Summary
applying similar test under Connecticut law, person arriving early to decorate banquet hall for party invitee, not licensee
Summary of this case from Disanto v. Genova Prods. Inc.Opinion
No. CV 02-0282780S
July 30, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (#119)
The defendant Fantasia Corporation has moved for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claims for damages for injuries that plaintiff Carolyn Wright received after falling at a banquet facility operated by this defendant. A member of a local political organization, plaintiff arrived at the facility with others to decorate the banquet hall dining room approximately 2 1/2 hours before a cocktail party held by the political organization. While placing flowers on tables, she tripped on a raised platform, fell to the ground and suffered various injuries. The defendant claims that, under the facts of this case, the only duty it owed the plaintiff was that due a licensee to warn her of dangerous conditions that a reasonable person could not observe. The plaintiff responds that she was instead a business invitee and that significant material factual issues are in dispute. For the following reasons, the motion is denied.
Although this plaintiff's spouse has also sued for loss of consortium, his action is entirely derivative of hers and hence for purposes of the pending motion all references to the plaintiff mean Ms. Wright, not her husband
A court will grant summary judgment if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party; Elliot v. Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 391, 715 A.2d 27 (1998); there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party would be entitled to a directed verdict on those facts. Batick v. Seymour, 186 Conn. 632, 647, 443 A.2d 471 (1982). A material fact is one that will make a difference in the result of the case. Hammer v. Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co., 214 Conn. 573, 578, 573 A.2d 699 (1990). The moving party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Gupta v. New Britain CT Page 9515-dl General Hospital, 239 Conn. 574, 582, 687 A.2d 111 (1996). Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Practice Book § 17-49.
The law has long recognized that a property owner owes different duties to people coming on the land depending on the circumstances under which they entered the land The terms traditionally used to describe the different statuses are "invitee," "licensee," and "trespasser," each owed a different degree of duty and care by the property owner. "Ordinarily, the status of one who sustains injury while upon the property of another is a question of fact . . . Where, however, the facts essential to the determination of the plaintiff's status are not in dispute, a legal question is presented." Kolaniak v. Board of Education, 28 Conn.App. 277, 282, 610 A.2d 193 (1992).
There is no dispute here that the plaintiff was on the property with the defendant's permission. Although the cocktail party was not scheduled to begin until 5:30 p.m., the defendant gave permission on this occasion, as it had on several earlier occasions, for people connected with the political party to come early and decorate the facility. It is undisputed that defendant was setting up the dining hall for the reception when plaintiff arrived and while she decorated the tables. Defendant's motion for summary judgment argues that defendant neither asked plaintiff to arrive early or to decorate. Depositions submitted by defendant suggest that defendant agreed to allow the early arrival for decorating as a convenience or "favor" to the political organization. Defendant argues that these facts show no formal invitation on its part for plaintiff to arrive early and require a finding that plaintiff was a licensee, who, it asserts under Connecticut law "takes the premises as she finds them."
Plaintiff does not dispute those facts, but does suggest one other to be taken into consideration that does not appear to be in dispute: that usually plaintiff and others would arrive during the noon hour to decorate CT Page 9515-dm the banquet hall, but on the day in question
Somebody called us from Fantasia . . . and said that we couldn't arrive until later because he had booked half of the room for a funeral that day. So we weren't allowed to get there until after three o'clock.
Dep. of pl., 8/11/03 at 73-74.
The distinction between someone on land as an invitee or as a trespasser "turns largely on whether the visitor has received an invitation, as opposed to permission, from the possessor of land, to enter the land or remain on the land" Kurti v. Becker, 54 Conn.App. 335, 338, 733 A.2d 916, cert. denied, 251 Conn. 909, 739 A.2d 1248 (1999).
Although invitation does not in itself establish the status of an invitee, it is essential to it. An invitation differs from mere permission in this: an invitation is conduct which justifies others in believing that the possessor desires them to enter the land; permission is conduct justifying others in believing that the possessor is willing that they shall enter if they desire to do so.
Restatement (Second) Torts § 532, comment (b). Yet an invitation need not be express or formal and may be inferred from the circumstances. Connecticut law has long recognized that "[a]n invitation is implied where one person goes upon the land of another for their mutual benefit." Guilford v. Yale University, 128 Conn. 449, 452, 23 A.2d 917 (1942); Reardon v. Shimelman, 102 Conn. 383, 386, 128 A. 705. (1925); Pomponio v. New York, N.H H.R. Co., 66 Conn. 528, 537, 34 A. 491 (1895) ("[W]here the privilege of user exists for the common interest or mutual advantage of both parties, it will be held to be a case of invitation; but, if it exists for the mere pleasure and benefit of the party exercising the privilege, it will be held to be a case of license").
The defendant's argument that it permitted plaintiff on the property as a mere favor or courtesy appears to claim that she was there early only for the benefit of the political party, and not for the mutual benefit of the party and defendant. But that position ignores the fact that defendant was a commercial enterprise that had contracted with the political party to provide the banquet facility and catering. By 5:30, when the cocktail reception was scheduled to begin, the presence of party-goers was obviously to the mutual benefit of both the political CT Page 9515-dn party, which had a site to hold its function, and the defendant which was being paid for use of the facility and its services. Can it be conclusively said, for purposes of summary judgment, that the early arrival of plaintiff and other political functionaries to decorate the banquet hall was not also to defendant's benefit? Would the political party have selected this facility, for example, if party members had not been allowed to arrive early to decorate it in the festive manner they intended? A "person who is invited to enter or remain on land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor of the land" is accorded invitee status. Restatement (Second) Torts, § 332(1). There can be no doubt here that plaintiff's early arrival to set up the banquet hall for the cocktail party was, at minimum, "indirectly connected" with defendant's business use of the property. As an invitee, she would be owed the duty by defendant for it to inspect the premises and erect safeguards, if necessary, to render the premises reasonably safe and to warn or guard her from being injured by reason of any defects that she could not reasonably be expected to discover.
Plaintiff tripped and fell on an elevated riser located on the floor where she was decorating tables. Undisputed evidence she submitted on summary judgment shows that the riser was not there when plaintiff arrived, and that neither plaintiff nor her associates placed it where it tripped her. The logical inference is that defendants' employees positioned it there after plaintiff arrived. Under either the licensee or invitee tests, under the facts of this case, defendant owed plaintiff a duty to notify her of dangers of which defendant was aware and which she could not have been expected to notice. Morin v. Bell Court Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 223 Conn. 323, 327, 612 A.2d 1197 (1992) ("[T]he possessor of land must warn an invitee of dangers that the invitee could not reasonably be expected to discover"); Id., 329 ("If the licensor actually or constructively knows of the licensee's presence on the premises, however, the licensor must use reasonable care both to refrain from actively subjecting him [or her] to danger and to warn him [or her] of dangerous conditions which the possessor knows of but which he [or she] cannot reasonably assume that the licensee knows of or by reasonable use of his [or her] faculties would observe"). Deposition transcripts of defendant's owners state that they ordinarily placed lights and trees near the riser for safety purposes to make it more noticeable, but had not yet done so on the day in question. These facts raise standard questions of whether plaintiff and defendants exercised reasonable care under the circumstances, matters more properly decided by the trier of fact rather than on summary judgment.
The motion for summary judgment is therefore DENIED. CT Page 9515-do
BY THE COURT
STEPHEN F. FRAZZINI, JUDGE.