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In Worthington v. City of New Haven, 1999 WL 958627 (D.Conn. 1999), the district court addressed the plaintiff's ADA claim, which alleged that the "defendant repeatedly delayed consideration of and failed to implement" accommodations.
Summary of this case from O'Dell v. Department of Public WelfareOpinion
No. 3:94-CV-00609 (EBB)
October 5, 1999
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Patricia Worthington brought this case against the defendant City of New Haven, alleging that her employer discriminated against her in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1998); Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Section 504"), 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1998); and the Connecticut Constitution article I, § 20. The plaintiff contends that from April 1992 to March 1995 she requested reasonable accommodations of her physical disability, including the provision of an ergonomic chair and modifications of her job duties and worksite. Worthington alleges that the defendant repeatedly delayed consideration of and failed to implement such accommodations. She seeks front pay to compensate for her inability to work, compensatory damages for pain and suffering, punitive damages for the defendant's reckless disregard of her civil rights, and attorney's fees and expenses. The case was tried to the Court, sitting without a jury, on May 13 and 14, 1998. After consideration of all the evidence presented at trial, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), and orders entry of judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. Plaintiff's Preexisting Injuries and Employment
Prior to her employment with the City of New Haven, Worthington had been involved in a severe auto accident in June 1983, which resulted in multiple orthopaedic injuries to her left knee, right leg, and right arm. (Tr. at 8; Ex. 25.) The severity of Worthington's injuries was documented by Enzo J. Sella, M.D., her treating physician, who declared her 100 percent disabled for work on October 25, 1983 and again on April 25, 1985. To rehabilitate the plaintiff's injuries, Dr. Sella performed reconstructive surgery, removed and replaced a rod in the femur, repaired her posterior cruciate ligament, referred her to specialists for her wrist injuries, and prescribed physical therapy among other treatments. (Tr. at 9, 99, 207-08; Ex. 25.) On August 18, 1986, Worthington hurt her back, neck, and knee in another car accident. After the second accident, Dr. Sella recommended that Worthington wear a "knee cage brace," but she disregarded this advice. Nevertheless, the plaintiff's condition gradually improved. (Tr. at 100-05; Ex. 25.)
In a report dated April 27, 1988, Dr. Sella stated that Worthington "should be able to do light work" but "should not do prolonged, extensive walking. She has difficulty climbing stairs and squatting. She should do no kneeling. She will not be able to work overhead with her right arm." On February 27, 1989, Dr. Sella recommended that he perform a fusion operation on the plaintiff, but she refused because the surgery would have prevented her from being able to bend her knee. (Tr. at 209-10, 238-39; Ex. 25.) By June 1990, Worthington had sustained four knee operations, possessed no ligament in her knee, used a cane to walk, endured fractures and tendon transfers in her right arm, wore a wrist brace, and took several medications. In a report dated January 28, 1991, Dr. Sella repeated that the plaintiff should not engage in prolonged walking or repeated climbing of stairs. (Ex. 25.) This fairly represents Worthington's physical condition at the time she commenced employment with the defendant.
The City of New Haven, which employs more than 500 persons and receives funds from the federal government, hired Worthington as an Account Clerk I in its Tax Office on December 23, 1991. The defendant's job description of an Account Clerk I position states that it requires application of bookkeeping skills, maintenance of accounts, preparation of payrolls and financial reports, checking of receipts and vouchers, receiving of monies, and the performance of other clerical duties. (Ex. 2.) The plaintiff's prior work experience included work as a nurse's aide, waitress, toll collector, account clerk, and in the Air Force. (Tr. at 8, 11.) During her initial interview, Worthington disclosed her disability and explained her physical limitations to the defendant. The City of New Haven asked her to submit to a pre-employment physical examination, which she did. In response to an inquiry from the defendant, Dr. Sella indicated that Worthington's physical condition did not require any restrictions or limitations, was under control, and would not compromise the safety of others. (Tr. at 20-24, 212-13, 244-45; Exs. 1, 2, 26; Joint Trial Mem. at 10.) On February 3, 1992, Worthington suffered a fall at work and injured her back, neck, and knee. After the accident, she began to experience neck pains and lower back pain when sitting for long periods at a time. Subsequently, the plaintiff underwent physical therapy and aqua therapy. (Tr. at 35-36, 101-02, 105; Exs. 26, 29; Def.'s Am. Answer ¶ 7.)
II. Initial Requests for Accommodation
The evidence shows that Worthington requested three specific accommodations from the City of New Haven after her accident at work: (1) provision of an ergonomic chair with neck and back support; (2) provision of waist-level shelves for parking tag books as opposed to overhead shelves requiring the plaintiff to reach over her head; and (3) modification of her job duties to avoid prolonged standing. Worthington's first request for accommodations came in April 1992, when she asked the defendant to replace her unadjustable chair with one having back and neck support. (Tr. at 36-37, 114.) After the denial of this request, the plaintiff enlisted the aid of Sally Esposito, the City of New Haven's Director of the Department of Services for Persons with Disabilities, in the summer of 1992. In addition to discussing the possibility of obtaining an ergonomic chair and a desk, Esposito suggested modifying the plaintiff's worksite so that certain shelves would be placed at waist-level to make it easier for her to reach for parking tag books. (Tr. at 38-39, 44.) On September 17, 1992, Dr. Sella wrote a prescription for a swivel chair with back rests and without arm rests to allow Worthington to swivel close to her computer monitor. The plaintiff provided the prescription to Sal Calderaro, her supervisor, on two occasions. She also complained to Calderaro about being required to fill in for the collection clerk when the clerk was unavailable to collect parking fines from the public, because this necessitated standing for extended periods of time. (Tr. at 41-42, 44-45, 215, 217-18, 247-48.; Exs. 3, 11, 26.)
