Opinion
Civil Action No: 01-3683 Section: "R"(4)
November 26, 2002
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are defendants' motions for summary judgment. Also before the Court is plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and declaratory judgment. Because the Court concludes that plaintiff is not entitled to an order granting membership in ILA Local 3000 and that plaintiff has not created an issue of fact as to whether he has been treated differently than other members of ILA Local 854, the Court grants defendants' motions for summary judgment and denies plaintiff's motion.
I. Background
Plaintiff Ray Worthy has been a member of the International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO ("ILA") since 1978, when he joined ILA Local 854. Worthy became the president of Local 854 in 1989 and remains the president to this day. This dispute arises out of plaintiff's repeated attempts to join a sister union, ILA Local 3000.
The guidelines for becoming a member of ILA Local 3000 are set forth in the constitutions of both the ILA and ILA Local 3000. The Constitution of the ILA, Article XIV, Section 2, provides:
Except as hereinafter provided, any worker who is employed or seeks employment in a trade, industry or occupation within the jurisdiction of the I.L.A. shall be eligible to apply for membership and shall be admitted to membership without regard to race, age, sex, citizenship, or ethnic origin thirty (30) days after application unless just cause can be shown for rejection of the application.
(Pl.'s Mot. for Preliminary Injunction, Ex. 1.)
The Constitution of ILA Local 3000, Article III, spells out in further detail the process that applies to applications for membership in Local 3000:
Section 1. This Association shall be composed of workers eligible for membership in the I.L.A.
Section 2. Any person of good moral character, sound in body and mind, eighteen years of age or older who is employed or seeks employment within the jurisdiction of Local No. 3000 shall be eligible for membership of this Local . . .
Section 4(a). All applicants shall be referred to an Investigating Committee, composed of three members to be appointed by the President to serve at his pleasure, and one of whom he shall designate as Chairman. Said Committee shall investigate the qualification of each applicant and report thereon in writing to the Association at its next regular meeting.
Section 4(b). If the report of the Committee is favorable to the applicant he shall be balloted upon at said meeting, and if he receives a majority of favorable votes, he shall be admitted and initiated at the next regular meeting . . .
Section 4(c). If the report of the Investigating Committee is unfavorable to the applicant, he shall not be accepted . . .
( Id. at Ex. Y.) Typically, when an individual applies for membership in Local 3000, Local 3000 checks to ensure that the individual is either working or seeking work as a longshoremen. This is accomplished both by checking hiring records of employers and by visiting the halls where workers seek employment. A representative of Local 3000 is present during every hiring session at these halls.
Worthy first attempted to join ILA Local 3000 in 1992. In September 1992, Local 3000 sent a letter to Worthy informing him that his application for membership was denied because Worthy was neither working nor seeking work within the jurisdiction of Local 3000. Worthy asserts that he never received this letter and that he first learned of the denial of his membership in 1999, when he began to attend meetings of Local 3000 because of his desire to run for president of Local 3000. Worthy wrote to Benny Holland, president of the ILA Southern District, complaining that Local 3000 violated the ILA's constitution by failing to show just cause and failing to notify him within 30 days. Holland conducted an inquiry and determined that Local 3000 rejected his application because Worthy was neither working nor seeking work within the jurisdiction of Local 3000. Worthy continued to press the issue with Holland, to no avail.
On June 4, 2001, Worthy reapplied for membership in Local 3000. In response to Worthy's application, Mark Ellis, Local 3000's Financial Secretary-Treasurer, Gregory Lee, its Vice President, and James Campbell, its President, checked the hiring records provided to them by employers and determined that Worthy had not worked as longshoreman. Furthermore, at least one of these three individuals was present at the hiring halls for all of the recent hiring periods, and no one observed Worthy actively seeking employment as a longshoreman. Local 3000 discussed Worthy's application at an Executive Board meeting on June 11, 2001. On June 19, Local 3000 informed Worthy by letter that his application was rejected. Although the letter did not state the reason for the rejection, Ellis, Lee and Campbell testified that Worthy was not eligible for membership because he was neither working nor seeking work when the application was filed. Worthy disputes the fact that he was not seeking work at that time.
On June 25, 2001, Worthy asked Local 3000 for the reasons he was rejected. When he received no response, he wrote to Holland. Holland notified Worthy that he had requested an explanation from Local 3000. Receiving no further word from the defendants as to this matter, plaintiff filed this lawsuit in December 2001. Plaintiff sued the ILA, ILA Local 3000, ILA Southern District, and various ILA officers. In the complaint, plaintiff asks the court for an order granting him membership in Local 3000 and declaring plaintiff's rights, as a union member, under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 ("LMRDA"), 29 U.S.C. § 411 and 412. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that defendants violated 29 U.S.C. § 411 (a)(1), which provides that "[e]very member of a labor organization shall have equal rights and privileges within such organization . . ." Plaintiff also asks the Court to enjoin Local 3000's upcoming election so that he may participate in the nomination and election process. Defendants move for summary judgment on each claim.
