The Judicial Commission, on the other hand, posits the theory that a judge's interests must be defined narrowly to mean only proprietary or pecuniary interests. For support, it turns to a dissenting opinion in Worth v. Benton County Circuit Court, 351 Ark. 149, 89 S.W.3d 891 (2002), where the dissenting justice defined a judge's economic interest in the case of disqualification under Canon 3 as "a personal proprietary or pecuniary interest or one affecting the individual rights of the judge." 351 Ark. at 165, 89 S.W.3d at 901 (Glaze, J. dissenting).
Both our court and the supreme court once held that a judge's disqualification may be reached for the first time on appeal, see Adams v. State, 269 Ark. 548, 551-52, 601 S.W.2d 881, 884 (1980); see also Green v. State, 21 Ark. App. 80, 81, 84-85, 729 S.W.2d 17, 20 (1987). However, in Worth v. Benton County Circuit Court, 351 Ark. 149, 154-55, 89 S.W.3d 891, 895 (2002), the supreme court held that a judge's alleged disqualification may be waived "by a failure to seasonably object." Worth, 351 Ark. at 154, 89 S.W.3d at 895.
The disqualification of a judge may be waived by the failure to timely object. Worth v. Benton Cty. Circuit Court, 351 Ark. 149, 89 S.W.3d 891 (2002). Petition denied.
The disqualification of a judge may be waived by the failure to timely object. Worth v. Benton Cty. Circuit Court, 351 Ark. 149, 89 S.W.3d 891 (2002). Finally, Rayford has presented no authority or convincing argument that a posttrial order pertaining to the preparation of a record on appeal and entered over a year after the judgment of conviction was entered and executed had any impact on the validity of that judgment.
This court said that the Rule of Necessity is most likely invoked in situations where the filing of a suit whose resolution will directly affect the pecuniary well-being of judges as a whole, such as a suit seeking the increase in judicial pay or retirement benefits. Also, after the Villines v. Harris case was in this court in 2000, we delivered the important case of Worth v. Benton County Circuit Court, 351 Ark 149, 89 S.W.3d 891 (2002), where county property owners sued Benton County and other taxing authorities, alleging ad valorem taxes were illegal exactions in violation of the state constitutional rollback provision. There, the presiding judge and his family members stood to gain in the refund of taxes that could occur, as well as any rollback that might result.
[5, 6] The logical conclusion that arises from the above noted facts is that Valley concluded that he would be better served by a judge other than Judge Simes. The facts show Valley wanted a judge other than Judge Simes. The desire for a different judge does not support disqualification of a judge. See, e.g., Worth v. Benton County Circuit Court, 351 Ark. 149, 89 S.W.3d 891 (2002). A judge bears a duty not to recuse when no prejudice exists.
[4-7] A trial judge has a duty not to recuse from a case where no prejudice exists. Worth v. Benton County Cir. Court, 351 Ark. 149, 89 S.W.3d 891 (2002). Thus, if there is no valid reason for the judge to disqualify himself or herself, he or she has a duty to remain on a case.
See Nowlin v. Kreis, 213 Ark. 1027, 214 S.W.2d 221 (1948); Ingram v. Raiford, 174 Ark. 1127, 298 S.W. 507 (1927). In Worth v. Benton County Circuit Court, 351 Ark. 149, 154-55, 89 S.W.3d 891, 895 (2002), the supreme court held that a judge's alleged disqualification may be waived "by a failure to seasonably object." In Ashley v. Ashley, 2012 Ark.App. 230, at 34, we held that "[t]o preserve a claim of judicial bias for review, appellant must have made a timely motion to the circuit court to recuse."
There is an affirmative duty not to recuse where no conflict exists. See Worth v. Benton Cnty. Cir. Ct., 351 Ark. 149, 156, 89 S.W.3d 891, 896 (2002).
There is an affirmative duty not to recuse where no conflict exists. See Worth v. Benton Cnty. Cir. Ct., 351 Ark. 149, 156, 89 S.W.3d 891, 896 (2002).