Wooten v. Williams

6 Citing cases

  1. Dunkle v. Dunkle

    158 S.W.3d 823 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 49 times
    Finding that “special rules,” which exist for juvenile and family law matters tried before a family court commissioner, supersede all inconsistent statutes and rules

    We acknowledge that there is support for the notion that Mother's failure to specifically rely on Rule 78.04 "is sufficient, in itself, to deny h[er] the benefits of that rule." Koppenaal v. Director of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 446, 451 (Mo.App. W.D. 1999) (citing Rule 73.01(a)(5) (1998), the former rule relating to a motion to amend the judgment); see also Wooten v. Williams, 827 S.W.2d 282, 284 n. 2 (Mo.App.E.D. 1992); contra Blue Ridge Bank and Trust Co. v. Hart, 152 S.W.3d 420, 425 (Mo.App.W.D. 2005). Since such denial is not required, we decline to do so here.

  2. Blue Ridge Bank and Trust Co. v. Hart

    152 S.W.3d 420 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 21 times
    Finding that a vehicle was "inventory" even where it had been driven by a merchant to another merchant's lot in order to negotiate a transaction

    See, e.g., Dangerfield v. City of Kansas City, 108 S.W.3d 769, 774 (Mo.App. 2003); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hart, 41 S.W.3d 504, 512 (Mo.App. 2000); Koppenaal v. Dir. of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 446, 451 (Mo.App. 1999); Burns v. Dir. of Revenue, 784 S.W.2d 918, 919-20 (Mo.App. 1990). This court also disagrees with decisions from the other districts of this court that also appear to conflict with Massman and Taylor, including Puisis v. Puisis, 90 S.W.3d 169, 172 n. 3 (Mo.App. 2002); Wooten v. Williams, 827 S.W.2d 282, 284 n. 2 (Mo.App. 1992); In re Marriage of Turner, 803 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo.App. 1991); and Higgins v. Dir. of Revenue, 778 S.W.2d 24, 27 (Mo.App. 1989). Looking at the substance of Blue Ridge Bank's motion, the motion alleged errors in the language of the judgment and, thus, qualified as a motion to amend the judgment.

  3. Ptsbrg. Airport v. Trans States Airlines

    119 S.W.3d 183 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 2 times

    The first pleading requesting that the judgment be set aside, filed within thirty days, was not an authorized after-trial motion that could have extended the time within which the judgment became final. See generally Koppenaal v. Director of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 446, 450-51 (Mo.App.W.D. 1999); see also Wooten v. Williams, 827 S.W.2d 282, 283-84 (Mo.App.E.D. 1992). The motion to set the judgment aside under Rule 74.05 filed almost ninety days after the entry of judgment — well after it became final is treated as an independent action.

  4. Moss v. Home Depot USA, Inc.

    988 S.W.2d 627 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 10 times

    The filing of a timely notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. Wooten v. Williams, 827 S.W.2d 282, 283 (Mo. App. 1992). We must therefore dismiss plaintiffs' appeal as to points one and two.

  5. State, Department of Labor & Industrial Relations v. Ron Woods Mechanical, Inc.

    926 S.W.2d 537 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 14 times
    Ruling that Rule 74.06 "applies only to mistakes or misconduct before or at the time the court entered its judgment"

    The Department's failure to specifically rely on Rule 73.01(a)(5) in their motion is sufficient, in itself, to deny it the benefits of this rule. Wooten v. Williams, 827 S.W.2d 282, 284 n.2 (Mo. App. 1992). The Department's motion expressly invoked Rule 75.01.

  6. Paparic v. McKinney

    877 S.W.2d 139 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994)   Cited 3 times

    The notice of appeal was required to be filed within ten days of July 12, 1993 in order to give this court appellate jurisdiction. Because the notice was not so filed and because no request was made for an order to file a late notice of appeal under Rule 81.07, this appeal must be dismissed. Wooten v. Williams, 827 S.W.2d 282, 283 (Mo.App. 1992). Appeal dismissed.