Following Esposito's advice, Worthington contacted the Connecticut Bureau of Rehabilitation Services ("BRS") in the fall of 1992. (Tr. 39-41, 144, 187-88; Ex. 4.) BRS is a state agency responsible for providing assistance to disabled individuals in seeking and maintaining employment. (Tr. at 180-82, 192-93.) On December 1, 1992, BRS conducted an assessment of Worthington's worksite. The agency subsequently prepared an Individualized Written Rehabilitation Program in January 1993, with the objective of obtaining workplace modifications by April 1993. (Tr. at 43-44, 145, 191; Exs. 4, 5.) In letters written to Worthington, Calderaro, his supervisor Michael Betz, and Esposito in January 1993, BRS proposed that the City of New Haven retain Rehabilitation Engineering Associates to conduct a worksite evaluation and suggest specific modifications. The letter also advised the parties that employers maintain responsibility to implement reasonable accommodations under the ADA. (Tr. at 43, 47, 50, 145-46, 149, 192-96; Exs. 5, 6, 8.)
Sometime between the summer of 1992 and early 1993, Calderaro attended ADA training provided by the City of New Haven to department heads. According to the plaintiff, Calderaro made disparaging remarks to her concerning the ADA after attending the training sessions. (Tr. at 71-72, 141-42, 165.) Worthington again sought accommodations in a meeting with Esposito, Calderaro, and Betz on January 28, 1993; in a written letter to Calderaro dated January 29, 1993; and in another meeting with Calderaro and Esposito on February 24, 1993. Esposito also met separately with Calderaro and Betz to discuss accommodations during this time. (Tr. at 47-49, 151; Exs. 7, 10.) Despite offering training to supervisors and receiving several requests for action by and on behalf of Worthington, the City of New Haven failed to hire a rehabilitation engineer, never conducted an evaluation of the plaintiff's worksite, and did not provide her with an ergonomic chair at this time. Instead, Calderaro complained to Martha Leo, a vocational rehabilitation counselor from BRS, that "we don't have the funds" to comply with the recommendations. (Tr. at 47-48, 50-51, 54-55, 147-154, 196-97; Exs. 10, 11.)
III. Plaintiff's Grievances and Defendant's Responses
In a report dated May 20, 1993, Dr. Sella described Worthington's physical condition, stating that she "is in pain," "can't fall asleep at night," "has a wrist problem," and "has an ulcer." In his view, the plaintiff's chair at work did not suit her needs adequately. (Tr. at 248; Ex. 26.) On May 24, 1993, Worthington filed a grievance under the City of New Haven's ADA grievance procedure, stating that she had requested a "properly designed ergonomic chair" and elimination of duties requiring "prolonged periods" of standing during the work day. (Tr. 51-53, 153-54; Exs. 10-12.) Esposito initiated the ADA investigation by sending letters and questionnaires to Calderaro and his supervisors. (Tr. at 51-53, 153-56; Exs. 10-15.) Calderaro responded in a letter dated June 26, 1993 that Peter Halsey, the Controller of the City of New Haven and Betz's supervisor, had approved the funds for an ergonomic chair. On July 3, 1993, Halsey sent a memorandum to Esposito confirming that Calderaro would obtain a more comfortable chair. (Tr. at 54-55; Exs. 16, 18.) On July 13, 1993, Worthington filed a grievance through her union, A.F.S.C.M.E. Local 884, seeking to be relieved of all duties not within her job classification and complaining that she still had to stand for long periods of time at work, even though Calderaro had promised at a meeting on June 9, 1993 that she would no longer be required to perform standing duties after July 1, 1993. (Tr. 54, 56-57; Ex. 30.)
In late August 1993, Worthington provided the defendant with information regarding the Grahl Xallence Chair, an ergonomic chair with elbow supports that she believed would accommodate her disability. Dr. Sella wrote a prescription for the chair in August 26, 1993 after reviewing the literature. It cost $1,043.00. (Tr. at 54, 57-58, 158-59, 252-53; Exs. 17, 19, 20, 26.) On October 21, 1993, Esposito sent a memorandum to Halsey with information on the chair and advised the defendant to purchase it. Halsey never responded to Esposito's memorandum, nor did the defendant purchase the requested chair by the end of 1993. (Tr. 159-60; Exs. 20, 21, 26.) Two days after a third-step hearing on Worthington's union grievance on March 23, 1994, the defendant finally ordered the ergonomic chair and agreed to restrict the plaintiff's time spent away from her desk. (Tr. 162, 311-12; Ex. 30.) During this time, Worthington's physical condition worsened. On August 26, 1993, Dr. Sella reported that the plaintiff "certainly has multiple injuries with systemic complaints and symptoms. In my opinion, she should be on Social Security Disability. She is still working in an office at City Hall but it is doubtful that she will be able to last much longer." (Ex. 26.)
Worthington filed this suit on April 13, 1994. At some point later this month, the City of New Haven provided her with the Grahl Xallence Chair. However, the plaintiff's job still required her to stand for extended periods throughout the day, and thus plaintiff's request to work sitting down had not yet been accommodated. (Tr. 26-30, 44-45, 55-56, 61-62, 65-66, 71-74; Ex. 22.)
IV. Post-Filing of Lawsuit Events
On June 1, 1994, Worthington underwent a cervical spinal fusion surgical procedure to remedy cervical spondylosis, a condition caused by her auto accident in June 1983 and aggravated by her fall in 1992. As a result of the surgery, she missed work and received workers compensation benefits for "temporary total disability" until November 13, 1994, when she returned to work part-time. (Tr. at 74-75, 220, 224; Exs. 26, 29.) Although Dr. Sella favored the plaintiff's return to work, he complained that "the ergonomics of her job are such that she has to get up, walk, bend, reach, twist, all of the activities that she should not be doing." Despite this, Worthington wanted to continue working. She again proposed that the defendant allow her to work sitting down without needing to walk around the office or perform activities requiring standing, reaching, or bending. (Tr. at 76-82, 241, 247, 253-56, 261-62; Ex. 26.) On February 13, 1995, Dr. Sella counseled Worthington to stop working and reported that she "has stuck it out as long as possible at work" and is "totally disabled." Sometime in March 1995, the City of New Haven performed an evaluation of the plaintiff's worksite. However, Worthington stopped working due to her disability on March 25, 1995. (Tr. at 77-78, 166-68; Exs. 23, 24, 26.)
