Opinion
1:22-cv-111
06-06-2023
WILLIAM HAROLD WRIGHT, JR., Plaintiff v. WARDEN HUTCHINSON, et al, Defendants
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER
ECF NO. 51
RICHARD A. LANZILLO, CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
It is respectfolly recommended that Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order [ECF No. 51] be DENIED.
II. Report
A. Background
In the underlying complaint, William Harold Wright, Jr., an inmate currently incarcerated at FCI Otisville, generally alleges that officials at his prior place of incarceration, FCI McKean, violated his constitutional rights by placing him on mattress restriction, denying him extra toilet paper and cleaning supplies, preventing him from obtaining medical care for a toothache and shoulder pain, and engaging in unlawful retaliation. ECF No. 9. In the present motion for injunctive relief, Wright alleges that he has spent two years in the Special Housing Unit (SHU) because of a "false allegation" in his prison file. ECF No. 51 at 3. He contends that he is "mentally stress[sed] out" and has "high blood pressure," creating a scenario in which a "stroke can easily occur for a man of [his] age." Id. He also suggests that placement in the SHU "can be a life threatening situation i.e. beating with locks or stab,” and that you “don't know what to expect when you [wake] up in the morning because of the BOP negligence.” Id.
B. Standard
Temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions are governed under the same standard. The party seeking preliminary injunctive relief has the burden of demonstrating: (1) a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that the issuance of an injunction will not result in greater harm to the non-moving party; and (4) that the public interest would best be served by granting the injunction. Council of Alternative Political Parties v. Hooks, 121 F.3d 876, 879 (3d Cir. 1997); Opticians Ass 'n of America v. Independent Opticians of America, 920 F.2d 187, 191-92 (3d Cir. 1990). The Court should issue the injunction only if the movant produces evidence sufficient to convince the trial judge that all four factors favor preliminary relief. Opticians, 920 F.2d at 192 (citing ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987)).
The purpose of the preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the rights of the parties can be fairly and fully litigated and determined by strictly legal proofs and according to the principles of equity. Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 1980). Thus, the grant of injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy which should be granted only in limited circumstances.” American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Winback and Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Frank's GMC Truck Center, Inc. v. General Motor Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir. 1988)). The facts clearly must support a finding that immediate and irreparable injury will result to the movant if preliminary relief is denied. United States v. Stazola, 893 F.2d 34, 37 n. 3 (3d Cir. 1990). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a “clear showing of irreparable injury.” Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989); ECRI, 809 F.2d at 226 (it is not enough to merely show irreparable harm: the plaintiff has the burden of showing immediate irreparable injury, which is more than merely serious or substantial harm and which cannot be redressed with money damages). Absent a showing of immediate, irreparable injury, the court should deny preliminary injunctive relief.
Moreover, because the purpose of preliminary injunctive relief is to prevent irreparable injury pending the resolution of the underlying claims on their merits, “the injury claimed in the motion for preliminary injunctive relief must relate to the conduct alleged and permanent relief sought in the plaintiffs complaint.” James v. Varano, 2017 WL 895569, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 2017). In other words, “there must be a connection between the underlying complaint and the relief requested in the motion for a preliminary injunction.” Id. (citing Ball v. Famiglio, 396 Fed.Appx. 836, 837 (3d Cir. 2010)). A district court “should not issue an injunction when the injunction in question is not of the same character, and deals with a matter lying wholly outside the issues in the suit.” Kaimowitz v. Orlando, Fla., 122 F.3d 41, 43 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing De Beers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945)).
Finally, in the prison context, a request for injunctive relief “must always be viewed with great caution because ‘judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.'” Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982)). Preliminary injunctive relief is “not a tool for prisoners to use to regulate ‘in every way, every day, the terms and conditions of plaintiffs confinement simply because they are “in court” . . Stiel v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2017 WL 2656646, at *4 (D.N.J. June 19, 2017) (quoting Muhammad v. Director of Corrections, 2009 WL 161075, at *1 (E.D. Ca. Jan. 22, 2009)). Thus, where a plaintiff requests an injunction that would require the Court to interfere with the administration of a prison, “appropriate consideration must be given to principles of federalism in determining the availability and scope of equitable relief.” Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976). The federal courts are not overseers of the day-to-day management of prisons. Prison officials require broad discretionary authority as the “operation of a correctional institution is at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974).
Accordingly, prison administrators should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that are needed to preserve internal order and to maintain institutional security. Beard v. Banks, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578 (2006); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,527(1979).
C. Analysis
In the instant case, the only claims raised in Wright's pleading involved a mattress restriction, denial of extra toilet paper and cleaning supplies, inadequate medical care, and unlawful retaliation. In contrast, his motion for a temporary restraining order addresses a “false allegation” placed in his prison file by an unknown individual and his ensuing transfer to the SHU. Each of those actions is wholly disconnected from the underlying claims in Wright's complaint. Under such circumstances, injunctive relief is plainly inappropriate. See, e.g., Ball, 396 Fed.Appx. at 837 (requiring “a relationship between the injury claimed in the party's motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint” in order for preliminary injunctive relief to be granted); Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 484 (3d Cir. 2000) (affirming denial of injunction where plaintiffs' alleged harm was “insufficiently related to the complaint and [did] not deserve the benefits of protective measures that a preliminary injunction afford”); Stewart v. Verano, 2015 WL 1636124, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2015) (“In sum, a federal district court lacks jurisdiction over claims raised in a motion for injunctive relief where those matters are wholly unrelated to the underlying complaint.”). If Wright wishes to pursue claims based on these unrelated matters, he must do so by filing a separate civil action against the appropriate defendants.
Even if Wright's motion hewed more closely to the events in his complaint, he has still failed to satisfy his heavy burden of demonstrating an entitlement to preliminary injunctive relief. As an initial matter, placement in the SHU, standing alone, does not represent cruel and unusual punishment or rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. See, e.g., Milhouse v. Arbasak, 2009 WL 1119488, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2009) (“The Third Circuit has held that a prisoner's placement in administrative detention and an extended stay in a Special Housing Unit do not constitute atypical and significant hardships.”) (citing Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 709 (3d Cir. 1997)). More critically, the harm alleged in Wrights' motion - that a man of his age with high blood pressure might theoretically suffer a stroke when exposed to mental stress - is based on the hypothetical possibility of a “remote future injury,” rather than immediate, substantial harm. Holiday Inns of America, Inc. v. B&B Corp., 409 F.2d 614, 618 (3d Cir. 1969) (a preliminary injunction “may not be used simply to eliminate a possibility of a remote future injury”); Louis v. Bledsoe, 438 Fed.Appx. 129, 130-31 (3d Cir. 2011) (inmate could not satisfy risk of immediate and irreparable injury based on general allegation that he was housed with potentially dangerous inmates). Injunctive relief based on these complaints is unwarranted.
III. Conclusion
For each of the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Wright's request for a temporary restraining order be DENIED.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).