II. Discussion
A. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues as to any material facts, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2551 (1986). The court must be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party or, in other words, "that the evidence favoring the nonmoving party is insufficient to enable a reasonable jury to return a verdict in her favor." Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 178 (5th Cir. 1990); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Krim v. BancTexas Group, Inc., 989 F.2d 1435, 1445 (5th Cir. 1993) A factual dispute precludes a grant of summary judgment if the evidence would permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Hunt v. Rapides Healthcare System, LLC, 2001 WL 1650961 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted)
If the dispositive issue is one for which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in the record contains insufficient proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2552; Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 178. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553.
The Fifth Circuit has "arguably articulated an even more lenient standard for summary judgment in certain nonjury cases." Phillips Oil Co. v. OKC Corp., 812 F.2d 265, 273 n. 15 (5th Cir. 1987). In Nunez v. Superior Oil Co., 572 F.2d 1119, 1123-24 (5th Cir. 1978), the Fifth Circuit explained:
If decision is to be reached by the court, and there are no issues of witness credibility, the court may conclude on the basis of the affidavits, depositions, and stipulations before it, that there are no genuine issues of material fact, even though decision may depend on inferences to be drawn from what has been incontrovertibly proved.
Therefore, in a nonjury case, such as this case, the Court is encouraged to draw inferences, even when they appear to be factual, if a "trial on the merits would reveal no additional data." Id. at 1124; see also Professional Geophysics, Inc. v. Placid Oil Co., 932 F.2d 394, 398 (5th Cir. 1991)
B. Discussion
Plaintiff's complaint, as amended on June 17, 2002, contains three counts. In the first count, plaintiff asserts that he is entitled to an order granting membership in Local 3000. In the second and third counts, plaintiff alleges that he was denied the equal rights and privileges guaranteed to union members by LMRDA. Because plaintiff asserts that he meets the statutory definition of a union "member" and seeks to assert rights protected by LMRDA, the Court has jurisdiction over this lawsuit. See 29 U.S.C. § 412; In re Ben Carter, 618 F.2d 1093, 1102 (5th Cir. 1980). Whether plaintiff is, in fact, a union "member" is a separate question to which the Court now turns its attention. Carter, 618 F.2d at 1102.
I. Membership in Local 3000
LMRDA defines the term "member" as follows:
"Member" or "member in good standing," when used in reference to a labor organization, includes any person who has fulfilled the requirements for membership in such organization, and who neither has voluntarily withdrawn from membership nor has been expelled or suspended from membership after appropriate proceedings consistent with lawful provisions of the constitution and bylaws of such organization.29 U.S.C. § 402 (o) (emphasis added). Plaintiff concedes that Local 3000 considered his membership application and rejected it. (Pl.'s Mot. for preliminary Injunction, Ex. U and W.) Nevertheless, plaintiff asserts that he is a "member" of Local 3000 in that he has "fulfilled the requirements for membership."
It is well established that "Congress did not intend [LMRDA] to limit the previously recognized rights of unions to choose their members." Moynahan v. Pari-Mutuel Employees Guild of California, Local 280, 317 F.2d 209, 210 (9th Cir. 1963); see also Brennan v. Local 357, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, 709 F.2d 611, 614 (9th Cir. 1983); Feist v. Engineers' Beneficial Assn., No. 83-557 (E.D.La. Nov. 30, 1983). For this reason, unions maintain the right to prescribe their own requirements and procedures for admission. See Wallace v. International Organization of Master, Mates and Pilots, 547 F. Supp. 155, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). At the same time, it is generally recognized that membership under LMRDA is not limited to individuals formally recognized as members by the union. Brennan, 709 F.2d at 614; see also Ricks v. Simons, 1990 WL 116834 (D.D.C. 1990). In Hughes v. Local No. 11 of International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Ironworkers, AFL-CIO, 287 F.2d 810 (3rd Cir. 1961), a member of one local desired to transfer membership to a sister local that did not reserve to itself the right to deny membership to individuals meeting certain requirements. Hughes, 287 F.2d at 812, 816. In addition, the sister local was bound to comply with the constitution of the International union to which it belonged. This constitution obliged the sister local to grant membership to individuals seeking to transfer from one local to another as long as that individual met certain requirements. Id. After distinguishing this situation from one in which a local reserved the right to select its members, the Third Circuit held that the plaintiff could be a member of the sister local under LMRDA if, on remand, the facts supported a finding that he had "fulfilled the requirements for membership." Id.