At the time she left her employment with the City of New Haven, the plaintiff's annual salary was $21,316.00. The value of her fringe benefits included $2,216.86 in pension contributions by the defendant and medical benefits with a value of $3,980.00 per year. The plaintiff also was entitled to fifteen sick days and ten paid vacation days in the first five years of her employment, and fifteen paid vacation days thereafter. (Tr. at 305-06; Ex. 32.) Additionally, the plaintiff previously had received a "specific injury" award of $5,000 for a 12% partial disability of her cervical spine, arising out of her February 1992 injury at work, pursuant to the Connecticut Workers Compensation Act. (Tr. at 288-89, 295-96, 299-300; Ex. 29.) This amount was deducted from her Social Security disability benefits. (Tr. at 88-89; Exs. 29, 31.) Through the defendant's employee assistance program, Worthington began receiving counseling in the spring of 1993. She also began taking anti-depressant medications in September 1993, on the advice of her psychiatrist. The counseling and medication have continued up through the time of trial. (Tr. at 92-95.)
Dr. Sella repeatedly made contradictory statements concerning whether the City of New Haven's failure to reasonably accommodate the plaintiff was a substantial factor in her becoming totally disabled in March 1995. In a letter to plaintiff's counsel on December 31, 1997, he stated that the defendant's failure to accommodate was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's total disability for work purposes. (Ex. 26.) However, he gave the following contrary testimony at a deposition on February 9, 1998:
Q: Doctor, do you recall being asked the following question and giving the following answer: "To a reasonable degree of medical certainty, is it not your opinion, doctor, that Miss Worthington would have to come to a time, despite whatever accommodation in terms of an ergonomic chair, that she would have to retire due to her multiple injuries?"
Q: The answer is: "Well, the chair is totally immaterial to the whole thing to me, I know its not legally but the chair, it doesn't matter whether they gave her the throne of England, she wouldn't — she had too many injuries to work, to continue to work. Yes, but I kept her — we talked, we discussed several times, we kept her working as long as possible and she wanted to do so. I thought it was good for her psychologically to keep her working as long as possible."
Q: Do you recall being asked that question and giving that answer?
A: Yes.
(Tr. at 231-32.) Dr. Sella's trial testimony proved equally elusive. For example, he stated that "in combination with all the multiple injuries and complaints that she has, something, maybe as insignificant as a chair, is the last straw that made her stop working and, in that context, it's a substantial factor." (Tr. at 233.) He also testified that Worthington could have continued working past March 1995 if the defendant had made reasonable accommodations. (Tr. at 263-64, 268-70.) Under cross-examination, however, Dr. Sella opined that Worthington's physical injuries prevented her from working, and that these injuries were caused by her 1983 auto accident. (Tr. at 236-37.) In sum, the evidence is inconclusive on this issue.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This bench trial presents the following issues: (1) whether the City of New Haven discriminated against the plaintiff in violation of Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act; (2) whether the plaintiff is entitled to front pay or loss of future earnings for the destruction of her ability to work and, if so, how much; (3) whether the plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages for pain and suffering and, if so, how much; and (4) whether the plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages and, if so, how much; and (5) whether the plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment and postjudgment interest and, if so, how much.
I. Liability Under the ADA and Section 504
The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act have similar regulatory schemes. Title II of the ADA provides that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability. shall, solely by reason of his or her disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). In employment discrimination cases, the elements of a prima facie case and available defenses are identical under both statutes, see Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1391 (5th Cir. 1993), and the terms and standards common to the statutes must be interpreted the same way. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(b); 29 U.S.C. § 794(d); Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 68 F.3d 1512, 1515 (2d Cir. 1995)
Under the ADA or Section 504, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by showing that: (1) she has a "disability" within the meaning of the statute; (2) her employer is covered by the statute and had notice of the individual's disability; (3) she could perform the essential functions of the job she holds or desires, with or without reasonable accommodations; and (4) she was subject to an adverse employment action because of her disability or her employer refused to make reasonable accommodations. See Ryan v. Grae Rybicki, P.C., 135 F.3d 867, 869-70 (2d Cir. 1998); Stone v. City of Mount Vernon, 118 F.3d 92, 96 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1044 (1998); Bates v. Long Island R.R. Co., 997 F.2d 1028, 1035 (2d Cir. 1993).
II. Prerequisites for an Action
A. Coverage of Employers Under the Statutes
At the outset, the Court must evaluate whether the City of New Haven is subject to Title II of the ADA and Section 504. Because the parties have stipulated that the defendant receives "federal financial assistance," (Joint Trial Mem. at 10), the defendant is covered under Section 504. The ADA presents a trickier issue. Title I of the ADA clearly covers the defendant because state and local governments fall within the scope of the term "employer" as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5). See United States v. Illinois, No. 3 C 7741, 1994 WL 562180, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 1994). The definition of "person" under Title I of the ADA is the same as the definition under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 42 U.S.C. § 12111(7), and thus includes state and local agencies. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a). However, Worthington brought suit pursuant to Title II of the ADA, which covers non-federal "public entities," rather than Title I, which prohibits disability discrimination in the public or private employment setting.
Although the Second Circuit has not decided whether employment discrimination plaintiffs suing state or local entities may bring claims under Title II, the clear weight of authority favors allowing such suits to be brought. See, e.g., Bledsoe v. Palm Beach County Soil and Water Conservation Dist., 133 F.3d 816, 820 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. (1998); Doe v. University of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1264-65 (4th Cir. 1995); Dominguez, v. City of Council Bluffs, Iowa, 974 F. Supp. 732, 736-37 (S.D. Iowa 1997); Hernandez v. City of Hartford, 959 F. Supp. 125, 133 (D. Conn. 1997); Davoll v. Webb, 943 F. Supp. 1289, 1297 (D. Cob. 1996); Wagner v. Texas A M Univ., 939 F. Supp. 1297, 1309 (S.D. Tex. 1996); Graboski v. Guiliani, 937 F. Supp. 258, 267-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 142 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 1998). Moreover, the Second Circuit has indicated that it would support this interpretation:
[T]he language of Title II's antidiscrimination provision does not limit [its] coverage to conduct that occurs in the "programs, services, or activities" of [a public entity] Rather, it is a catch-all phrase that prohibits all discrimination by a public entity regardless of the context.
Innovative Health Sys., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d 37, 44-45 (2d Cir. 1997). The legislative history of the ADA also reveals that Congress intended Title II to apply to employment discrimination by state and local agencies. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485 (111), at 50 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 473. Finally, the regulations promulgated by the Department of Justice indicate that plaintiffs may bring employment discrimination suits under Title II. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.140 (b)(1). As a result, the Court holds that the City of New Haven is covered under Title II of the ADA, as well as Section 504.
