WPC Enterprises, Inc. v. United States

103 Citing cases

  1. J. W. Bateson Company v. United States

    450 F.2d 896 (Fed. Cir. 1971)   Cited 9 times

    The rule of contra preferentum. United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 216, 90 S.Ct. 880, 25 L.Ed.2d 224 (1970); Gorn Corp. v. United States, 191 Ct.Cl. 560, 567, 424 F.2d 588, 592 (1970); Tecon Corp. v. United States, 188 Ct.Cl. 15, 411 F.2d 1262 (1969); D L Constr. Co. v. United States, 185 Ct.Cl. 736, 402 F.2d 990 (1968); Sundstrand Turbo v. United States, 182 Ct.Cl. 31, 389 F.2d 406 (1968); Southern Constr. Co. v. United States, 176 Ct.Cl. 1339, 1362, 364 F.2d 439, 453 (1966); WPC Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 163 Ct.Cl. 1, 6, 323 F.2d 874, 876-877 (1963); and Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. United States, 109 Ct.Cl. 390 (1947). Note 15 supra at 3, 5-6, 323 F.2d at 875-877.

  2. Fruin-Colnon Corp. v. U.S.

    912 F.2d 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 27 times

    Fruin contends that two earlier Court of Claims cases, which are binding precedents of this court, support its position that mere reliance during performance is sufficient to prove entitlement. These cases are Astro-Space Laboratories, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 1003, 200 Ct.Cl. 282 (1972), and WPC Enters., Inc. v. United States, 323 F.2d 874, 163 Ct.Cl. 1 (1963). In WPC, the contractor and the Government disputed whether, under a contract for the manufacture of generators, certain components of the generators had to be manufactured by specific named companies.

  3. National By-Products, Inc. v. United States

    186 Ct. Cl. 546 (Fed. Cir. 1969)   Cited 38 times
    Finding that plaintiff did not prove a taking because it “failed to establish that the floodings ... will inevitably recur”

    II. In plaintiff's contract claim we have, as we shall see, the very model of one of the most ancient forms of consensual dispute — two parties sign the same papers or discuss the same subject, the one thinking he is consenting to a clear set of obligations, the other perceiving a different agreement, each having reasonable support for his own view, and neither realizing the other's contrary position. Cf. WPC Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 323 F.2d 874, 163 Ct.Cl. 1 (1963). For the unfortunate transactions in this mold, the law has developed general solutions which conform to our current sense of justice.

  4. W.G. Cornell Co. of Wash., D.C., Inc. v. U.S.

    376 F.2d 299 (Fed. Cir. 1967)   Cited 13 times

    This is the situation here. See Stein Bros. Mfg. Co. v. United States, 337 F.2d 861, 869, 162 Ct.Cl. 802, 817-818 (1963); WPC Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 323 F.2d 874, 878, 163 Ct.Cl. 1, 8 (1963); C.J. Langenfelder Son, Inc. v. United States, supra, 341 F.2d 600, 169 Ct.Cl. at 479-480; Associated Traders, Inc. v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 502, 506, 144 Ct.Cl. 744, 750-751 (1959); Wingate Construction Co. v. United States, 164 Ct.Cl. 131, 138 (1964). It is pertinent to note that the Engineers Board's decision was almost wholly concerned with an analysis of Federal Specification HH-I-562, supra, to ascertain whether it permitted installation of blanket insulation material over the non-exposed ducts.

  5. States Roofing v. Winter

    587 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009)   Cited 14 times
    Adopting a contractor's interpretation of a disputed contract provision where the contracting agency " ‘inadvertently’ omitted a [provision] that could have avoided misunderstanding"

    States Roofing argues that its interpretation of the contract as permitting use of waterproofing paint on the parapet walls of all roof cells was reasonable in light of the contract documents and the circumstances surrounding its bid. States Roofing states that when a contractor relies in its bid on a reasonable interpretation of the contract documents and specifications, any change based on a different interpretation by the government is not chargeable to the contractor, as explained in WPC Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 163 Ct.Cl. 1, 323 F.2d 874, 877-78 (1963) (citations omitted): [I]f some substantive provision of a government-drawn contract is fairly susceptible of a certain construction and the contractor actually and reasonably so construes it, in the course of bidding or performance, that is the interpretation which will be adopted, unless the parties' intention is otherwise affirmatively revealed.

  6. Consumers Ice Company v. United States

    475 F.2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1973)   Cited 22 times
    Describing “a judicial reluctance to lock parties into a given set of rights and obligations for long or indefinite periods without some clear indication that this was actually intended by the parties”

    The duty described in Blount Bros. Constr. Co. v. United States, 346 F.2d 962, 171 Ct.Cl. 478 (1965), and Beacon Constr. Co. v. United States, 314 F.2d 501, 161 Ct.Cl. 1 (1963), to seek clarification of obviously ambiguous contract language is nothing more than the other side of the coin from the contra proferentem rule. See Chris Berg, Inc. v. United States, 197 Ct.Cl. 503, 455 F.2d 1037 (1972); Mountain Home Contractors v. United States, 425 F.2d 1260, 192 Ct.Cl. 16 (1970); WPC Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 323 F.2d 874, 163 Ct.Cl. 1 (1963); Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. United States, 109 Ct.Cl. 390 (1947). The court then is left with the alternative possibilities of either enforcing the contract between the parties by finding, if possible, a reasonable means of assigning a definite interpretation to the language in clause No. 3 without undertaking to write provisions into the contracts when the record fails to show what the parties actually intended, 3 Corbin, Contracts § 541 (1960), or finding that the ambiguity went to the heart of the contract while both parties held reasonable, but different views of what the contract meant, so that it can be said that no contract existed at all because there was no "meeting of minds."

