We acknowledge that there is support for the notion that Mother's failure to specifically rely on Rule 78.04 "is sufficient, in itself, to deny h[er] the benefits of that rule." Koppenaal v. Director of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 446, 451 (Mo.App. W.D. 1999) (citing Rule 73.01(a)(5) (1998), the former rule relating to a motion to amend the judgment); see also Wooten v. Williams, 827 S.W.2d 282, 284 n. 2 (Mo.App.E.D. 1992); contra Blue Ridge Bank and Trust Co. v. Hart, 152 S.W.3d 420, 425 (Mo.App.W.D. 2005). Since such denial is not required, we decline to do so here.
See, e.g., Dangerfield v. City of Kansas City, 108 S.W.3d 769, 774 (Mo.App. 2003); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hart, 41 S.W.3d 504, 512 (Mo.App. 2000); Koppenaal v. Dir. of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 446, 451 (Mo.App. 1999); Burns v. Dir. of Revenue, 784 S.W.2d 918, 919-20 (Mo.App. 1990). This court also disagrees with decisions from the other districts of this court that also appear to conflict with Massman and Taylor, including Puisis v. Puisis, 90 S.W.3d 169, 172 n. 3 (Mo.App. 2002); Wooten v. Williams, 827 S.W.2d 282, 284 n. 2 (Mo.App. 1992); In re Marriage of Turner, 803 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo.App. 1991); and Higgins v. Dir. of Revenue, 778 S.W.2d 24, 27 (Mo.App. 1989). Looking at the substance of Blue Ridge Bank's motion, the motion alleged errors in the language of the judgment and, thus, qualified as a motion to amend the judgment.
The first pleading requesting that the judgment be set aside, filed within thirty days, was not an authorized after-trial motion that could have extended the time within which the judgment became final. See generally Koppenaal v. Director of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 446, 450-51 (Mo.App.W.D. 1999); see also Wooten v. Williams, 827 S.W.2d 282, 283-84 (Mo.App.E.D. 1992). The motion to set the judgment aside under Rule 74.05 filed almost ninety days after the entry of judgment — well after it became final is treated as an independent action.
The filing of a timely notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. Wooten v. Williams, 827 S.W.2d 282, 283 (Mo. App. 1992). We must therefore dismiss plaintiffs' appeal as to points one and two.
The Department's failure to specifically rely on Rule 73.01(a)(5) in their motion is sufficient, in itself, to deny it the benefits of this rule. Wooten v. Williams, 827 S.W.2d 282, 284 n.2 (Mo. App. 1992). The Department's motion expressly invoked Rule 75.01.
The notice of appeal was required to be filed within ten days of July 12, 1993 in order to give this court appellate jurisdiction. Because the notice was not so filed and because no request was made for an order to file a late notice of appeal under Rule 81.07, this appeal must be dismissed. Wooten v. Williams, 827 S.W.2d 282, 283 (Mo.App. 1992). Appeal dismissed.