Opinion
Civ No. 99-2194, SECTION "G".
January 31, 2000.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Background
Presently before the court are two motions. Defendant Daybrook Fisheries, Inc. ("Defendant" or "Daybrook") brings a motion for summary judgment seeking to have me enforce a settlement agreement entered into by the parties, Daybrook and Robert Wortham ("Plaintiff" or "Wortham"), through their respective attorneys on December 1, 1999, pursuant to which I entered a sixty-day order of dismissal that same day. Plaintiff moves to vacate the order of dismissal and/or administratively close this matter pending his release from Ventress Correctional Facility in Clayton, Alabama.
Plaintiff's claim arises out of an alleged work-related accident which occurred on board one of the purse boats assigned to the Daybrook vessel, F/V VASCO DA GAMA, on or about September 25, 1997. Robert Wortham worked as a fisherman on board the vessel, and claims that his head and neck were injured when a piece of equipment came loose from the vessel and struck him on the forehead, knocking him unconscious.
As a result of these injuries, plaintiff filed suit against Daybrook in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688. The action was transferred to this district pursuant to defendant's venue/personal jurisdiction motion. Pursuant to an amended complaint, plaintiff seeks $1.5 million in damages and $50,000 in maintenance and cure.
After the action was transferred to this district, plaintiff was arrested and incarcerated in the Ventress Correctional Facility in Clayton, Alabama. The plaintiff's incarceration has hampered the prosecution and defense of the claim, including taking depositions of plaintiff and his doctors and conducting independent medical examinations. In November 1999, arrangements were made to depose plaintiff in prison and to depose plaintiff's treating physicians on or about December 6, 1999.
As the date for this discovery approached, the attorneys began to talk settlement. On December 1, 1999, plaintiff's counsel contacted the attorney for Daybrook and advised that Mr. Wortham desired to settle his claim for $100,000.00, a figure previously agreed upon by both parties' lawyers after intense negotiation. Daybrook accepted the offer made by plaintiff's counsel, and plaintiff's counsel confirmed the settlement by letter to defense counsel and advised the court in writing of the settlement and requested entry of a sixty-day dismissal order from the court. Pursuant to plaintiff's counsel's letter, I entered a sixty day order of dismissal on December 1, 1999, and the case was administratively closed.
See Exhibit 1 to Daybrook's Motion for Summary Judgment.
See Exhibit 2 to Daybrook's Motion for Summary Judgment.
See Exhibit 3 to Daybrook's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Following these events, plaintiff refused to execute the release documents and accept settlement funds from Daybrook. Apparently, a third party, Ms. Nellina Taylor, plaintiff's purported "power of attorney," was not satisfied with the terms of the settlement and dissuaded plaintiff from executing the documents.
This is not simply defendant's speculation; plaintiff counsel has communicated as much to the court in conversations leading up to these motions.
Daybrook seeks enforcement of the settlement by motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff opposes defendant's motion on grounds that he did not have adequate understanding of the settlement and its legal implications. Plaintiff moves to have the order of dismissal vacated on these same grounds and to administratively close the case until he is released from prison. Defendant opposes plaintiff's motion.
Discussion
I reopen the case now solely for purposes of ruling on the motions before me.
The United States Fifth Circuit recognizes that in the absence of a factual basis rendering it invalid, an agreement to settle a personal injury cause of action within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the federal courts is enforceable and cannot be repudiated. In Jones Act cases, the Fifth Circuit has stated that "[the] ultimate concern . . . is whether, at the time the seaman relinquished [his] rights, he did so with `an informed understanding of his rights and a full appreciation of the consequences' of executing the release, where the burden of demonstrating such understanding rests with the party claiming that the matter has been settled.
See Strange v. Gulf South American Steamship Co. Inc., 495 F.2d 1235, 1236 (5th Cir. 1974) (citations omitted)
See Borne v. A P Boat Rentals No. 4. Inc., 780 F.2d 1254, 1256 (5th Cir. 1986) ( citing Cates v. United States, 451 F.2d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 1971), quoted with approval in Bass v. Phoenix Seadrill/78. Ltd., 749 F.2d at 1161; Charnentier v. Fluor Ocean Services. Inc., 613 F.2d 81, 84 (5th Cir. 1980).
Id. ( citing Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co. Inc., 317 U.S. 239, 248, 63 S.Ct. 246, 252, 87 L.Ed. 239 (1942); Gueho v. Diamond M. Drilling Co., 524 F.2d 986, 987 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 976, 96 S.Ct. 2177, 48 L.Ed.2d 800 (1976)).
In applying this standard, the Fifth Circuit looks to whether the parties have negotiated at arms-length and in apparent good faith, whether the competency of counsel or the adequacy of medical or legal advice is questioned, and whether there is any appearance of "taint or fraud, deception, coercion or overreaching . . . in the negotiations eventuating in the settlement." Adequacy of the settlement consideration has been considered relevant to the extent that it indicates "whether the seaman had a full understanding of his rights and of the consequences of the settlement agreement."
Id. ( citing Strange v. Gulf South American Steamship Co. Inc., 495 F.2d 1235. 1236 (5th Cir. 1974)
Id. at 1257 ( citing Bass v. Phoenix Seadrill/78. Ltd., 749 F.2d at 1161).
Underlying this determination is the tension between the principle that, as a ward of the admiralty, a seaman such a plaintiff is entitled to vigilant protection to avoid overreaching. At the same time, the Fifth Circuit recognizes the hazard associated with too stringent a rule on whether a settlement will be set aside. "If employers are denied any degree of confidence in the finality of a settlement, seamen will lose the option to settle since employers will have little incentive to avoid a full-scale trial on the merits. Denying seamen that option is no kindness."
Id. at 1257.
Id. at 1257.
Here, plaintiff argues conclusorily that he did not have "an actual understanding of the settlement and legal implications of authorizing his attorney to make an offer of settlement to the defendant."
Plaintiff offers no facts or evidence to suggest medical or legal incompetency, limited intelligence, coercion or overreaching. Although there has been previous allusion to a power of attorney for plaintiff, the nature of that power of attorney is entirely unclear and plaintiff does not argue that fact in his opposition. Correspondence in the record from Ms. Taylor, the purported power of attorney, suggest that plaintiff is able to understand these proceedings and to communicate with Ms. Taylor.
Plaintiff was represented by and acted on the advice of counsel, counsel that he does not contend was incompetent. At most, plaintiff appears to claim that he did not understand the legal implications of his settlement.
The settlement was reached after issue had been joined and there had been at least some investigation of the claim. Still, this case involves less factual development than either of the cases cited by defendant, in which settlements were enforced.
Having reviewed the allegations and record documents, I do not find the settlement consideration of $100,000 so inadequate as to support a finding that Wortham was ill-informed of his rights and the consequences of agreeing to settle. I make this statement tentatively, however, in view of the absence of record evidence concerning plaintiff's medical condition and the quantum alleged (presumably in good faith) by plaintiff in his complaint.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion for summary judgment enforcing settlement will be denied at this time, although I decline to vacate the settlement. This matter shall instead remain administratively closed until plaintiff is released from prison and is able to appear before me and testify concerning his understanding or lack thereof of the settlement reached with defendant.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that defendant's motion for summary judgment and plaintiff's motion to vacate dismissal ARE DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter shall remain ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSED pending plaintiff's release from prison, at which time he shall seek to have the matter reopened for consideration of the motion for summary judgment and the motion to vacate dismissal order.