The third-party complaint in that case having alleged that the third-party defendant's negligence was the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, this court correctly held that the third-party defendant's motions to dismiss should have been granted. Also see Worrill v. Pitney-Bowes, Inc., 119 Ga. App. 258 ( 167 S.E.2d 236) and Whitehead v. Central of Ga. R. Co., 126 Ga. App. 407. 2. "[I]mpleader is proper only when a right to relief exists under the applicable substantive law."

Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Lester, 118 Ga. App. 794 ( 165 S.E.2d 587). The situation here does not come within that rule, and the refusal of the trial court to implead [Philips] was proper." Worrill v. Pitney-Bowes, 119 Ga. App. 258 ( 167 S.E.2d 236) (1969); Burroughs Corp. v. Outside Carpets, 127 Ga. App. 622 (2) ( 194 S.E.2d 487) (1972). Therefore, Enumeration No. 10 is without merit.

The court was also correct to dismiss appellant's impleader action, as that action did not constitute an attempt to render Burgamy secondarily liable for any part of the bank's claim against appellant. Code § 81A-114 (a); Worrill v. Pitney-Bowes, Inc., 119 Ga. App. 258 ( 167 S.E.2d 236) (1969); Wolski v. Hayes, 144 Ga. App. 180 ( 240 S.E.2d 720) (1977). 3. "When the presence of parties other than those to the original action is required for the granting of complete relief in the determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall order them to be brought in as defendants as provided in this Title, if jurisdiction of them can be obtained."

This court has held many times that a third-party complaint must show that the third-party defendant is secondarily liable to the third-party plaintiff. Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Lester, 118 Ga. App. 794 (2) ( 165 S.E.2d 587); Worrill v. Pitney-Bowes, Inc., 119 Ga. App. 258 ( 167 S.E.2d 236). Quoting from Kooman, Federal Civil Practice, this court held in Mathews v. McConnell, 124 Ga. App. 519 ( 184 S.E.2d 491): "The absolute requirement of every third-party proceeding is that its purpose must be to impose upon the third-party defendant a liability for part or all of the liability asserted by the original plaintiff against the third-party plaintiff. A third-party action may be maintained only against one who is secondarily liable to the original defendant for part or all of the original plaintiff's claim.

The evidence on the hearing of the motion for summary judgment establishes unequivocally that there is no secondary liability on the part of the third party defendant to the original defendant "as in cases of indemnity, subrogation, contribution, warranty and the like." Worrill v. Pitney-Bowes, Inc., 119 Ga. App. 258 ( 167 S.E.2d 236). The landlord's motion for summary judgment was properly sustained. Judgment affirmed. Bell, C. J., and Quillian, J., concur.

An appeal followed to our court. In Worrill v. Pitney-Bowes, Inc., 119 Ga. App. 258 ( 167 S.E.2d 236) the ruling of the lower court was affirmed. Rehearing was denied February 28, 1969, and certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court. Thus the third-party action terminated adverse to Worrill.

Only one who is secondarily liable to the original defendant may be brought in as a third-party defendant, as in cases of indemnity, subrogation, contribution, warranty and the like. See Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Lester, 118 Ga. App. 794, 801 ( 165 S.E.2d 587); Worrill v. Pitney-Bowes, Inc., 119 Ga. App. 258 ( 167 S.E.2d 236). Code Ann. § 81A-114 (a) ( § 14 CPA; Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609, 627; 1969, p. 979) allows a defendant as a third-party plaintiff to cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the action "who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him." Here, the main action contends that National Acceptance Co. is the lessor of certain equipment leased to the defendant, Outside Carpets, Inc. It is true that Outside Carpets, Inc., as third-party plaintiff, has filed a breach of warranty complaint against Burroughs Corporation, the third-party defendant.

Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Lester, 118 Ga. App. 794, 801 ( 165 S.E.2d 587). See Worrill v. Pitney-Bowes, Inc., 119 Ga. App. 258 ( 167 S.E.2d 236). In Bill Heard Chevrolet Co. v. G. M. A. C., 120 Ga. App. 328, 330 ( 170 S.E.2d 454), this court cited with approval the Colorado court's holding ( 314 P.2d 903) that: "Rule 14 (a) does not permit nor does it grant discretion to the court to implead when there are separate and independent controversies between the defendant and his desired third-party defendant."

The third-party proceeding applies solely to a defendant bringing in a third-party who is or may be liable over to him in the event of a recovery by the plaintiff in the main action. Worrill v. Pitney-Bowes, Inc., 119 Ga. App. 258 ( 167 S.E.2d 236); Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Lester, 118 Ga. App. 794, 800, supra, and citations. No such case is pleaded here; in fact, the pleading of this "third-party complainant" denies such a status exists and therefore affirmatively shows that no third-party claim exists.

See Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Lester, 118 Ga. App. 794, 800 ( 165 S.E.2d 587). This was followed in Worrill v. Pitney-Bowes, Inc., 119 Ga. App. 258 ( 167 S.E.2d 236) which cites the Central of Ga. case as authority for the proposition that "[o]nly one who is secondarily liable to the original defendant may be brought in as a third-party defendant, as in cases of indemnity, subrogation, contribution, warranty and the like." Cases such as the above, where the original defendant, as a third-party plaintiff, is attempting merely to provide the plaintiff with another or substitute defendant, without disclosing any legal basis of liability to the third-party plaintiff, so as to come within the rule itself, which specifically provides that the third-party complaint must show that the third-party defendant "is or may be liable to" the third-party plaintiff, i.e., the original defendant, "for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against" the third-party plaintiff, are inapposite to the present case.