As discussed above, the record shows Cassiar purposely directed its activities and products toward California by selling raw asbestos to "discrete locations" within the state. Direct sales of raw asbestos to the forum satisfies specific jurisdiction even under the "stream of commerce plus" view adopted by a plurality of the United States Supreme Court in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court (1987) 480 U.S. 102, 112 [107 S.Ct. 1026, 1032, 94 L.Ed.2d 92] (plur. opn. by O'Connor, J.); see Felix v. Bomoro Kommanditgesellschaft (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 106, 117 [ 241 Cal.Rptr. 670, 69 A.L.R.4th 1]; As You Sow v. Crawford Laboratories, Inc., supra, 50 Cal.App.4th 1859; and W.R. Grace Co. v. CSR Ltd. (1996) 279 Ill. App.3d 1043, 1048-1049 [216 Ill.Dec 840, 666 N.E.2d 8, 11] ["Manville had a factory in Waukegan, Illinois. . . . [W]e find ample evidence of `additional conduct' by CSR in reaching out to Illinois and promoting the sale and use of its product here"].)
"Thus, our analysis must focus on two factors: (1) the defendant's contacts with Illinois and (2) the fairness or reasonableness of exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant." W.R. Grace Co. v. CSR Ltd., 279 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 1047, 666 N.E.2d 8, 10 (1996). 1. Minimum Contacts
What is of consequence, however, is that Petitioner would certainly have expected to be haled into a Maryland court by a dissatisfied buyer who rejected the goods delivered to the Port of Baltimore and sued Petitioner for breach of contract. The holding of the Court of Special Appeals is actually more limited than the holdings in State ex rel. CSR Ltd. v. MacQueen, et al., 190 W.Va. 695, 441 S.E.2d 658 (1994) and W.R. Grace Co. v. Ensey, 279 Ill.App.3d 1043, 216 Ill.Dec. 840, 666 N.E.2d 8 (1996), in which the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia and the Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District, affirmed trial court rulings requiring CSR to defend lawsuits filed against it in those states. In each of those cases, (1) the lawsuits at issue sought to hold CSR liable for injuries resulting from "job site" exposure to building materials manufactured by Johns-Manville that contained asbestos purchased by Johns-Manville from CSR, (2) CSR moved to dismiss the lawsuits on the ground that it had no control over the distribution of products that Johns-Manville manufactured and thereafter shipped into the forum state, and (3) the trial court denied CSR's motion.
Thus, if the contacts between a defendant and Illinois are sufficient to satisfy both federal and state due process concerns, the requirements of Illinois' long-arm statute have been met, and no other inquiry is necessary. Zazove v. Pelikan, Inc., 326 Ill. App. 3d 798, 803, 761 N.E.2d 256, 260 (2001); W.R. Grace Co. v. CSR Ltd., 279 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 1047, 666 N.E.2d 8, 10 (1996). In other words, the first step, which involves a determination of whether a defendant did any of the acts enumerated in the statute, is "wholly unnecessary."
Subsection (c) has been interpreted to mean that, if contacts between the defendant and Illinois are sufficient to satisfy due process under the state and federal constitutions, no further inquiry is necessary to satisfy the statute. Zazove v. Pelikan, Inc., 326 Ill. App. 3d 798, 803, 761 N.E.2d 256, 260 (2001), citing W.R. Grace Co. v. CSR Ltd., 279 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 666 N.E.2d 8 (1996). Accordingly, if the constitutional guarantees of due process are satisfied in this case, we need not determine whether plaintiffs have established jurisdiction under the alternative "tortious act" provision.
However, following the enactment of subsection (c), which became effective in 1989, if the contacts between the defendant and Illinois are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process, then the requirements of the Illinois long-arm statute also have been met, and no other inquiry is necessary. See W.R. Grace Co. v. CSR Ltd., 279 Ill. App.3d 1043, 1047, 666 N.E.2d 8, 10 (1996). Personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant may only be exercised if the defendant has certain "minimum contacts" with the forum state so that requiring the defendant to defend in the forum does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
Some cases state that the standard of review is whether the findings of the court were against the manifest weight of the evidence. E.g., W.R. Grace Co. v. CSR Ltd., 279 Ill. App.3d 1043, 1046, 666 N.E.2d 8 (1996); Dilling v. Sergio, 263 Ill. App.3d 191, 195, 635 N.E.2d 590 (1994); Pilipauskas v. Yakel, 258 Ill. App.3d 47, 54, 629 N.E.2d 733 (1994); Rokeby-Johnson v. Derek Bryant Insurance Brokers, Ltd., 230 Ill. App.3d 308, 318, 594 N.E.2d 1190 (1992); Finnegan v. Les Pourvoiries Fortier, Inc., 205 Ill. App.3d 17, 25, 562 N.E.2d 989 (1990). Other cases state that the standard of review is de novo where no evidentiary hearing was held.