The Hughes exception is limited to those narrow situations where the applicant has fulfilled all membership requirements and only "ministerial" acts remain to complete the application. Brennan, 709 F.2d at 614; Feist, No. 83-557; Gavin, Etc. v. Structural Iron Workers Local No. 1, 1975 WL 11827 (N.D.Ill. 1975) The Hughes exception has never been extended to situations in which a union has reserved the right to deny membership by, for example, requiring that applicants be approved by a vote of the membership before attaining membership status. Just three years after the Third Circuit decided Hughes, the Ninth Circuit declined to grant an individual membership status in a union that required a two-thirds favorable vote of current members because it considered the vote to constitute more than a "ministerial" act. Moynahan, 317 F.2d at 210. Similarly, the vote of a membership committee is not considered a "ministerial" act. Wallace, 547 F. Supp. at 157. The Fifth Circuit has, in the course of deciding that the district could exercise jurisdiction under LMRDA, summarized this state of the law. Carter, 618 F.2d at 1103. The Fifth Circuit specifically noted that courts hold that "[i]f the local reserved that right [to refuse membership], or required a vote for admittance, the plaintiff had not `fulfilled the requirements for membership,' and was not a `member' . . ." Carter, 618 F.2d at 1103.
The requirements for membership in Local 3000 are set forth in Article III of ILA Local 3000's constitution. First, only those individuals who are of good moral character, eighteen years of age or older, and who are employed or seeking employment within the jurisdiction of Local No. 3000 are eligible. (Pl.'s Mot. for Preliminary Injunction, Ex. Y.) Second, an "Investigating Committee" investigates the qualifications of each applicant and files a report to the Association. ( Id.) If the report is unfavorable to the applicant, the application is rejected. ( Id.) If the report is favorable, then the applicant is balloted on at the next union meeting. ( Id.) In addition, the procedures established by Local 3000 "shall not be inconsistent" with the provisions set forth in the constitution of ILA. ( Id. at Ex. 1, Article XII, Section 5.) The constitution of the ILA maintains that individuals working or seeking work within a jurisdiction of the ILA "shall be eligible for membership and shall be admitted . . . unless just cause can be shown for rejection of the application." ( Id. at Article XIV, Section 2.)
It is clear that among the requirements for membership in Local 3000 is a favorable vote of the membership It is equally clear that plaintiff has not fulfilled this requirement. Therefore, the Court is compelled to conclude that plaintiff "has not fulfilled the requirements for membership" in Local 3000. Instructive in this regard is Moynahan, a case in which the plaintiff sought membership in a union requiring a two-thirds favorable vote of the current members. The plaintiff had not fulfilled this requirement. The Ninth Circuit concluded that such a vote "can hardly be characterized as a mere formality or ministerial act" and refused to grant plaintiff membership status under LMRDA. 317 F.2d at 210. It is clear that "[w]here a majority vote in favor of the applicant is a requirement of membership, this requirement does not constitute a mere formality or ministerial act." Feist, No. 83-557. Indeed, a review of the case law indicates that no court has ever granted an individual membership status in a union if that individual has not fulfilled a vote requirement.
Worthy notes, correctly, that Local 3000's discretion to reject members is not boundless. This is because Local 3000 is bound by the ILA Constitution to accept members unless just cause can be shown for rejection. First, the Court notes that Local 3000's vote requirement is not inconsistent with the constitution of the ILA. The constitution of the ILA does not elaborate on what constitutes "just cause," and it is entirely possible that Local 3000's vote requirement represents the local's decision to allow its members to have the last word on whether just cause for rejection exists. The Court also notes that the ILA is aware of Local 3000's vote requirement and has not objected to it. Second, even though the "just cause" requirement limits to some extent Local 3000's discretion to reject applicants, the Court does not find that this requirement places Local 3000 in a straightjacket. The union in Hughes, by contrast, was in a straightjacket, with no reserved rights to deny membership at all. Here, Local 3000 possesses the discretion to reject applicants as long as it can articulate just cause. Specifically, Local 3000 "reserve[s] the right to refuse membership" through its vote requirement, a requirement that plaintiff has not fulfilled. Carter, 618 F.2d at 1103.