B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The importance of the previous determination becomes clear in light of the defendant's contention that the plaintiff's failure to exhaust her administrative remedies with the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission ("EEOC") compels dismissal of her claims. While Title I of the ADA requires exhaustion of administrative remedies, see Dominguez, 974 F. Supp. at 735; Winfrey v. City of Chicago, 957 F. Supp. 1014, 1018 (N.D. Ill. 1997), plaintiffs need not exhaust administrative remedies when bringing an action against a state or local government entity under Title II. See Bledsoe, 133 F.3d at 824; Ethridge v. Alabama, 847 F. Supp. 903, 907 (M.D. Ala. 1993). In contrast to Title I which incorporates the enforcement procedures of Title VII requiring exhaustion, see 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a); Winfrey, 957 F. Supp. at 1022, Title II incorporates the enforcement provisions of Section 505 of the Rehabilitation Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 12133; Ethridge, 847 F. Supp. at 907, which do not require exhaustion in Section 504 suits brought against a non-federal entity. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2); Finley v. Giacobbe, 827 F. Supp. 215, 219 n. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Peterson v. University of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 818 F. Supp. 1276, 1278 (W.D. Wis. 1993). Thus, the Court holds that Worthington's claims under Title II and Section 504 are not barred by her failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
The Rehabilitation Act only requires exhaustion in suits brought against federal agencies under Section 501. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 1614.101, 1614.408; Vinieratos v. United States Dep't of Air Force, 939 F.2d 762, 773 (9th Cir. 1991); Guice-Mills v. Brown, 882 F. Supp. 1427, 1429 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
One court recognized the inconsistency of Title II's "no exhaustion" rule with a finding that it covers employment discrimination, contending that it "renders the entire statutory framework a monstrous distortion." Bledsoe v. Palm Beach County Soil and Water Conservation Dist., 133 F. Supp. 1439, 1445 (S.D. Fla. 1996), rev'd, 133 F.3d 816 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 72 (1998). As the court stated:
The statute the majority of district courts (and the Justice Department) give us is completely bewildering: Both Title I and Title II apply to employment, although Title II says nothing at all on the subject and Title I lays out a comprehensive scheme to deal with employment issues; Title I says an employer must hire 15 employees to be sued for employment discrimination, but you can get around this under Title II if your employer is an arm of the State; Title I says you must exhaust administrative remedies, but you can ignore this requirement too if you are employed by the State. If this is really what Congress meant, then the ADA surely must rank as one of the great drafting debacles of recent times.
See id.
C. Workers Compensation Act Bar
The City of New Haven also erroneously argues that the exclusivity provisions of the Connecticut Workers Compensation Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-284 (1998) preclude the plaintiff's action on the ground that her injuries were caused by her accident at work on February 3, 1992. The defendant cites a plethora of state cases for the proposition that the workers compensation statute provides the exclusive remedy for injuries sustained in the workplace. See Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 698 A.2d 838 (Conn. 1997); Rivera v. Calbox Corp., No. CV960563382, 1998 WL 61919 (Conn.Super.Ct. Feb. 5, 1998) Paoletta v. Ogden Martin Sys., No. CV970572616, 1997 WL 769522 (Conn.Super.Ct. Nov. 24, 1997). However, these cases concerned whether the Workers Compensation Act precluded state law personal injury claims for negligence or an intentional tort based on workplace injuries. The defendant presents no support whatsoever for the notion that a state workers compensation law can preempt an action under the federal anti-discrimination laws.
A state law making recovery under a worker's compensation statute the exclusive remedy for work-related injuries cannot bar an employee from seeking relief for employment discrimination under the ADA or Section 504 in light of the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitution. See, e.g., Sumner v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 966 F. Supp. 1567, 1573-77 (M.D. Ala. 1997); Horth v. General Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 873, 880 (M.D. Pa. 1997); Mohamed v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 277, 281-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Pegues v. Emerson Elec. Co., 913 F. Supp. 976, 980 (N.D. Miss. 1996); Wood v. County of Alameda, 875 F. Supp. 659, 665-66 (N.D. Cal. 1995). The defendant's argument turns the Supremacy Clause on its head and runs counter to basic principles of federalism. Legislatures enacted workers compensation schemes to replace state tort law as applied to workplace injuries, not to displace federal laws designed to vindicate discrimination by an employer. For this reason, the Court holds that the exclusivity provisions of the Connecticut Workers Compensation Act do not bar the plaintiff's claims.
III. Disability
As a threshold requirement, a plaintiff seeking relief under the ADA or Section 504 must establish that she has a "disability" protected by the statute. This determination demands an individualized, fact-specific analysis. See Reeves v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 140 F.3d 144, 151 (2d Cir. 1998); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 897 (10th Cir. 1997). The ADA defines disability as: (1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of an individual; (2) a record of such impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2). A physical impairment is defined as "any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (h)(1) Under this definition, the Court finds that Worthington possessed a physical impairment that negatively affected her musculoskeletal system.
Major life activities include "functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (i). EEOC Interpretive Guidelines also provide that sitting, standing, lifting, and reaching constitute major life activities. See U.S. Equal Employment Comm'n, Americans with Disabilities Act Handbook I-27 (1992). An impairment substantially limits a major life activity other than work if it prevents an individual from performing an activity that the average person in the general population can perform, or if it significantly restricts the duration, manner, or condition under which an individual can perform the activity as compared to the ability of the average person in the general population. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (j)(1). Courts may consider the following factors in this analysis: (1) the nature and severity of the impairment; (2) the duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (3) the permanent or long-term impact, or the expected permanent or long-term impact of or resulting from the impairment. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (j)(2).
The Court concludes that Worthington's physical impairment substantially limits the major life activity of walking. Evidence at trial establishes that Worthington used and continues to use a cane to aid her in walking. The plaintiff's physical impairment also substantially limits the major life activities of standing and reaching. Evidence shows that she has great difficulty reaching above her head and standing for any extended period of time as compared to the average person in the general population. Accordingly, the Court holds that the plaintiff possessed a physical disability within the meaning of the ADA and Section 504.
