¶ 14 First, Dus argues that the September 22 ruling was not a ruling on the merits of his posttrial motion but, rather, was “tantamount to ‘striking’ the motion from the calendar for failure of the movant to appear.” Citing Workman v. St. Therese Medical Center, 266 Ill.App.3d 286, 203 Ill.Dec. 690, 640 N.E.2d 349 (1994), Dus maintains that a trial court has jurisdiction to reconsider and vacate an order striking a posttrial motion and to reinstate the motion within 30 days of the entry of the order striking the motion. This argument fails.

See Krasnow, 78 Ill.2d 42 (attorney advised client not to give medical history to defendant's doctor); Martzaklis v. 5559 Belmont Corp., 157 Ill. App.3d 731 (1987) (attorney instructed investigator to misrepresent himself to secure discovery from a witness after the discovery closure date); In re Marriage of Brack, 149 Ill. App.3d 777 (1986) (attorney refused to produce requested document in his possession). The imposition of sanctions for the noncompliance with discovery rules and orders rests largely within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on review absent a clear abuse of discretion. Workman v. St. Therese Medical Center, 266 Ill. App.3d 286, 293 (1994). However, sanction orders are to be imposed only when the noncompliance is unreasonable and the order entered is just. Workman, 266 Ill. App.3d at 293.

¶ 24 A trial court retains jurisdiction to consider judgments and orders within 30 days of entry of said judgments and orders. Workman v. St. Therese Medical Center, 266 Ill.App.3d 286, 291–92, 203 Ill.Dec. 690, 640 N.E.2d 349 (1994). Accordingly, a trial court has the authority to vacate an order striking a motion to reconsider and to reinstate the motion within that 30–day period.

A plaintiff's repeated failures to comply with discovery deadlines ordered by the court and pay court-ordered sanctions demonstrate "a deliberate and wilful disregard of the court's authority" that justifies dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint. See Workman v. St. Therese Medical Center, 266 Ill.App.3d 286, 293-94 (1994).

Weber argues that her second post-judgment motion was filed within the 30-day period during which a trial court retains jurisdiction over a matter after disposing of it. She contends that this is sufficient to allow the trial court to rule on her motion and that the trial court's "stay" of the notice of appeal was an implicit vacation of its June 6 ruling on Weber's first post-judgment motion, citing to Workman v. St. Therese Medical Center, 266 Ill. App.3d 286 (1994), for support. Workman is factually distinguishable.

Defendant argues that the net effect of the January 9, 1992, dismissal was to preclude review by this court. We disagree and find this case is controlled by this court's decision in Workman v. St. Therese Medical Center, 266 Ill. App.3d 286 (1994). In Workman, this court held that the striking of a motion to reconsider did not trigger the period in which a notice of appeal had to be filed, where the order striking the motion to vacate was thereafter vacated, and the motion to reconsider the judgments of dismissal was reinstated as a pending motion.

Yazzin , 224 Ill. App. 3d at 291, 166 Ill.Dec. 575, 586 N.E.2d 533.¶ 26 This case is distinguishable from the circumstances presented in Workman v. St. Therese Medical Center , 266 Ill. App. 3d 286, 291, 203 Ill.Dec. 690, 640 N.E.2d 349 (1994), where the circuit court's order striking the plaintiff's motion to reconsider was vacated, thus the motion to reconsider was reinstated as a pending motion.¶ 27 Nor are the circumstances presented here similar to those in Yang v. Chen , 283 Ill. App. 3d 80, 82, 218 Ill.Dec. 655, 669 N.E.2d 1181 (1996), where the plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider on June 18, 1993, within 30 days of the entry of a May 21, 1993, dismissal order.

Such a reading makes no sense. Trial courts normally retain jurisdiction for 30 days after the last action taken by them. "We acknowledge that, as a general matter, a ‘trial court retains jurisdiction to reconsider judgments and orders within 30 days of their entry.’ " Dus v. Provena St. Mary's Hospital , 2012 IL App (3d) 091064, ¶ 14 n.2, 360 Ill.Dec. 425, 968 N.E.2d 1178 (quoting Workman v. St. Therese Medical Center , 266 Ill. App. 3d 286, 291-92, 203 Ill.Dec. 690, 640 N.E.2d 349 (1994) ); see also People v. Heil , 71 Ill. 2d 458, 461, 17 Ill.Dec. 673, 376 N.E.2d 1002 (1978) ; Weilmuenster v. H.H. Hall Construction Co. , 72 Ill. App. 3d 101, 105, 28 Ill.Dec. 412, 390 N.E.2d 579 (1979). Nowhere does the majority attempt to explain how this claimed "lapsed" jurisdiction can coexist with, let alone overrule, this basic rule of law.

Thus, the order voluntarily dismissing the foreclosure action without prejudice was a final order and appealable by defendants. ¶ 25 "A trial court retains jurisdiction to consider judgments and orders within 30 days of entry of said judgments and orders." Won v. Grant Park 2, L.L.C., 2013 Il App (1st) 122523, ¶ 24 (citing Workman v. St. Therese Medical Center, 266 Ill. App. 3d 286, 291-92 (1994)). Further "[a]lthough a Supreme Court Rule 137 motion is not considered a post-trial motion, it is considered to be a claim for relief within the underlying action."

11 ¶ 36 As a general matter, a circuit court retains jurisdiction to reconsider judgments and orders within 30 days of their entry. Workman v. St. Therese Medical Center, 266 Ill. App. 3d 286, 291-92 (1994). After the expiration of the 30-day period, the circuit court loses the jurisdiction to amend, modify or vacate its judgments unless a petition has been filed sufficient to warrant relief from final judgments after 30 days of their entry.