  7. John McShain, Inc. v. United States

    462 F.2d 489 (Fed. Cir. 1972)   Cited 4 times

    __ 80+20 PSF (b) Corridors ___________________________ 100 PSF (c) File storage area ___________________ 110 PSF 4" lightweight fill _______________________ @ 9 PSF/inch thickness Ceiling ___________________________________ 4 PSF Slab system _______________________________ Actual weight [45] Intrinsically involved in the determination of the meaning to be given to the pertinent specifications and drawings are the facts that no express language negated the inclusion of the fill strength in calculating the specified strength of the precast, prestressed tee members, that trade practice supported plaintiff's interpretation that the fill strength was to be included, and that plaintiff submitted its contract did on that basis. In view of the complexity of the specifications, these facts in my opinion reasonably require the conclusion that plaintiff's interpretation falls within the zone of reasonableness, WPC Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 323 F.2d 874, 876, 163 Ct.Cl. 1, 6 (1963) as trade practice is of substantial significance in the interpretation of disputed contract language, Gholson, Byars Holmes Constr. Co. v. United States, 351 F.2d 987, 999, 173 Ct.Cl. 374, 395 (1965). However, because defendant's Instructions to Bidders relating to subject contract called for submission in writing by a bidder of a request for any explanation of the meaning or interpretation of the specifications and drawings before submission of a bid, plaintiff's entitlement to rely upon its interpretation must be tested on the principle that if it was confronted with an obvious ambiguity, it was required to consult defendant concerning defendant's intention with respect to such ambiguity, before relying upon its own interpretation in the submission of its bid. Beacon Constr. Co. v. United States, 314 F.2d 501, 504, 161 Ct.Cl. 1, 6-7 (1963).

  8. Chris Berg, Inc. v. United States

    455 F.2d 1037 (Fed. Cir. 1972)   Cited 13 times
    Finding that if the contractor was either actually or constructively ordered to paint certain surfaces beyond contract requirements, an equitable adjustment would be merited

    The rule of contra preferentum. See, for example, Tecon Corp. v. United States, 411 F.2d 1262, 188 Ct.Cl. 15 (1969); WPC Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 323 F.2d 874, 163 Ct.Cl. 1 (1963); Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. United States, 109 Ct.Cl. 390 (1947). * * * While ambiguous contract provisions are construed against the author (Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. United States, 109 Ct.Cl. 390 (1947), and a contractor is not usually obligated to seek clarification of all interpretative problems inhering in the contract terms, he must nevertheless inquire where the discrepancy, omission or conflict is obvious (Consolidated Eng'r. Co. for Use of Fulton National Bank of Atlanta v. United States, 98 Ct.Cl. 256, 280 (1943); Jefferson Construction Co. v. United States, 151 Ct.Cl. 75, 89-91 (1960)), and most particularly so when a specification provision affirmatively warns him of such possible discrepancies in the plans (WPC Enterprises Inc. v. United States, 323 F.2d 874, 876, 163 Ct.Cl. 1, 6 (1963), and collated authorities), or where a contract article requires him to submit detected discrepancies to the contracting officer for decision (Beacon Construction Co. of Mass. v. United St

  9. Jamsar, Inc. v. United States

    442 F.2d 930 (Fed. Cir. 1971)   Cited 21 times
    In Jamsar, Inc. v. U.S., 194 Ct.Cl. 819, 442 F.2d 930 (1971), the Board dealt with a comparable problem and refused to apply the order of precedence clause in a case where the work to be done was shown on the drawings, but was not mentioned in the specifications.

    This alone, we feel, creates the type of discrepancy, omission or conflict which should alert a reasonable man of a difference in interpretation. WPC Enterprises Inc. v. United States, 323 F.2d 874, 163 Ct.Cl. 1 (1963); Beacon Constr. Co. v. United States, 314 F.2d 501, 161 Ct.Cl. 1, 6-7, supra. In failing to respond to this obligation and going ahead with its bid preparation, plaintiff voluntarily assumed all risks of an incorrect interpretation.

  10. Sherwin v. United States

    436 F.2d 992 (Fed. Cir. 1971)   Cited 10 times

    6. We see no reason, in this regard, to distinguish between theories of liability not considered below and the issue of damages, which may not initially have been considered if the Board found no liability. If, because of the disposition of the case on appeal, any of these issues becomes important, the Board should be given an opportunity to consider them first. The rule we announce necessarily disapproves of such cases as Stein Bros. Mfg. Co. v. United States, 337 F.2d 861, 162 Ct.Cl. 802 and WPC Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 323 F.2d 874, 163 Ct.Cl. 1, in which the Court of Claims retained the issue of damages after it reversed the Board's finding of no liability. The above quotations, particularly the footnote dealing with damages, seem, at first blush, to encompass all cases where an issue is not decided by the administrative board.