IV. qualified Individual with a Disability
Under the statutes, Worthington must prove that she was a "qualified individual with a disability," who could perform the essential functions of her job, with or without reasonable accommodations, during all relevant times. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); Stone, 118 F.3d at 96; Lyons, 68 F.3d at 1515. The determination of whether a person is qualified should be made at the time of the discriminatory employment action, and should not be based on the possibility that the employee or applicant will become incapacitated and unqualified in the future. See Castellano v. City of New York, 142 F.3d 58, 67 (2d Cir. 1998) H.R. Rep. No. 101-485 (111), at 34 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 456; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 app. This analysis requires a two-step process. First, the Court must examine whether Worthington satisfied the requisite education, experience, licenses, skills, or other prerequisites of her position as an Account Clerk I. Second, the Court must determine whether she could perform the essential functions of her job with reasonable accommodations. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (m); Criado v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437, 443 (1st Cir. 1998). There is little doubt that Worthington possessed the education, experience, and skills necessary to perform her job; thus, the Court will focus its discussion on the second inquiry.
A. Essential Functions
ADA regulations define "essential functions" as "the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires," but "does not include the marginal functions of that position." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (n)(1) A job function may be considered essential because: (1) the reason the position exists is to perform the function; (2) there is a limited number of employees available among whom the performance of that job function can be distributed; or (3) the incumbent in the position is hired for his or her expertise or ability to perform the particular function due to its high degree of specialization. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (n)(2). Evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes: (1) the employer's judgment as to what job functions are essential; (2) written job descriptions prepared for advertising or used when interviewing applicants for the job; (3) the amount of time spent on the job performing the function in question; (4) the consequences of not requiring the person to perform the functions; (5) the terms of a collective bargaining agreement if one exists; (6) the work experience of past incumbents in the job; and (7) the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (n)(3).
The Court finds that the essential functions of the plaintiff's Account Clerk I position predominantly involved the performance of bookkeeping and clerical tasks within the City of New Haven's Tax Office. The first category of essential functions includes the preparation of payrolls and financial reports, the maintenance of accounts, and the checking of receipts and vouchers. These functions require the application of thinking, accounting, and mathematical skills. Moreover, these duties could be performed while sitting rather than standing. The second category of essential functions concerns the maintenance of parking tag books and other tasks requiring reaching for documents and books. These tasks involved occasional standing and moving around, but they were limited to short periods of time. The City of New Haven argues that Worthington's essential job functions also included covering for another employee, whose job was to collect parking fines from the public at the front of the Tax Office, at times when the collection clerk was unavailable. The Court finds that this "fill-in" duty did not constitute an essential job function for the following reasons.
First, the defendant's written description of the Account Clerk I position does not specify the need to fill in for other employees, nor does it specify that such duties might require prolonged standing. Second, the account clerk position did not exist for the purpose of covering for others, but instead existed to ensure that the City of New Haven collected taxes and maintained its accounts in an accurate manner. Third, the defendant had fair notice both at the commencement of plaintiff's employment, and after her February 1992 accident, that she could not perform physically intensive tasks. Finally, there were other employees in the Tax Office that could have covered for the collection clerk rather than Worthington. No evidence suggests that these collection duties demanded a high degree of specialization, experience, education, or expertise. The consequences of not assigning the plaintiff this duty would have been small given that other employees could have performed such tasks. Consequently, the Court holds that Worthington's fill-in duties did not constitute an essential function of her job.
B. Reasonable Accommodations
The ADA defines "reasonable accommodations" as those modifications to the workplace which allow an individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of a job or to enjoy the same benefits and privileges as an employee without a disability. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (o). Reasonable accommodations may include:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modification of examinations, training, materials, or policy, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.42 U.S.C. § 12111(9). This list does not exhaust the potential kinds of accommodations that employers may be required to make. However, reasonable accommodations do not include modifications that would eliminate an essential job function, see Gilbert v. Frank, 949 F.2d 637, 642 (2d Cir. 1991), or require an employer to restrict a person's duties to those only which the individual can perform. See Simmerman v. Hardee's Food Sys., Inc., No. CIV.A.94-6906, 1996 WL 131948, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 1996), aff'd, 118 F.3d 1578 (3d Cir. 1997). Moreover, employers need not accommodate an employee in the exact manner that the employee requests or provide the employee with the "best" possible accommodation. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 app. An accommodation is deemed "reasonable" only when "its costs are not clearly disproportionate to the benefits that it will produce." Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Stone, 118 F.3d at 98.
In Borkowski, the Second Circuit established the following burdens of production and persuasion that govern the reasonable accommodation inquiry:
It follows that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that she can meet the requirements of the job without assistance, or that an accommodation exists that permits her to perform the job's essential functions. . . . As to the requirement that an accommodation be reasonable, we have held that the plaintiff bears only a burden of production. This burden, we have said, is not a heavy one. It is enough for the plaintiff to suggest the existence of a plausible accommodation, the costs of which, facially, do not clearly exceed its benefits. Once the plaintiff has done this, she has made out a prima facie showing that a reasonable accommodation is available, and the risk of nonpersuasion falls on the defendant. At this point the defendant's burden of persuading the factfinder that the plaintiff's proposed accommodation is unreasonable merges, in effect with its burden of showing, as an affirmative defense, that the proposed accommodation would cause it to suffer an undue hardship. For in practice meeting the burden of nonpersuasion on the reasonableness of the accommodation and demonstrating that the accommodation imposes an undue hardship amount to the same thing.
Borkowski, 63 F.3d at 138 (citations omitted); see also Stone, 118 F.3d at 98; Gilbert, 949 F.2d at 642.
An undue hardship means an action requiring significant difficulty or expense in light of the following factors: (1) the nature and cost of the accommodation; (2) the overall financial and personnel resources of the facility or facilities involved and the effect of the accommodation on expenses and resources, or other impact on the operations of the facility or facilities; (3) the overall financial and personnel resources of the employer; and (4) the type of operation or operations of the employer, including the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce, and the geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship between facilities involved. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10).
