Id. As to the particular instruction on failure to keep a careful lookout, there must be substantial evidence from which the jury could find that in exercising the highest degree of care, Ms. Snelling could have seen the other vehicle in time to have taken effective precautionary action to avoid the collision, had she been keeping a careful lookout. Lewis v. State Sec. Ins.Co. , 718 S.W.2d 539, 541 (Mo.App. 1986); Woten v. Day , 684 S.W.2d 901, 902 (Mo.App. 1985); Wellhausen v. Harris , 654 S.W.2d 101, 103 (Mo.App. 1983). "What constitutes negligence in failing to keep a lookout in a particular direction at a particular time or place and whether a driver who has looked has seen all that he should is usually a fact question."

In determining whether an instruction is supported by the evidence, we of course take the evidence most favorable to such instruction, and ignore all evidence contrary to the hypotheses of the instruction. Woten v. Day, 684 S.W.2d 901, 902 (Mo.App. 1985). There was testimony that plaintiff failed to advise defendant that his work assignments were causing pain in his ankle; that his superiors did not know of the ankle pain caused by his work; and that if Conley had told them of the difficulties he was experiencing in working on the ankle, that they would have relieved him of his duties.

Bayne v. Jenkins, 593 S.W.2d 519, 530 (Mo. banc 1980). It is essential, for an instruction to be proper, that an issue in the instruction be supported by substantial evidence from which a jury can reasonably find such issue, and not be based on mere speculation or conjecture. Evinger v. McDaniel Title Co., 726 S.W.2d 468, 472 (Mo.App. 1987). When an instruction states more than one element of negligence in the disjunctive, there must be substantial evidence to prove each element. Woten v. Day, 684 S.W.2d 901, 902 (Mo.App. 1985). In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support the instruction, the evidence is reviewed in a light favorable to the proponent of the instruction.