Opinion
1:22-cv-111
07-17-2023
WILLIAM HAROLD WRIGHT, Jr., Plaintiff v. WARDEN HUTCHISON, et al., Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS/MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ECF NO. 46 MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
RICHARD A. LANZILLO, Chief United States Magistrate Judge
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 46] be GRANTED.
This matter has been referred to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
II. Report
A. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff William Harold Wright, Jr. is an inmate in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP). At all relevant times, Wright was housed at FCI McKean. ECF No. 9 at 1.
Wright has since been transferred to FCI Otisville. See ECF No. 38.
In the instant action, Wright alleges that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by sanctioning him to sixty days of mattress restriction on March 17, 2022. ECF No. 9 at 3. He also states that he has been denied cleaning materials for his cell, given inadequate amounts of toilet paper and soap, and forced to take freezing showers with unsanitary towels. Id. Finally, Wright makes a passing reference to a “tooth ache” and “shoulder pain,” implying that he may have been denied medical attention. Id. As Defendants, Wright identified four individuals: Warden Hutchison, Lt. Blankenship, and corrections officers D. Gabriel and S. Ezzolo. Id. at 2.
Defendants filed the instant motion on February 23, 2023. ECF No. 46. Defendants' motion was accompanied by a supporting brief, concise statement of material facts, and appendix of exhibits. ECF Nos. 47-49. In directing Wright to respond to the pending motion, the Court cautioned him that it “may be treated, either in whole or in part, as a motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.” ECF No. 50 (citing Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d 315 (3d Cir. 2010)). Although he later filed a motion for temporary restraining order, see ECF No. 51, Wright failed to file a response to Defendants' motion. As such, this matter is fully briefed and ripe for review.
B. Standards
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) requires the court to enter summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Under this standard “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A disputed fact is “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome of the case under applicable substantive law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257; Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (3d Cir. 1991).
When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact remains for trial, the court must view the record and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in favor of the nonmoving party. Moore v. Tartier, 986 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1993); Clement v. Consol. Rail Corp., 963 F.2d 599, 600 (3d Cir. 1992); White v. Westinghouse Electric Co., 862 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1988). To avoid summary judgment, however, the nonmoving party may not rest on the unsubstantiated allegations of his or her pleadings. Instead, once the movant satisfies its burden of identifying evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must go beyond his pleadings with affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or other record evidence to demonstrate specific material facts that give rise to a genuine issue. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
Further, under Rule 56, a defendant may seek summary judgment by pointing to the absence of a genuine fact issue on one or more essential claim elements. The Rule mandates summary judgment if the plaintiff then fails to make a sufficient showing on each of those elements. When Rule 56 shifts the burden of production to the nonmoving party, “a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. See Harter v. G.A.F. Corp., 967 F.2d 846, 851 (3d Cir. 1992).
Finally, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court must “apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether [the] pro se litigant has mentioned it by name.” Holley v. Dep't of Veteran's Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999). Nevertheless, “a pro se plaintiff is not relieved of his obligation under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 56 to point to competent evidence in the record that is capable of refuting a defendant's motion for summary judgment.” Dawson v. Cook, 238 F.Supp.3d 712,717 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (citation omitted). In other words, a plaintiffs pro se status does not relieve him of his “obligation under Rule 56(c) to produce evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. (quoting Boykins v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 78 F.Supp.2d 402, 408 (E.D. Pa. 2000)); see also Winfield v. Mazurkiewicz, 2012 WL 4343176, *1 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2012).
C. Analysis
Defendants seek summary judgment based on Wright's failure to properly exhaust his administrative remedies before initiating this lawsuit. In broad brush, the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (the “PLRA”), requires a prisoner to exhaust any available administrative remedies before he may bring an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the conditions of his confinement. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This exhaustion requirement applies to all claims relating to prison life which do not implicate the duration of the prisoner's sentence. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Further, the statute requires “proper exhaustion,” meaning that a prisoner's completion of the administrative review process must also satisfy the applicable procedural rules of the prison's grievance system. Fennell v. Cambria County Prison, 607 Fed.Appx. 145, 149 (3d Cir. 2015). A procedurally defective administrative grievance, even if pursued to final review, precludes action in federal court. Id. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA is an affirmative defense that the defendants must plead and prove. Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 295 (3d Cir. 2002).
The grievance system utilized by the BOP consists of a multi-tier administrative process that allows “an inmate to seek formal review of an issue relating to any aspect of his/her own confinement.” 28 C.F.R. § 542.10. First, the inmate must attempt to informally resolve the issue with the institutional staff. 28 C.F.R. § 542.13(a). If the inmate is dissatisfied with the informal response, the inmate may submit a formal Administrative Remedy Request to the Warden of his institution on the appropriate BP-9 form within twenty calendar days “following the date on which the basis for the Request occurred.” 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(a). If the inmate remains dissatisfied following the Warden's response, the inmate may submit an appeal on a BP-10 form to the Regional Director within twenty calendar days of the date that the Warden signed the response. 28 C.F.R. § 542.15. Finally, an inmate who is not satisfied with the Regional Director's response may submit a final appeal on a BP-11 form to the General Counsel at the Central Office of Appeals within thirty calendar days of the Regional Director's signed response. Id. Each of these steps must be completed before the PLRA's exhaustion requirement is satisfied. See, e.g., Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006) (“[E]xhaustion of available administrative remedies is required for any suit challenging prison conditions”); Rogers v. United States, 696 F.Supp.2d 472, 484 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (noting that “[t]he administrative remedies process is not considered exhausted until the fourth step of the process is complete and the appeal is denied by the General Counsel”).
Here, the record is clear: Wright did not initiate, much less complete, this administrative process. Defendants have submitted an uncontradicted declaration from a paralegal specialist employed by the BOP stating that the only administrative appeal filed by Wright during his time at FCI McKean pertained to an incident report issued by another institution prior to his arrival. ECF No. 49-1 ¶ 6. Aside from that, Wright “did not file any other requests for administrative remedy after arriving at FCI McKean.” Id. Wright has made no attempt to contest or respond to the substance of the paralegal's declaration. Rogers, 696 F.Supp.2d at 485 (noting that, “[i]n the face of a supported motion for summary judgment, [a plaintiff] must provide contrary evidence in order to save their case.”). Because the undisputed facts of record demonstrate that Wright failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to any of his claims, Defendants' motion for summaiy judgment must be granted.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully recommended Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 46] be GRANTED. Judgment should be entered in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff based on Plaintiffs failure to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to initiating this action.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties must seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).