Thus, group pleading is permissible so long as it provides notice to each defendant of the contours of the alleged deprivation and that he or she is alleged to have participated in it.”). That is not the case here, where Plaintiffs, with the assertion of facts common to all Counts and the use of specific subheadings, provided detail far exceeding what was required under Rule 8(a)(2). See Wordlaw v. Enter. Leasing Co. of Chicago, LLC, No. 20-cv-3200, 2020 WL 7490414, *3 (N.D. Ill.Dec. 21, 2020) (finding, in a case arising under BIPA, the plaintiff alleged enough to put each defendant on notice of their alleged wrongdoing where “she plan[ned] to prove that both defendants violated BIPA, even though she [wa]s currently unable to allege which one in particular installed and controlled the timekeeping system”); (Doc. 21, pgs. 4-14)
Plaintiff has alleged that Supply Network implemented a timekeeping system that collected his biometrics and then shared them (without his consent) with its payroll vendor. See Wordlaw v. Enter. Leasing Co. of Chi., LLC, 2020 WL 7490414, at *4 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (finding allegations of disclosure based upon “information and belief” sufficient); Naughton v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2022 WL 19324, at *4 (N.D. Ill. 2022) (plaintiff pleaded “plausible dissemination” by alleging that Amazon collected his biometric information and disclosed that information to “other Amazon entities” and “third-party biometric device and software vendor(s).”).
It can be reasonably (and obviously) inferred from those allegations that Omnitracs' collection (or “obtain[ing]”) of the facial geometry scans entailed Omnitracs being “in possession” of the scans. See Wordlaw v. Enter. Leasing Co. of Chicago, 2020 WL 7490414, at *4 (N.D. Ill.Dec. 21, 2020) (reasoning that defendants' “collection” of biometric data “raises a reasonable (and obvious) inference that, once collected, defendants possessed the [data]”). At this stage, then, Hernandez has adequately stated a § 15(a) claim.
Another court within this district found as much in a similar case.See Wordlaw v. Enter. Leasing Co. of Chi., 2020 WL 7490414 (N.D. Ill.Dec. 21, 2020). In Wordlaw, the plaintiff alleged that, as part of her employment, she was required to use a biometric scanning device that scanned her fingerprints at the beginning and end of her shift.
As multiple Illinois federal courts have found, a BIPA plaintiff may defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion without providing detailed factual allegations regarding a defendant's failure to implement safety measures. See Heard v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 524 F.Supp.3d 831, 843 (N.D. Ill. 2021) (denying motion to dismiss BIPA claim where plaintiff alleged that defendant disseminated biometric data to third-party data centers, finding that plaintiff did not need to identify those third parties by name); Wordlaw v. Enter. Leasing Co. of Chicago, LLC, No. 20-cv-3200, 2020 WL 7490414, at *4 (N.D. Ill.Dec. 21, 2020) (same). As Plaintiff has properly pled facts to defeat Defendant's Motion as to her BIPA claim, Defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Those allegations, backed by the certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 that they have or are likely to have evidentiary support, are sufficient to proceed against Topoll. Wordlaw v. Enter. Leasing Co. of Chicago, LLC, No. 20 CV 3200, 2020 WL 7490414, at *3 (N.D. Ill.Dec. 21, 2020); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b)(2).
In re Clearview AI, 2022 WL 252702, at *3. Plaintiffs' allegations sufficiently suggest that NCR used third-party vendors and thus disseminated Plaintiffs' biometric data to them, which is all that they must do to proceed to discovery on this claim.See Naughton v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 20-cv-6485, 2022 WL 19324, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 2022) (plaintiff pleaded “plausible dissemination” by alleging that Amazon collected his biometric information and disclosed that information to “other Amazon entities” and “third-party biometric device and software vendor(s)”); Heard II, 524 F.Supp.3d at 843 (amended complaint suggested dissemination through affirmative allegations that the employer disseminated biometric information to third-party data centers); Wordlaw v. Enter. Leasing Co. of Chicago, LLC, 2020 WL 7490414, at *4 (N.D. Ill.Dec. 21, 2020) (plaintiff need not include “detailed factual allegations” to support § 15(d) claim, with allegation that “Defendants implemented a timekeeping system that collected her biometrics and then shared them-without her consent-with subsidiaries, data storage vendors, and payroll service providers” enough)
"Enacted in 2008, BIPA aims to protect the privacy interests of personal biometric information, including fingerprints." See Herron v. Gold Standard Baking, Inc., 2021 WL 1340804, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 2021); see also Wordlaw v. Enter. Leasing Co. of Chicago, LLC, 2020 WL 7490414, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2020) ("BIPA protects individuals' uniquely sensitive privacy interests in their personal biometric information, including their fingerprints."); Bryant v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc., 958 F.3d 617, 626 (7th Cir. 2020) ("The judgment of Illinois's General Assembly [in codifying BIPA] is that the sensitivity of biometric information and the risk of identity theft or other privacy or economic harm that may result from its dissemination, necessitates that people be given the opportunity to make informed choices about to whom and for what purpose they will relinquish control of that information."); Cothron v. White Castle Sys., Inc., 20 F.4th 1156, 1161 (7th Cir. 2021) (noting that at least one section of BIPA "protect[s] a person's privacy interest in his unique biometric data, so a noncompliant collection of biometric data amounts to an invasion of an individual's private domain, much like an act of trespass") (cleaned up).
(See Opposition at 25-26.) The courts in Wordlaw v. Enterprise Leasing Co. of Chicago, LLC, No. 20 CV 3200, 2020 WL 7490414, at *3 (N.D. Ill.Dec. 21, 2020), and Cunningham v. Foresters Financial Services, Inc., 300 F.Supp.3d 1004, 1016 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 9, 2018), allowed plaintiffs to pursue claims against multiple defendants where plaintiffs stated facts connecting defendants to the alleged harm but did not fully flesh out the relationships between defendants. In both cases, however, the plaintiffs could not reasonably be expected to provide the missing information without the benefit of discovery. See Wordlaw, 2020 WL 7490414, at *3; Cunningham, 300 F.Supp.3d at 1016.
Further, courts have concluded that “BIPA injuries are not compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act” because the “privacy injuries BIPA protects are not the kind of intangible injuries compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act.” Wordlaw v. Enter. Leasing Co. of Chicago, LLC, No. 20 CV 3200, 2020 WL 7490414, at *3 (N.D. Ill.Dec. 21, 2020). Indeed, the Illinois state and federal courts to have considered the issue agree that the IWCA's exclusivity provision does not bar a BIPA claim.