Based on the evidence, the Court finds that Worthington made a prima facie showing that three accommodations existed — provision of an ergonomic chair, provision of waist-level shelves for parking tag books, and modifications to allow her to perform her job without prolonged periods of standing, reaching, or bending — that would have permitted the plaintiff to perform the essential functions of her job, and whose costs do not facially exceed their benefits. The ergonomic chair requested by the plaintiff cost $1043; however, its benefits were to increase back and neck support and allow Worthington to swivel close to her monitor at work to avoid extensive reaching. Although the parties did not quantify the cost of the other two accommodations, job restructuring and modifications to worksites are specifically contemplated by 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) Worthington's prima facie showing of reasonableness shifted the burden to the City of New Haven to demonstrate that the requested accommodations were unreasonable or would have imposed an undue hardship.
The defendant did not meet this burden. An accommodation may not be considered unreasonable merely because it requires an employer to absorb more than a de minimis cost, see H.R. Rep. No. 485, at 68, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 350, or because it would cost the employer less to obtain the same level of performance from a nondisabled employee. See Lyons, 68 F.3d at 1517; Borkowski, 63 F.3d at 138 n. 3. The defendant employs over 500 persons, and while it may not possess the same financial and personnel resources as a Fortune 500 company, it does retain a significant financial and personnel base. Given the City's resources, the relative cost of providing accommodations to the plaintiff would have been small. Thus, the Court finds that Worthington's requested accommodations were reasonable and would not have imposed an undue hardship on the defendant.
The Court holds that Worthington was a qualified individual with a disability, who could perform the essential functions of her job with reasonable accommodations, from the commencement of her employment to February 13, 1995. Dr. Sella pronounced the plaintiff totally disabled on February 13, 1995, even though she worked for more than a month after this date against his advice. The term "total disability" generally means that a "person is incapacitated from performing any substantial part of his ordinary duties." Black's Law Dictionary 462 (6th ed. 1990). Even with the provision of reasonable accommodations, Worthington could not perform the essential functions of her Account Clerk I position as of February 13, 1995. She thus ceased to be a qualified individual with a disability on this date.
V. Discrimination: Failure to Reasonably Accommodate
The ADA provides that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Discrimination includes:
[N]ot making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or an employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity.42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). In this regard, the City of New Haven argues that it is not liable under the ADA because (1) the plaintiff failed to adequately communicate her limitations and need for accommodations, and (2) the defendant satisfied the plaintiff's requests for accommodations. These contentions possess no merit.
Under the ADA, employers and employees share responsibility for determining an appropriate accommodation, through a flexible, interactive process. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9. The employee possesses the initial responsibility to inform the employer that she needs an accommodation, and to identify the limitation that needs accommodating. See Taylor v. Principal Fin. Group. Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 165 (5th Cir. 1996). An employer has no duty to provide an accommodation for a disability of which it has no knowledge. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 app. However, the ADA does not require employees to suggest a specific type of accommodation in order to trigger the employer's obligation to investigate which reasonable accommodations, if any, might be appropriate. See Sidor v. Reno, No. 95 CIV. 9588 (KMW), 1997 WL 582846, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 1997); Schmidt v. Safeway Inc., 864 F. Supp. 991, 997 (D. Or. 1994) (explaining that employees "need not mention the ADA or even the term `accommodation'" so long as the employer has knowledge of the disability). Once an individual with a disability requests accommodations, the responsibility for fashioning a reasonable accommodation is shared between the employer and the employee. See Beck v. University of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1134-36 (7th Cir. 1996); Porter v. Mesquite Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 3:96-CV-3311-BF, 1998 WL 329361, at *7 (N.D. Tex. June 11, 1998). At this point, the employer must make a reasonable effort to determine an appropriate accommodation based on the particular job involved and consultation with the employee. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 app.; Schmidt, 864 F. Supp. at 997. In circumstances where there is an alleged breakdown of the interactive process, "courts should look for signs of failure to participate in good faith or failure by one of the parties to make reasonable efforts to help the other party determine what specific accommodations are necessary." See Beck, 75 F.3d at 1135; Sidor, 1997 WL 582846, at *7.
This Court declines to follow the more restrictive view of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals that the ADA does not provide a cause of action for an employer's failure to investigate or make reasonable efforts to identify reasonable accommodations. See Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 285 (11th Cir. 1997); Moses v. American Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 446, 448 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1118 (1997).
The Court holds that Worthington satisfied her obligation under the ADA and Section 504 to inform her employer that she had a physical disability which needed to be accommodated. As stated in the Findings of Fact, she repeatedly asked for accommodations, both orally and in written form, from Sal Calderaro, Michael Betz, and Peter Halsey. Each of these individuals possessed supervisory authority to work with Worthington in identifying and implementing reasonable accommodations. The plaintiff also enlisted the aid of Sally Esposito, the Director of the Department of Services for Persons with Disabilities, who proposed accommodations and a specific course of action on the plaintiff's behalf. As suggested by Esposito, Worthington contacted the Connecticut Bureau of Rehabilitation Services in an attempt to facilitate the accommodations process. Finally, the plaintiff filed grievances under the ADA and through her union. The defendant's claim that Worthington failed adequately to communicate her limitations and need for accommodations rings hollow in light of the efforts just described.
In response to Worthington's requests, the City of New Haven dragged its feet. The defendant failed to hire Rehabilitation Engineering Associates to conduct a worksite evaluation, despite the fact that BRS had recommended this action. While the defendant provided the plaintiff with an ergonomic chair in April 1994, this came a full two years after Worthington's initial request and nearly a year and a half after she presented the defendant with Dr. Sella's prescription for the chair. In addition, the City of New Haven never attempted to eliminate or modify the plaintiff's duty to cover for the collections clerk when the clerk was unavailable to collect parking fines from the public, despite knowing that she had an extremely limited ability to perform work while standing. In sum, the evidence shows that the City of New Haven failed to make a reasonable, good faith effort to determine and implement reasonable accommodations in consultation with the plaintiff, and thus discriminated against her in violation of the ADA and Section 504.
After weighing all of the evidence, the Court concludes that the plaintiff has established all of the elements of a violation of Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Therefore, she is entitled to relief.
