We next address enumerations of error likely to recur on retrial. Crump asserts that allowing testimony of the Crumps' temporary separation was error under Wright v. Dilbeck, 122 Ga. App. 214, 216(2) ( 176 S.E.2d 715) (1970). The trial court granted Crump's motion in limine excluding testimony about the Crumps' temporary separation and Mr. Crump's subsequent remarriage, provided however, that Crump did not open the door to such testimony.
4. The defendant argues that it was error for the trial judge to refuse its requested charge that an ordinarily prudent person must, when his view is obstructed, exercise greater care and prudence when looking for an approaching train. This charge was held to be erroneous in Wright v. Dilbeck, 122 Ga. App. 214, 228 ( 176 S.E.2d 715) as an invasion of the province of the jury. No error was made in properly refusing this charge, the reason being found in Hieber v. Watt, 119 Ga. App. 5 (4), 10 ( 165 S.E.2d 899) which should be compared with Northern Freight Lines, Inc. v. Southern R. Co., 108 Ga. App. 189 (2) ( 132 S.E.2d 541) and Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. Associated Transports, Inc., 94 Ga. App. 563 ( 95 S.E.2d 755).
Id. The Court of Appeals quoted Wright v. Dilbeck, 122 Ga. App. 214(16), 176 S.E.2d 715 (1970), and held that "[a]n act or omission may amount to negligence under the particular facts and circumstances, although there is no statute so declaring." Georgia Kraft, 188 Ga. App. at 624, 373 S.E.2d 774.
Hence, nothing said herein relates to the admissibility of evidence on the issue of liability, to impeach a witness, or as to any other matter. Regarding the admissibility of other transactions and occurrences on the issue of liability, see Wright v. Dilbeck, 122 Ga. App. 214 (4) ( 176 S.E.2d 715) (1970); OCGA § 24-2-2. Our Code, OCGA § 51-12-5, provides: "In a tort action in which there are aggravating circumstances, in either the act or the intention, the jury may give additional damages to deter the wrongdoer from repeating the trespass or as compensation for the wounded feelings of the plaintiff."
However, it is also true that "it is for the jury to apply the unvarying standard of ordinary care to the facts and exigencies of each particular case . . ." Wright v. Dilbeck, 122 Ga. App. 214, 228 ( 176 S.E.2d 715) (1970), quoting Davies v. West Lumber Co., 32 Ga. App. 460 (1) ( 123 S.E. 757). The jury in this case was properly charged on Code § 3-807 with the exception of that part of the charge which authorized the jury to judge the plaintiffs' conduct using a standard other than that of a reasonably prudent person.
We have affirmed a trial court's refusal to allow evidence that a decedent had filed for divorce against the plaintiff, "as this evidence could in no way reduce the measure of damages, nor the damages recoverable, as the husband and child are entitled under the statute to recover the full value of the life of the deceased wife and mother; nor was this evidence admissible to disprove" her companionship, love, and affection for her family. Wright v. Dilbeck, 122 Ga. App. 214, 216(2) ( 176 S.E.2d 715) (1970); see also Cornelius v. Macon-Bibb County Hosp. Auth., 243 Ga. App. 480, 486 (3) ( 533 S.E.2d 420) (2000) (while evidence of three-month separation admissible to rebut opening statement that decedent and husband "had been together since 1963," evidence of reason for separation inadmissible). We also reversed a defense verdict in a wrongful death case because of the admission of irrelevant evidence of a relative's crime, holding that, [w]hile the range of proof in determining the full value of a deceased's life is broad, we find no reasonable basis for holding that a decedent's father's and brother's criminal records are relevant to any aspect of such a valuation.
Any delayed activation failure causes the warning system to act similarly; therefore, there existed sufficient similarity for such evidence to be probative. See Cochran v. Lowe's Home Center, Inc., 226 Ga. App. 417, 418-419 (1) ( 487 S.E.2d 50) (1997); Wright v. Dilbeck, 122 Ga. App. 214, 217 (4) ( 176 S.E.2d 715) (1970); see also Skil Corp. v. Lugsdin, 168 Ga. App. 754, 756 (1) ( 309 S.E.2d 921) (1983). See Ga. Cotton Oil Co. v. Jackson, 112 Ga. 620 (4) ( 37 S.E. 873) (1901).
It is within the trial court's sound discretion to determine whether the prior similar occurrences or tire failures are sufficiently substantially similar to allow the admission of such evidence; this means a continuum of admissible, substantially similar occurrences, where at one extreme the occurrences were the same and at the other extreme the occurrences were barely sufficient to be substantially similar for admission so as not to be an abuse of discretion. Skil Corp. v. Lugsdin, supra at 756; Carlton Co. v. Poss, supra at 155; Wright v. Dilbeck, 122 Ga. App. 214, 216-217 (4) ( 176 S.E.2d 715) (1970). 3. Mrs. Crosby contends that the trial court erred in excluding Cooper Tire's admissions of the relationship between tire failure and loss of vehicle control and the danger of tire vibration.
See CSX Transp. v. Trism Specialized Carriers, 9 F. Supp.2d 1374 (1998) (holding that the GCPT supercedes a common-law cause of action for the failure to install adequate warning devices and signals at a grade crossing). We expressly overrule Southern R. Co. v. Ga. Kraft Co., supra, which did not consider the effect of the GCPT and which relied upon Wright v. Dilbeck, 122 Ga. App. 214(16) ( 176 S.E.2d 715) (1970), a case decided prior to the enactment of the GCPT. Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Markert, supra, cited by the dissent, relied upon Southern R. Co. v. Ga. Kraft Co. However, Central of Ga. R. Co. is distinguishable from the present case as it addressed a grade crossing on a private road, a situation outside the scope of the GCPT.
The objection made in the brief was not the objection made at trial; failure to make the specific objection at trial acted as a waiver of such grounds for appellate review. Henderson v. Glen Oak, Inc., 179 Ga. App. 380 ( 346 S.E.2d 842) (1986), aff'd, 256 Ga. 619 ( 351 S.E.2d 640) (1987); see also Pierce v. Pierce, 241 Ga. 96 ( 243 S.E.2d 46) (1978); Jackson v. Meadows, 157 Ga. App. 569 ( 278 S.E.2d 8) (1981); Wright v. Dilbeck, 122 Ga. App. 214 ( 176 S.E.2d 715) (1970). Further, the appellate decisions relied upon gave only directory instructions to the trial court that, if the remedial measure is admitted, then proper limiting instructions should also be given when the evidence is admitted; the appellate decisions did not hold that failure of the trial court to so instruct the jury was reversible error.