Opinion
Civil Action No. 19-572
03-04-2020
LINDSEY R. WRIGHT, Plaintiff, v. L. ANTHONY BOMPIANI and RAYMOND DUPILKA, Defendants.
District Judge Arthur J. Schwab
Re: ECF No. 26 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. RECOMMENDATION
Presently before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint filed by Defendant Raymond Dupilka ("Detective Dupilka"). ECF No. 26. For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss be granted in part, and that Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief be dismissed. It is further recommended that the Court enter an order staying this action until Plaintiff's pending criminal proceedings arising out of Detective Dupilka's alleged misconduct are concluded.
II. REPORT
A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Lindsey R. Wright ("Plaintiff") is a pretrial detainee currently incarcerated at the Westmoreland County Prison. Plaintiff has filed a pro se Amended Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ECF No. 9. Plaintiff alleges that he was falsely arrested by Defendant Detective Dupilka, whom Plaintiff claims knowingly made false statements and omissions in sworn affidavits when applying for a warrant for his arrest. ECF No. 9 ¶¶ 33-35.
Plaintiff claims that Detective Dupilka violated his Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments rights by knowingly and deliberately making false statements and omissions in applying for the arrest warrant. In addition to seeking compensatory damages of $730,000, Plaintiff requests a declaration that the acts and omissions identified in his Amended Complaint violated the Constitution and laws of the United States, and a preliminary and permanent injunction relieving Detective Dupilka of his duties. Id. ¶¶ 39-41.
Detective Dupilka has filed a Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support. ECF Nos. 26 and 27. In his Motion to Dismiss, he relies on three arguments. First, Detective Dupilka argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims because Plaintiff is awaiting trial on the criminal charges at issue. Thus, Plaintiff does not present a ripe controversy. ECF No. 27 at 3-4. Second, Detective Dupilka argues that Plaintiff's specific requests for declaratory and injunctive relief are improper. Id. at 4. Third, he argues that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because Defendant Dupilka is afforded qualified immunity as to all claims asserted against him. Id. at 5.
Plaintiff filed a Response in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, as well as exhibits supporting his claims. ECF Nos. 32 and 33. In his Response, Plaintiff argues that his claims for false arrest and false imprisonment accrued on the date of his arrest and, as such, are ripe. ECF No. 32 at 2. Plaintiff further contends that his allegations are sufficient to establish that Detective Dupilka acted with reckless disregard for the truth in the warrant application and, therefore, state a claim for false arrest. Id. at 3. Finally, Plaintiff argues that Detective Dupilka is not entitled to qualified immunity because he intentionally falsified documents to obtain an arrest warrant. Id.
The Motion to Dismiss is now ripe for consideration.
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In assessing the sufficiency of a complaint pursuant to a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint and all reasonable factual inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). The Court, however, need not accept bald assertions or inferences drawn by the plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts set forth in the complaint. See Cal. Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that a complaint is properly dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) where it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," id. at 570, or where the factual content does not allow the court "to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding that, under Twombly, "labels, conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" do not suffice but, rather, the complaint "must allege facts suggestive of [the proscribed] conduct" and that are sufficient "to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s] of his claim").
Pro se pleadings and filings, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). If the court can reasonably read pleadings to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax, and sentence construction, or the litigant's unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); U.S. ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (A "petition prepared by a prisoner . . . may be inartfully drawn and should . . . be read 'with a measure of tolerance'"); Freeman v. Dept. of Corrections, 949 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1991). Under our liberal pleading rules, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1997) (overruled on other grounds); see also Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (discussing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standard); Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990) (same).
Even so, there are limits to the court's procedural flexibility: "pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim . . . they cannot flout procedural rules — they must abide by the same rales that apply to all other litigants." Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). As a result, because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, this Court will consider the facts and make inferences where it is appropriate.
C. DISCUSSION
1. Accrual of Plaintiff's Claims and Necessity of Stay
Detective Dupilka argues that Plaintiff's claims for false arrest and false imprisonment, whether arising under the Fourth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, are not yet ripe because Plaintiff's criminal charges arising out of any alleged misconduct are pending and await trial. ECF No. 26-1; ECF No. 27.
See Commonwealth v. Wright, No. CP-65-CR-0002747-2017 (CCP Westmoreland Cty. 2017).