Moreover, the Court is convinced that today's conclusion works no injustice on Worthy. Local 3000 established requirements for membership. Local 3000 also established a procedure for making a determination as to whether an applicant meets these requirements. This procedure entails, first, checking employment records to determine who works in the jurisdiction of Local 3000 and, second, visiting the employment halls to see if there is anyone seeking work but not getting it. (Pl.'s Mot. for Preliminary Injunction, Ex. 3, Dep. of Gregory Lee at 5-9; Ex. 5, Dep. of Mark Ellis at 33; Ex. 8, Dep. of James Campbell at 10 and 32; and Dep. of John Bowers at 15.) Local 3000 followed this process in the course of rejecting Worthy's application. (Id.)
Local 3000's President, Vice President and Secretary-Treasurer all testified that plaintiff's application was rejected because he was neither working nor seeking work within the jurisdiction of Local 3000. ( Id.) This is a perfectly valid reason for rejection under the constitution of Local 3000, and it is not inconsistent with the constitution of the ILA. Furthermore, Local 3000's determination is supported by evidence. Local 3000 checked the employment records and determined that Worthy was not working within its jurisdiction. ( Id.) The members of the Executive Committee were present at the hiring halls at the time plaintiff filed his application and did no: observe plaintiff seeking work. ( Id.) The only evidence to which plaintiff cites is testimony that he was seeking work after he filed his application. ( Id. at Ex. 7, Dep. of Edward Munster, at 8-9.) Moreover, plaintiff has a history of trying to get into Local 3000 without complying with the work requirement. ( Id. at Exs. A, C, F.)
In summary, the Court concludes that among the requirements for membership in Local 3000 is a favorable vote of union members. Because plaintiff has not fulfilled this requirement, the Court cannot declare him a "member" under LMRDA. The Court therefore will not review Local 3000's decision not to admit plaintiff. In any event, the Court strongly doubts that plaintiff would be entitled to relief even if the union's actions were scrutinized. Local 3000 established a procedure for applying its membership requirements, followed this procedure in rejecting Worthy's application, and provided substantial evidence supporting its determination.
2. Membership in Local 854
Although Worthy is not a member of Local 3000, plaintiff may nevertheless assert those rights that he possesses by virtue of his status as a member of ILA Local 854. In this regard the Court notes, first, that membership in ILA Local 854 does no: entitle plaintiff to membership in other ILA locals. John Bowers, President of ILA, testified to this effect, stating that a member of one ILA local may become a member of a second ILA local, but "they would have to be approved by the local for membership." (Pl.'s Mot. for Preliminary Injunction, Ex. 9, Dep. of John Bowers, at 42.)
Second, the record does not support a finding that the ILA violated Worthy's "equal rights" by treating him differently than it treats other ILA members. 29 U.S.C. § 411. There is no evidence that the ILA makes available to other ILA members, but not to plaintiff, a process for appealing membership decisions made by sister ILA locals. There is no evidence that the ILA goes to bat for other ILA members, but not for plaintiff, when they seek membership in a sister ILA local. Nor is there evidence that the ILA has ever ordered an ILA local to grant membership to an individual whom the ILA local determined was ineligible for membership. In support of this proposition, plaintiff produces only a single letter indicating that the ILA once ordered an ILA local to grant membership to an individual when the ILA local could not articulate just cause for rejecting the application. (Pl.'s Mot. for Preliminary Injunction, at Ex. 2.) As plaintiff makes no showing that the applicant in that situation was an ILA member, plaintiff has not created an issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff was denied equal rights as an ILA member. Moreover, Local 3000 has articulated a reason why they denied plaintiff's application. As previously discussed, Local 3000's President, Vice President and Secretary-Treasurer all testified that plaintiff's application was rejected because he was neither working nor seeking work within the jurisdiction of Local 3000. ( Id. at Ex. 3, Dep. of Gregory Lee at 5-9; Ex. 5, Dep. of Mark Ellis at 33; Ex. 8, Dep. of James Campbell at 10 and 32; and Dep. of John Bowers at 15.) Although the reason was not stated in the letter rejecting plaintiff's application, neither the Constitution of the ILA nor that of Local 3000 so requires. Finally, if anything, the record indicates that when plaintiff requested that the ILA investigate his membership application, ILA responded and indicated that they would look into it. ( Id. at Ex. V.)
In summary, defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to the first count of the complaint because Worthy has not fulfilled all of the requirements for membership in Local 3000. Nevertheless, as a member of ILA Local 854, plaintiff is guaranteed those rights that other ILA members possess. Plaintiff has failed to create an issue of material fact as to whether the ILA has, in any respect, treated plaintiff differently than other ILA members. For this reason defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to the second and third counts in the complaint. Accordingly, the Court grants defendants' motions for summary judgment and denies plaintiff's motion.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants defendants' motions for summary judgment and denies plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and declaratory relief.