 286, 182 So. 10.
We think the description โ "all real estate held in my name" โ is capable of being made certain by parol proof and is, therefore, sufficient. Brown v. Huckabaa, 264 Ala. 660, 662, 89 So.2d 180; Hart v. Baptist Foundation of Alabama, 264 Ala. 632, 635, 88 So.2d 681; Spires v. Nix, 255 Ala. 642, 646, 57 So.2d 89; Aiken v. McMillan, 213 Ala. 494, 502, 106 So. 150; Wright v. Louisville N. R. Co., 203 Ala. 118, 120, 82 So. 132; Holly v. Dinkins, 202 Ala. 477, 479, 80 So. 861; Hamilton v. Stone, 202 Ala. 468, 469, 80 So. 852; Nolen v. Henry, 190 Ala. 540, 544-545, 68 So. 500, Ann.Cas. 1917B, 792; Dinkins v. Latham, 154 Ala. 90, 99, 45 So. 60; Caston v. McCord, 130 Ala. 318, 321, 30 So. 431; Cottingham v. Hill, 119 Ala. 353, 354-355, 24 So. 552, 72 Am.St.Rep. 923; Webb v. Elyton Land Co., 105 Ala. 471, 478-479, 18 So. 178; Homan v. Stewart, 103 Ala. 644, 650, 16 So. 35; 26 C.J.S. Deeds ยง 30, pp. 640, 642, 643, 644, 645; 16 Am.Jur., Deeds, ยง 272, pp. 591, 592; Annotation, 55 A.L.R. 163; 8 R.C.L., Deeds, ยง 131, p. 1076; 6 Thompson on Real Property, ยง 3291, pp. 472-473. The question arises as to whether a court of equity has power to decree a sale of land for division under Code 1940, Tit. 47, ยง 186, where the party seeking such relief has only an equitable interest in the real property. The answer is found in Copeland v. Copeland, 242 Ala. 507, 510, 7 So.2d 87, 89, where it is said:
In reliance on a statement in 2 C.J.S., Adverse Possession, section 72, page 606, defendants contend that possession under a void tax deed is of no avail to the possessor during the time when title is in the government. The author cites the case of Wright v. Louisville N.R. Co., 203 Ala. 118, 82 So. 132, in support of the text. Neither the text nor the Wright case has application here.
Floyd v. Andress, 246 Ala. 301, 20 So.2d 331. Exclusive right of ownership set up in cotenant, followed by open, notorious exclusive and hostile possession for statutory period will ripen into title as against cotenants who were ousted. Turner v. Turner, 202 Ala. 515, 81 So. 17; Ratliff v. Ratliff, 234 Ala. 320, 175 So. 259. A void deed is color of title. Wright v. Louisville N. R. Co., 203 Ala. 118, 82 So. 132; Code 1940, Tit. 7, ยง 828. A period of more than ten years elapsed from the date of entering into possession by appellant's predecessor, and the statute barred the present action.
Dillingham v. Brown, 38 Ala. 311." To like effect are the following decisions of this court: Long et al. v. Boast, supra; Perry v. Marbury Lumber Co., 212 Ala. 542, 103 So. 580; Wright et al. v. Louisville N. R. Co., 203 Ala. 118, 82 So. 132; Boone et al. v. Gulf, F. A. R. Co., 201 Ala. 560, 78 So. 956; Hooper v. Bankhead Bankhead, 171 Ala. 626, 54 So. 549. In view of the above we are of the opinion that ยง 295, Title 51, supra, is not rendered inapplicable to the present case because the tax sale was void.
Hughes v. Tuscaloosa, 197 Ala. 592, 73 So. 90. Lands granted to the State of Alabama for railroad improvement purposes, under an Act of Congress approved in 1856, are not subject to the statute of limitations and adverse possession; and by analogy, lands granted to the State for internal improvement purposes are not so subjected. Swann Billups v. Lindsey, 70 Ala. 507; Standifer v. Swann, 78 Ala. 88; Ware v. Swann Billups, 79 Ala. 330; Swann Billups v. Miller, 82 Ala. 530, 1 So. 65; Swann Billups v. Gaston, supra; McCarver v. Herzberg, 120 Ala. 523, 25 So. 3; Adler v. Prestwood, 122 Ala. 367, 24 So. 999; Galloway v. Doe, 136 Ala. 315, 34 So. 957; Wright v. L. N. R. Co., 203 Ala. 118, 82 So. 132. Key Key, of Russellville, for appellee.
