W.R. Grace & Co. v. CSR Ltd.

7 Citing cases

  1. Cassiar Mining Corp. v. Superior Court

    66 Cal.App.4th 550 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 6 times
    In Cassiar Mining Corp. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 550, the defendant was incorporated in Canada, mined and milled raw asbestos in British Columbia, and sold raw asbestos fibers to manufacturers, including several different companies with California plants.

    As discussed above, the record shows Cassiar purposely directed its activities and products toward California by selling raw asbestos to "discrete locations" within the state. Direct sales of raw asbestos to the forum satisfies specific jurisdiction even under the "stream of commerce plus" view adopted by a plurality of the United States Supreme Court in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court (1987) 480 U.S. 102, 112 [107 S.Ct. 1026, 1032, 94 L.Ed.2d 92] (plur. opn. by O'Connor, J.); see Felix v. Bomoro Kommanditgesellschaft (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 106, 117 [ 241 Cal.Rptr. 670, 69 A.L.R.4th 1]; As You Sow v. Crawford Laboratories, Inc., supra, 50 Cal.App.4th 1859; and W.R. Grace Co. v. CSR Ltd. (1996) 279 Ill. App.3d 1043, 1048-1049 [216 Ill.Dec 840, 666 N.E.2d 8, 11] ["Manville had a factory in Waukegan, Illinois. . . . [W]e find ample evidence of `additional conduct' by CSR in reaching out to Illinois and promoting the sale and use of its product here"].)

  2. Bell v. Don Prudhomme Racing, Inc.

    405 Ill. App. 3d 223 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010)   Cited 15 times
    Finding that the location of the injury for purposes of retaliatory discharge action is where the plaintiff was located at the time of termination and not where the defendant made the decision to terminate the plaintiff

    "Thus, our analysis must focus on two factors: (1) the defendant's contacts with Illinois and (2) the fairness or reasonableness of exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant." W.R. Grace Co. v. CSR Ltd., 279 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 1047, 666 N.E.2d 8, 10 (1996). 1. Minimum Contacts

  3. CSR, Ltd. v. Taylor

    411 Md. 457 (Md. 2009)   Cited 64 times
    Holding that shipping asbestos through the Port of Baltimore was not purposeful availment because defendant did not engage in significant activities in Maryland or create continuing obligations with Maryland residents

    What is of consequence, however, is that Petitioner would certainly have expected to be haled into a Maryland court by a dissatisfied buyer who rejected the goods delivered to the Port of Baltimore and sued Petitioner for breach of contract. The holding of the Court of Special Appeals is actually more limited than the holdings in State ex rel. CSR Ltd. v. MacQueen, et al., 190 W.Va. 695, 441 S.E.2d 658 (1994) and W.R. Grace Co. v. Ensey, 279 Ill.App.3d 1043, 216 Ill.Dec. 840, 666 N.E.2d 8 (1996), in which the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia and the Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District, affirmed trial court rulings requiring CSR to defend lawsuits filed against it in those states. In each of those cases, (1) the lawsuits at issue sought to hold CSR liable for injuries resulting from "job site" exposure to building materials manufactured by Johns-Manville that contained asbestos purchased by Johns-Manville from CSR, (2) CSR moved to dismiss the lawsuits on the ground that it had no control over the distribution of products that Johns-Manville manufactured and thereafter shipped into the forum state, and (3) the trial court denied CSR's motion.

  4. Kostal v. Pinkus Dermatopathology Lab

    357 Ill. App. 3d 381 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005)   Cited 88 times
    Noting that the court had not located any post-Rollins cases finding that federal due process requirements had been met where Illinois due process requirements were not

    Thus, if the contacts between a defendant and Illinois are sufficient to satisfy both federal and state due process concerns, the requirements of Illinois' long-arm statute have been met, and no other inquiry is necessary. Zazove v. Pelikan, Inc., 326 Ill. App. 3d 798, 803, 761 N.E.2d 256, 260 (2001); W.R. Grace Co. v. CSR Ltd., 279 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 1047, 666 N.E.2d 8, 10 (1996). In other words, the first step, which involves a determination of whether a defendant did any of the acts enumerated in the statute, is "wholly unnecessary."

  5. Bombliss v. Cornelsen

    355 Ill. App. 3d 1107 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005)   Cited 26 times
    In Bombliss, the plaintiffs had established minimum contacts emerging from a transaction with the defendants out of which the alleged tortious acts arose.

    Subsection (c) has been interpreted to mean that, if contacts between the defendant and Illinois are sufficient to satisfy due process under the state and federal constitutions, no further inquiry is necessary to satisfy the statute. Zazove v. Pelikan, Inc., 326 Ill. App. 3d 798, 803, 761 N.E.2d 256, 260 (2001), citing W.R. Grace Co. v. CSR Ltd., 279 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 666 N.E.2d 8 (1996). Accordingly, if the constitutional guarantees of due process are satisfied in this case, we need not determine whether plaintiffs have established jurisdiction under the alternative "tortious act" provision.

  6. Zazove v. Pelikan, Inc.

    326 Ill. App. 3d 798 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001)   Cited 19 times
    Following the enactment of subsection (c), no other jurisdictional inquiry necessary as long as the contacts between the defendant and Illinois are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process

    However, following the enactment of subsection (c), which became effective in 1989, if the contacts between the defendant and Illinois are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process, then the requirements of the Illinois long-arm statute also have been met, and no other inquiry is necessary. See W.R. Grace Co. v. CSR Ltd., 279 Ill. App.3d 1043, 1047, 666 N.E.2d 8, 10 (1996). Personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant may only be exercised if the defendant has certain "minimum contacts" with the forum state so that requiring the defendant to defend in the forum does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."

  7. Gaidar v. Tippecanoe Distribution Service, Inc.

    299 Ill. App. 3d 1034 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)   Cited 39 times
    Finding that an Indiana trucking corporation was doing business in Illinois even though it did not maintain offices or directly advertise Illinois, reasoning: "[Defendant's] contacts with Illinois may not have been numerous, but its contacts were not random, fortuitous, or attenuated. The relatively small percentage of trips made to Illinois is not determinative; it is whether the business in Illinois was fairly regular. [Defendant's] business in Illinois was sufficiently regular to satisfy section 2-209(b)"

    Some cases state that the standard of review is whether the findings of the court were against the manifest weight of the evidence. E.g., W.R. Grace Co. v. CSR Ltd., 279 Ill. App.3d 1043, 1046, 666 N.E.2d 8 (1996); Dilling v. Sergio, 263 Ill. App.3d 191, 195, 635 N.E.2d 590 (1994); Pilipauskas v. Yakel, 258 Ill. App.3d 47, 54, 629 N.E.2d 733 (1994); Rokeby-Johnson v. Derek Bryant Insurance Brokers, Ltd., 230 Ill. App.3d 308, 318, 594 N.E.2d 1190 (1992); Finnegan v. Les Pourvoiries Fortier, Inc., 205 Ill. App.3d 17, 25, 562 N.E.2d 989 (1990). Other cases state that the standard of review is de novo where no evidentiary hearing was held.