Generally, in resolving a motion to dismiss, courts may consider only the allegations set forth in the complaint, any exhibits submitted with the complaint and matters of public record. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. White Consolidated Industries, Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1042 (1994). In reviewing Plaintiff's Complaint to determine whether he has stated a claim for relief, the Court has examined the state court docket related to Plaintiff's underlying criminal charges. "[J]udicial opinions and docket sheets are public records, of which this court may take judicial notice in deciding a motion to dismiss. See Zedonis v. Lynch, 233 F. Supp. 3d 417, 422 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 998 F.2d at 1197 (defining public record to include, inter alia, criminal case dispositions, such as convictions or mistrials); Dean v. Copozza, No. CIV.A. 13-41, 2013 WL 1787804, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 10, 2013) ("Pennsylvania's Unified Judicial System provides online access to the docket sheets for criminal cases, and this Court may take judicial notice of those public dockets.")). In this case, the state court docket is relied on to establish the procedural history of Plaintiff's charges giving rise to his claims for false arrest and false imprisonment. Such review makes clear that Plaintiff has not yet been tried on the charges at issue in his Amended Complaint.
Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims require him to show that the criminal proceedings against him and consequent deprivation of liberty were caused by Defendant Dupilka's malfeasance in fabricating or falsifying evidence. Thus, Plaintiff is challenging the factual basis of his pending criminal charges through this civil proceeding. Such an attack runs afoul of "the pragmatic concerns with avoiding parallel criminal and civil litigation over the same subject matter and the related possibility of conflicting civil and criminal judgments." McDonough v. Smith, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2149, 2156 (2019). These concerns arise out of the "'strong policy requiring exhaustion of state remedies' in order 'to avoid the unnecessary friction between the federal and state court systems.'" Id. (quoting Presier v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490 (1973)).
Thus, while Plaintiff's claims arising out of his arrest and pretrial detention have accrued, Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393-94 (2007), the Court should stay this federal action until Plaintiff's state court proceedings result in either dismissal, acquittal, or the reversal of any eventual conviction.
If a plaintiff files a false-arrest claim before he has been convicted (or files any other claim related to rulings that will likely be made in a pending or anticipated criminal trial), it is within the power of the district court, and in accord with common practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended. [] If the plaintiff is ultimately convicted, and if the stayed civil suit would impugn that conviction, Heck[ v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)] will require dismissal; otherwise, the civil action will proceed, absent some other bar to suit.Id. (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, to avoid a parallel challenge to Plaintiff's state criminal proceedings, it is recommended that the Court stay Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against Detective Dupilka until the state criminal charges against Plaintiff are dismissed or he is acquitted, or any resulting conviction is reversed.
The recommendation to stay this action results in the denial without prejudice of Detective Dupilka's motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity, which would otherwise require adjudication of the propriety of his conduct. --------
2. Claims for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief in the form of a declaration that Detective Dupilka's acts and omissions violated the Constitution and laws of the United States. ECF No. 9 at 4. Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief in the form of an order relieving Detective Dupilka of his duties. Id. Detective Dupilka moves to dismiss Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief as failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. ECF No. 27 at 4. As this Court has determined, Plaintiff's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are improper because "[d]eclaratory judgment is inappropriate solely to adjudicate past conduct" and it is not "meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another." ECF No. 43, quoting Corliss v. O'Brien, 200 F. App'x 80, 84 (3d Cir. 2006).
Moreover, in order to obtain injunctive or declaratory relief, Plaintiff must assert "facts from which it appear[s] substantially likely he would suffer future injury" and "injunctive relief anticipates future conduct among the named parties." Id. (quoting O'Callaghan v. Hon. X., 661 F. App'x 179, 182 (3d Cir. 2016)). In this case, Plaintiff fails to allege facts establishing that he is likely to personally suffer injury related to Detective Dupilka's future investigation of criminal activity. Moreover, any testimony that Detective Dupilka may provide in the state criminal case that results in Plaintiff's conviction does not hinge on his future employment status, as he may testify to past events in any event. Thus, Plaintiff's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
D. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss of Defendant Detective Dupilka, ECF No. 26, be granted in part and that Plaintiff's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief be dismissed with prejudice. It is further recommended that the instant federal action be stayed until Plaintiff is acquitted of the underlying criminal charges or any resulting conviction is reversed. Finally, it is recommended that the Motion to Dismiss based on qualified immunity be denied without prejudice to raise if this case is reopened.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties are permitted to file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may file their response to the objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/_________
MAUREEN P. KELLY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Dated: March 4, 2020 cc: The Honorable Arthur J. Schwab
United States District Judge
Lindsey R. Wright
Westmoreland County Prison
3000 South Grande Blvd.
Greensburg, PA 15601
All counsel of record by Notice of Electronic Filing