While the title to property is vested in the state, the property is not subject to taxation and cannot be assessed as an escape for years during which title has remained in the state. Wright v. Louisville N. R. Co., 203 Ala. 118, 82 So. 132; Stein v. England, 202 Ala. 297, 80 So. 362; Greil Bros. Co. v. City of Montgomery, 182 Ala. 291, 62 So. 692, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 738; Anniston City Land Co. v. State, 160 Ala. 253, 48 So. 659; Const. 1901, ยง 91. The sale of land for taxes destroys the lien.
Within the application of these rules, and the evidence before us, we entertain no doubt of the agent's authority to sell as he did, and evidenced by the writings to bind Sadler. The description was sufficiently definite and certain (Angel v. Simpson, 85 Ala. 53, 3 So. 758; McMillan v. Aiken, 205 Ala. 35, 44, 88 So. 135; Wright v. L. N. R. Co., 203 Ala. 118, 82 So. 132; Ala. Cent. R. Co. v. Long, 158 Ala. 301, 305, 48 So. 363; Howison v. Bartlett, 147 Ala. 408, 40 So. 757; s. c., 141 Ala. 593, 37 So. 590; Head v. Sanders, 189 Ala. 443, 445, 66 So. 621; Homan v. Stewart, 103 Ala. 644, 16 So. 35; Hamilton v. Stone, 202 Ala. 468, 80 So. 852; Parker v. Jefferson Co., 209 Ala. 138, 95 So. 364; Ezzell v. Holland Stave Co., 210 Ala. 694, 99 So. 78), or may be rendered certain within the rule obtaining in this jurisdiction (Ezzell v. Holland Stave Co., supra; Matthews v. Bartee, 209 Ala. 25, 95 So. 289; McMillan v. Aiken, supra; Dixie Ind. Co. v. Benson, 202 Ala. 149, 153, 79 So. 615; Reynolds v. Trawick, 197 Ala. 165, 72 So. 378; Nolen v. Henry, 190 Ala. 540, 545, 67 So. 500, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 792; Seymour v. Williams, 139 Ala. 414, 36 So. 187; Caston v. McCord, 130 Ala. 318, 30 So. 431; O'Neal v. Seixas, 85 Ala. 80, 83, 4 So. 745; Reynolds v. Shaw, 207 Ala. 274, 92 So. 444; Head v. Sanders, supra). In Nelson v. Shelby, etc., Co., 96 Ala. 515, 11 So. 695,
In cases of "exceptional shading of ambiguity," as here, it is permissible to aid the description by showing the surroundings and situation of the parties and thing described, and if the description is made certain when read in the light of these circumstances, the conveyance should be sustained. Chambers v. Ringstaff, supra; Nolen v. Henry, 190 Ala. 540, 67 So. 500, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 792; Cottingham v. Hill, 119 Ala. 353, 24 So. 552, 72 Am. St. Rep. 923; Dixie Ind. Co. v. Benson, 202 Ala. 153, 79 So. 615; Russell v. Garrett, 208 Ala. 92, 93 So. 711; Nelson v. Shelby Co., 96 Ala. 515, 11 So. 695, 38 Am. St. Rep. 116; Head v. Sanders, 189 Ala. 443, 66 So. 621; Daniel v. Wade, 203 Ala. 355, 83 So. 99; Wright v. L. N., 203 Ala. 118, 82 So. 132; Harris v. Byrd, 202 Ala. 78, 79 So. 472. The mortgage to which reference is made in the deed will be considered for purposes of interpretation. Brannan v. Henry, 142 Ala. 702, 39 So. 92, 110 Am. St. Rep. 55; Southern I. S. Co. v. Stowers, 189 Ala. 314, 66 So. 677. The description in the deed is aided and strengthened by the averments of the cross-bill.