While the plaintiff pleaded a violation of the Connecticut Constitution article I, § 20 in her Complaint, she all but abandoned this claim in her post-trial brief, spending one sentence on the subject and citing the case of Daly v. DelPonte, 624 A.2d 876 (Conn. 1993). Perhaps the plaintiff recognized the weakness of this claim. The Equal Protection Clause of the Connecticut Constitution provides the same rights as its counterpart in the United States Constitution. See Zapata v. Burns, 542 A.2d 7001 705 (Conn. 1988) Brunswick Corp. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 440 A.2d 792, 797 n. 4 (Conn. 1981). "[T]he concept of equal protection under both the federal and state constitutions has been traditionally viewed as requiring the uniform treatment of persons standing in the same relation to the government action questioned or challenged." Franklin v. Berger, 560 A.2d 444, 447 (Conn. 1989) (citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Reynolds v. Sims, 337 U.S. 533 (1964)).
As these cases make clear, Daly is inapposite to the case at bar. In Daly, the government defendant had treated the disabled plaintiff differently than his nondisabled peers by imposing an additional requirement to get a license, thus forming the basis of an equal protection claim. Our case presents the exact opposite situation. The City of New Haven did not treat Worthington differently than her nondisabled peers. To the contrary, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant violated the ADA and Section 504 precisely because it did not treat her differently (by failing to offer a reasonable accommodation) than her nondisabled peers. Therefore, the Connecticut Constitution article I, § 20 does not provide an avenue for relief.
VI. Relief
The remedies for employment discrimination claims under the ADA and Section 504 are the same as those under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, 12117(a); Armstrong v. Turner Indus., Inc., 141 F.3d 554, 560 (5th Cir. 1998). In establishing a remedy for employment discrimination, the Court's goal should be to make the plaintiff whole and place her in the position she would have been absent the discriminatory conduct. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 254 (1994); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-19 (1975); Muller v. Costello, 997 F. Supp. 299, 305 (N.D.N.Y. 1998). As always, an ADA or Section 504 plaintiff must show a causal link between the specific violations proven and the injuries sustained for which she seeks damages. See Buchanon v. City of San Antonio, 85 F.3d 196, 200 (5th Cir. 1996); Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 144 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that plaintiffs only are "entitled to losses suffered `as a result' of defendants' discrimination")
A. Front Pay
Front pay may be awarded in the sound discretion of the Court. See Reed v. A.W. Lawrence Co., Inc., 95 F.3d 1170, 1182 (2d Cir. 1996). Courts generally consider front pay an equitable remedy that may be awarded where reinstatement is unavailable, see Lussier v. Runyon, 50 F.3d 1103, 1108 (1st Cir. 1995), and the plaintiff has been unable to find another job. See Reed, 95 F.3d at 1182; Padilla v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 92 F.3d 117, 125-26 (2d Cir. 1996). "It follows a fortiori from the equitable nature of the remedy that the decision to award or withhold frontpay is, at the outset, within the equitable discretion of the trial court." Lussier, 50 F.3d 1108 (emphasis in original); see also Saulpaugh, 4 F.3d at 145; 2 Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 6.10(4), at 214 (2d ed. 1993). In a prior ruling, the Court decided that Worthington could receive front pay for the loss of future earnings if she proved a causal relationship at trial between the defendant's failure to accommodate her disability and her inability to work as of February 1995. See Worthington v. City of New Haven, 994 F. Supp. 111, 114 (D. Conn. 1997). Other courts have held that plaintiffs can recover front pay under similar circumstances. See, e.g., Langon v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 959 F.2d 1053, 1061-62 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that "special damages" could be recovered if the defendant's denial of reasonable accommodations caused a deterioration in work performance that lead to the plaintiff's termination); Lussier, 50 F.3d at 1107-08; Saulpaugh, 4 F.3d at 145; Shore v. Federal Express Corp., 777 F.2d 1155, 1158-60 (6th Cir. 1985)
Using its equitable discretion, the Court holds that Worthington cannot recover for the loss of her future earnings after February 13, 1995, because she has not proven by a preponderance of evidence that the defendant's denial of reasonable accommodations was a substantial factor in causing her total disability and inability to work as of this date. The evidence shows that Worthington suffered two major auto accidents in 1983 and 1986, which caused severe orthopaedic injuries to her leg, knee, and arm. By June 1990, she had sustained four knee operations, used a cane to walk, endured fractures and tendon transfers in her right arm, wore a wrist brace, and took several medications. In February 1992, the plaintiff suffered a fall at work, injuring her back, neck, and knee. On June 1, 1994, Worthington underwent a cervical spinal fusion procedure to remedy a condition caused by her prior accidents. She was totally disabled for the next six months. Each of these accidents and resulting injuries were the result of unfortunate circumstances, not the City of New Haven's discriminatory actions. Just as importantly, Dr. Sella's position on the causation issue was contradictory and inconclusive. As a result, it would be sheer speculation to conclude that a causal link existed between the defendant's denial of and delay in implementing reasonable accommodations and the plaintiff's total disability. Front pay thus is not available as a remedy.
B. Compensatory Damages
Worthington may recover compensatory damages for pain and suffering against the City of New Haven for its violation of the ADA and Section 504. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Magnet Cove Pub. Sch., 34 F.3d 642, 644-45 (8th Cir. 1994); Pandazides v. Virginia Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d 823, 829-32 (4th Cir. 1994); Hernandez, 959 F. Supp. at 133-34; DeLeo v. City of Stamford, 919 F. Supp. 70, 74 (D. Conn. 1995); Ali v. City of Clearwater, 807 F. Supp. 701, 704-05 (M.D. Fla. 1992). However, the combined amount of compensatory damages and punitive damages may not exceed the statutory cap of $300,000 for employers with more than 500 employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). While 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(3) provides an exemption from damages for violations of section 12112(b)(5) to employers who attempted reasonable accommodations in good faith, the defendant does not qualify for this protection. It remains undisputed that the plaintiff wanted to continue working at the time she left her job with the defendant. The evidence demonstrates that she made numerous unsuccessful attempts to obtain accommodations over a period of three years. Despite having physical limitations, Worthington refused to become sedentary and made every effort to perform her job for as long as she could. Her testimony revealed that she has suffered pain, humiliation, emotional distress, and financial hardship as a result of the defendant's violations of federal law. Accordingly, the Court awards Worthington compensatory damages in the amount of $150,000.
