This is true even when desegregation otherwise is still in progress. Wright v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 569 F.2d 1383, 1384 (5th Cir. 1978). The district court found that race was not "a significant factor in the School Board's failure to select Dr. Patterson for the position of Supervisor of English and Social Studies. * * * [S]he was not selected for legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons."
The provision also created preferences, or recall rights, in favor of those teachers and staff members who inevitably would be displaced because of the court order.See Wright v. Houston Independent School District, 569 F.2d 1383 (5th Cir. 1978); Lee v. Chambers County Board of Education, 533 F.2d 132, 135 (5th Cir. 1976); Pickens v. Okolona Municipal Separate School District, 527 F.2d 358, 361 (5th Cir. 1976). This model order is the foundation of so-called " Singleton rights."
See generally Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board, 594 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1979). Pegues having thus failed to discharge his burden of proving the requisite elements of a Singleton violation, Wright v. Houston Independent School District, 569 F.2d 1383 (5th Cir. 1978), his claim was properly denied. In light of this holding, we need not address the propriety of the trial court's treatment of the laches issue.
Lee v. Russell County Board of Education, 563 F.2d 1159, 1161 (5th Cir. 1977). Cognizant of the principle that "rules do not run beyond the reasons which occasion them," Wright v. Houston Independent School District, 569 F.2d 1383, 1384 (5th Cir. 1978), we have repeatedly held that Singleton's reinstatement preference proviso applies only in cases where a school district reduces the total number of faculty or administrative positions in its schools as a result of desegregation. Cousin v. Board of Trustees, 648 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1981) (in order for Singleton's reinstatement preference proviso to apply "there must be a desegregation-related reduction in personnel resulting in a demotion or dismissal"); Wright v. Houston Independent School District, supra ("The law of the question is now clear that it is a desegregation related general reduction in force that triggers Singleton's application."); Barnes v. Jones County School District, 544 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1977) (unless there is an overall reduction in force as a result of desegregation, a dismissed or demoted faculty member cannot claim right to reinstatement under Singleton); Pickens v. Okolona Municipal Separate School District, 527 F.2d 358, 361 (5th Cir. 1976) ("[T]his court did
Law v. Royal Palm Beach Colony, Inc., 578 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1978); Weiszmann v. Dist. Eng'r., 526 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1976); Am. Marine Corp. v. Citizens Cas. Co. v. N.Y., 447 F.2d 1328 (5th Cir. 1971). We have been cited no authority, nor do we know of any, which supports this basis for denying Singleton relief. The district court reasoned that to allow Pegues to enforce the Singleton requirements at this time would be contrary to "the principle that rules do not run beyond the reasons which occasion them," Wright v. Houston Independent School District, 569 F.2d 1383, 1384 (5th Cir. 1978). Singleton entitlements are "aspects of equitable remedies, designed by this court under its general equitable power to fashion relief for constitutional violations (in this case, maintenance of a segregated, dual school system) in accordance with principles of fairness and with a minimum of hardship to persons affected by a large scale, court-ordered social change."
Although we do not rule on this issue, we note that two cases lend support to its contention. See Hander v. San Jacinto Junior College, 5 Cir. 1975, 519 F.2d 273, 277-80; Wright v. Houston Independent School Dist., S.D.Tex., 1975, 393 F. Supp. 1149, 1152-58, vacated and remanded on other grounds, 5 Cir. 1978, 569 F.2d 1383. III
The defendants also point to Judge Rubin's finding in his August 1969 oral opinion that Jones and Marzett were discharged for failure to satisfy teaching requirements and try to fit this case under our recent cases denying relief because the challenged discharges were not "desegregation related." See Wright v. Houston Independent School District, 5 Cir., 1978, 569 F.2d 1383; Ayers v. Western Line Consolidated School District, 5 Cir., 1977, 555 F.2d 1309; Hardy v. Porter, 5 Cir., 1977, 546 F.2d 1165. This argument simply will not wash.
Furthermore, regardless of the unitary nature of the school systems, Singleton is inapplicable to the nonrenewal decisions because the plaintiffs did not show that the teachers' nonrenewals were the result of a desegregation related reduction in the number of teachers. Wright v. Houston Independent School District, 569 F.2d 1383, 1384 (5th Cir. 1978); Barnes v. Jones County School District, 544 F.2d at 806-07. The teachers on whose behalf relief is sought are Mary Goldsby, Georgiana Guthrie, Shirley Davis, Robert Renschler, and Bobbie Starnes.
They can levy and collect taxes, id. § 23.27, and funds disbursed by the state to the districts become the property of the local board of trustees, which holds them in trust for the district; they cannot be taken away by the state. Wright v. Houston Ind. School Dist., 393 F. Supp. 1149, 1155 (S.D.Tex. 1975), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 569 F.2d 1383 (5th Cir. 1978); Love v. City of Dallas, 120 Tex. 351, 40 S.W.2d 20, 26 (1931). Thus in addition to its independent legal powers, the GISD seems likely to have a mind of its own; we think it improbable that its litigation will be controlled by the state authorities to any significant extent.
The requirement of opening remaining positions to competition, however, does not arise when reductions in school personnel are unrelated to desegregation. Lee v. Tuscaloosa County Board of Education, 591 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1979); Wright v. Houston Independent School District, 569 F.2d 1383 (5th Cir. 1978). The merger of Willow Lane and the R E School was not effected to implement the integration of schools, and accordingly the defendant was under no obligation to declare the position of principal vacant and allow competition for that job.