Opinion
March 28, 1988
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Meehan, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The petitioners own a parcel of land in the Town of Orange-town which is improved by a residence and which is adjacent to Blauvelt State Park. Allegedly, the parcel is landlocked and the only feasible access to it is through an existing driveway from Tweed Boulevard through Blauvelt State Park. Prior to purchasing the parcel in question from their predecessor in title, Kyriena Ziloti, the petitioners sought to obtain an easement from the respondents, who have immediate operational control over Blauvelt State Park (see, 9 NYCRR 381.7). As reflected in the minutes of the respondents' September 24, 1984 meeting, the following resolution was passed: "RESOLVED that an easement be granted to Miss Ziloti for a 50-year period, for a fee to be determined by Management on the basis of a professional appraisal of the property."
Although the petitioners expressly conditioned the sale of the subject parcel upon their ability to obtain an extension of the existing easement from the respondent Commission, they nevertheless took title to the property with full knowledge that the grant of the easement had not been finally approved.
The petitioners allegedly purchased the subject parcel in reliance upon this resolution as well as upon various communications with the respondent Nash Castro, the Executive Director of the Palisades Interstate Park Commission. By letter dated December 3, 1985, the petitioners were informed that the grant of the easement would have to be executed by the Office of Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation, the Attorney-General and the Comptroller of the State of New York. The petitioners alleged that Executive Director Castro assured them that the execution of the documents by this office was a mere formality. However, the Office of Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation subsequently withheld its approval of the easement on the ground that it contravened PRHPL 13.06, which requires that any grant of an easement serve a "public purpose". The petitioners thereafter commenced the instant proceeding to compel the grant of the subject easement.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition after finding that the respondents lacked the authority to grant the subject easement since it was not for a "public purpose." The petitioners now challenge this finding and contend that the September 24, 1984 resolution and the correspondence with the Palisades Interstate Park Commission evidence an enforceable contract which entitles them to specific performance. Alternatively, the petitioners claim that the respondents should be equitably estopped from denying the grant of the easement.
It is axiomatic that "[w]hen the plain language of the statute is precise and unambiguous, it is determinative" (Matter of Washington Post Co. v. New York State Ins. Dept., 61 N.Y.2d 557, 565). In the instant case, the plain language of PRHPL 13.06 provides that any grant of an easement must serve a "public purpose". The exclusively private use of the proposed easement to provide ingress and egress to the owners of the subject property does not fall within the definition of a public purpose (cf., Matter of Altona Citizens Comm. v. Town of Altona, 54 N.Y.2d 908; Murphy v. Erie County, 28 N.Y.2d 80, rearg denied 29 N.Y.2d 551). Consequently, the Supreme Court properly found that the respondents lack the authority to grant the easement sought by the petitioners.
Moreover, the record contains no evidence indicating that either the Office of Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation was privy to the purported agreement or that it had delegated its authority to enter into the contract to the Palisades Interstate Park Commission or to the respondent Castro. Thus, the written evidence of the purported agreement does not satisfy the Statute of Frauds (see, General Obligations Law § 5-703; Read v Henzel, 67 A.D.2d 186, 188-189) and is, therefore, unenforceable.
Finally, the facts at bar do not warrant the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Generally, estoppel may not be invoked against a governmental agency to prevent it from discharging its statutory duties (see, Matter of Parkview Assocs. v. City of New York, 71 N.Y.2d 274, 278-279; Matter of E.F.S. Ventures Corp. v. Foster, 71 N.Y.2d 359; Scruggs-Leftwich v Rivercross Tenants' Corp., 70 N.Y.2d 849, 852). "Moreover, `[e]stoppel is not available against a local government unit for the purpose of ratifying an administrative error'" (Matter of Parkview Assocs. v. City of New York, supra, at 282). At bar, the easement was properly denied because it contravened the legislative mandate that an easement over park lands be granted for a "public purpose". As such, a judicial estoppel preventing the respondents from complying with this statutory mandate would place the court in opposition to the Legislature and constitute a usurpation of that body's prerogative (cf., Bender v. New York City Health Hosps. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 662; Eden v. Board of Trustees, 49 A.D.2d 277). Thus, we find that the equities presented in the situation at bar do not warrant a departure from the general rule which forecloses a party from asserting the defense of equitable estoppel against a governmental unit. Moreover, "[a] party contracting with the State is chargeable with knowledge of the statutes which regulate its contracting powers and is bound by them" (Parsa v. State of New York, 64 N.Y.2d 143, 147, rearg denied 64 N.Y.2d 885; see also, Matter of Parkview Assocs. v. City of New York, supra). Thompson, J.P., Brown, Weinstein and Sullivan, JJ., concur.