C. Punitive Damages
Although prevailing plaintiffs may obtain punitive damages against a private party for a violation of the ADA or Section 504, see 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2), punitive damages may not be recovered against a government defendant in such suits. See id. § 1981a(b)(1). The statute governing recovery under the ADA, Section 504, and Title VII provides in relevant part:
A complaining party may recover punitive damages under this section against a respondent (other than a government, government agency, or political subdivision) if the complaining party demonstrates that the respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of the aggrieved individual.
Id. (emphasis added). Presumably, this congressional policy reflects the Supreme Court's ruling in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981), which prohibited the recovery of punitive damages against a municipality in actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Most courts hold that section 1981a(b)(1) does not permit punitive damages to be imposed in an ADA or Section 504 suit against a federal, state, or local government entity. See, e.g., Boyajian v. Runyon, No. CIVA3:93CV1959 (AWT), 1998 WL 229921, at *1 (D. Conn. Apr. 15, 1998); Matos v. Runyon, No. CIVA3:95CV2012 (AWT), 1998 WL 229839, at *6 (D. Conn. Mar. 25, 1998); Winfrey, 957 F. Supp. at 1024; Ausfeldt v. Runyon, 950 F. Supp. 478, 487 (N.D.N.Y. 1997); Tuers v. Runyon, 950 F. Supp. 284, 284-85 (E.D. Cal. 1996); Erickson v. Hunter, 932 F. Supp. 1380, 1385 (M.D. Fla. 1996); Clark v. City of Macon, Ga., 860 F. Supp. 1545, 1552 (M.D. Ga. 1994); Beth v. Espy, 854 F. Supp. 735, 737 (D. Kan. 1994). Hence, the plaintiff may not recover punitive damages.
D. Prejudgment Interest
Prejudgment interest "is an element of complete compensation," Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 558 (1988), and is "presumptively available to victims of federal law violations." McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 973 F.2d 1366, 1372 (7th Cir. 1992). "In a suit to enforce a federal right, the question of whether or not to award prejudgment interest is ordinarily left to the discretion of the district court." Gierlinger v. Gleason, 160 F.3d 858, 873 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Criado, 145 F.3d at 446; Greenway v. Buffalo Hilton Hotel, 143 F.3d 47, 56 (2d Cir. 1998). Courts most often make prejudgment interest available to prevailing parties in employment discrimination cases with respect to back pay awards. See. e.g., Saulpaugh, 4 F.3d at 144-45; Equal Opportunity Employment Comm'n v. County of Erie, 751 F.2d 79, 81 (2d Cir. 1984); Equal Opportunity Employment Comm'n v. Local 638 . . . Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 13 F. Supp.2d 453, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 509 F. Supp. 353, 355 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). However, courts also have awarded prejudgment interest on compensatory damages awards. See Perdue v. City Univ. of N.Y., 13 F. Supp.2d 326, 342 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dep't, 967 F. Supp. 1419, 1436 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
An award of prejudgment interest must take into account the following factors: (1) the need to fully compensate the wronged party for actual damages suffered; (2) considerations of fairness and the relative equities of the award; (3) the remedial purpose of the statute involved; and (4) such other general principles that are deemed relevant by the court. See Securities Exchange Comm'n v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1476 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 57 (1997). The Court has discretion to determine the appropriate rate of prejudgment interest since the Second Circuit has not expressly endorsed any particular interest rate. See McIntosh v. Irving Trust Co., 873 F. Supp. 872, 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). "Courts in this and other circuits have used various interest rates including the postjudgment interest rate provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1961, statutory interest rates, or market rates." Frank v. Relin, 851 F. Supp. 87, 91 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (citations omitted). For example, courts used the adjusted prime rate of interest in County of Erie, 751 F.2d at 82, the New York statutory rate in Malarkey v. Texaco, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 1237, 1243 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd, 983 F.2d 1204 (2d Cir. 1993), and section 1961's postjudgment fifty-two week treasury bill rate in Frank, 851 F. Supp. at 91.
Nevertheless, courts appear to favor the postjudgment statutory rate pursuant to section 1961, see infra, because it takes into account the effects of inflation, but does not overly compensate the plaintiff. See Turley v. New York City Police Dep't, 988 F. Supp. 675, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Stratton v. Department for the Aging for the City of N.Y., No. 91 Civ. 6623 (SAS), 1996 WL 352909, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); McIntosh, 873 F. Supp. at 883. Courts also typically calculate interest at a compounded rate in order to make the plaintiff whole. See McIntosh, 873 F. Supp. at 883; Frank, 851 F. Supp. at 91. The Court will follow both of these approaches and awards the plaintiff compound interest at the section 1961 rate from the time she filed suit on April 13, 1994 until the date of judgment, to be determined by the average auction price for the last auction of fifty-two week United Treasury Bills settled immediately prior to the date of judgment.
E. Postjudgment Interest
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1961, prevailing plaintiffs are entitled to postjudgment interest on all money judgments obtained in federal court. See Ford v. Uniroyal Pension Plan, 154 F.3d 613, 616 (6th Cir. 1998); Greenway, 143 F.3d at 55. "Post-judgment interest is designed to compensate the plaintiff for the delay it suffers from the time damages are reduced to an enforceable judgment to the time the defendant pays the judgment." Andrulonis v. United States, 26 F.3d 1224, 1230 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Reed, 95 F.3d at 1182. According to federal law, postjudgment interest
[S]hall be calculated from the date of the entry of the judgment, at a rate equal to the coupon issue yield equivalent (as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury) of the average accepted auction price for the last auction of fifty-two week United States Treasury bills settled immediately prior to the date of judgment.28 U.S.C. § 1961(a). The Court orders the defendant to pay the plaintiff postjudgment interest on her damages award at this rate.
ORDER OF JUDGMENT
(1) For the reasons set forth above, the Court orders entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff Patricia Worthington against defendant City of New Haven in the amount of $150,000 in compensatory damages and prejudgment interest to be calculated as set forth above. The Court also orders the defendant to pay the plaintiff postjudgment interest on her damages award at the same rate as prejudgment interest. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
(2) If plaintiff's counsel wishes to file a motion for attorney's fees, she shall do so in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil procedure 54(d)(2) within fourteen days from this date. If the defendant wishes to oppose this application, it shall do so within ten days thereafter.
SO ORDERED.