It is well established that there can be more than one proximate cause of an accident. Here, the fact that Cooley made a left-hand turn in front of Urban's vehicle is not dispositive of the issue whether Urban failed to exercise reasonable care in proceeding toward the area where the accident occurred without slowing, despite seeing the Cooley vehicle exit its lane of travel and traverse the entire median before turning into Urban's lane of traffic (see Deshaies v. Prudential Rochester Realty, 302 A.D.2d 999, 1000, 755 N.Y.S.2d 155; Wooley v. Coppola, 179 A.D.2d 991, 992, 578 N.Y.S.2d 729). Also, in Greco v. Boyce, 262 A.D.2d 734, 691 N.Y.S.2d 599, 600 (3d Dep't 1999), similar language as to the straightaway driver is helpful.

Like Boutelle, she did not slow down or have an opportunity to take evasive action.Generally, “[d]rivers have a duty to see what should be seen and to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances to avoid an accident” (Singh v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 119 A.D.3d 768, 769, 989 N.Y.S.2d 302 [2014] ; see Rost v. Stolzman, 81 A.D.3d 1401, 1402, 917 N.Y.S.2d 470 [2011] ; Woolley v. Coppola, 179 A.D.2d 991, 992, 578 N.Y.S.2d 729 [1992] ). The deposition testimony of both Boutelle and Allen established that it was dusk and that neither of them saw the deer until it came into contact with their respective vehicles.

It is well established that there can be more than one proximate cause of an accident. Here, the fact that Cooley made a left-hand turn in front of Urban's vehicle is not dispositive of the issue whether Urban failed to exercise reasonable care in proceeding toward the area where the accident occurred without slowing, despite seeing the Cooley vehicle exit its lane of travel and traverse the entire median before turning into Urban's lane of traffic ( see Deshaies v Prudential Rochester Realty, 302 A.D.2d 999, 1000; Woolley v. Coppola, 179 A.D.2d 991, 992). "To meet his initial burden on the motion, [Urban] had to establish both that [Cooley's] vehicle `suddenly entered the lane where [Urban] was operating [his vehicle] in a lawful and prudent manner and that there was nothing [Urban] could have done to avoid the collision'" ( Fratangelo v. Benson, 294 A.D.2d 880, 881). Although we recognize that Urban was entitled to anticipate that the other driver would obey the traffic laws that required him to yield the right-of-way to Urban ( see Galvin v Zacholl, 302 A.D.2d 965, 966, lv denied 100 N.Y.2d 512 [Sept.

The conflicting versions provided by Quiles and Samuel reveal issues of disputed material fact involving the time interval between cross-over and impact, the condition and position of the Quiles vehicle and the ability of Samuel to have avoided impact by reducing speed or moving to other lanes. The record reveals triable factual disputes on the applicability of the emergency doctrine (see, Trevino v. Castro, 256 A.D.2d 6 and Raposo v. Raposo 250 A.D.2d 420 [several seconds between cross-over and collision raises triable issue]; Woolley v. Coppola, 179 A.D.2d 991 [ability to see vehicle 200 feet away and failure to apply brakes create triable issue]; and Gaeta v. Morgan, 178 A.D.2d 732 [20 seconds between cross-over and impact raises triable issue]). THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

The appellant Anne Flynn was faced with an emergency similar to a situation in which a vehicle crosses over into an oncoming lane of traffic ( see, e.g., Velez v. Diaz, 227 A.D.2d 615; Williams v. Econ, 221 A.D.2d 429; Greifer v. Schneider, 215 A.D.2d 354), when the vehicle in which the plaintiff was a passenger spun around two or three times, crossed multiple lanes of traffic, and struck the Flynn vehicle. However, the record contains no evidence as to whether Anne Flynn's actions in responding to the emergency situation were reasonable under the circumstances ( see, Hentschel v. Campbell Carpet Servs., 256 A.D.2d 500; Ayotte v. Gervasio, 186 A.D.2d 963, affd 81 N.Y.2d 1062; Woolley v. Coppola, 179 A.D.2d 991; Gaeta v. Morgan, 178 A.D.2d 732). Thus, the appellants' motion should be denied without prejudice to renewal upon the completion of discovery ( see, CPLR 3212 [f]; Hentschel v. Campbell Carpet Servs., supra).

The appellants' contention that the driver of the tractor trailer, Paul Cueto, did not act reasonably in light of the emergency confronting him is without merit ( see, Woolley v Coppola, 179 AD2d 991). The evidence in the record reveals that the vehicle which Angela Christian was driving, at a speed in excess of the designated speed limit, flew over the divider only 10 to 15 feet in front of the tractor trailer, and collided with it.

ot concur with defendant's contention that these facts demonstrate, as a matter of law, that he was confronted with an emergency since it is not uncommon for motorists to encounter debris or other hazards in the roadway. Except in the most egregious circumstances, it is normally left to the trier of fact to determine if a particular situation rises to the level of an emergency, and in this case a question arises as to whether defendant should have anticipated and been prepared to deal with the situation confronting him ( see, Tyson v Brecher, 212 A.D.2d 851; Pincus v Cohen, 198 A.D.2d 405, 406; Davey v Ohler, 188 A.D.2d 726, 727). Since there are indications in the record that defendant had ample opportunity to observe the rock before striking it, and given the absence of evidence showing that he could not have stopped or driven carefully around the rock, whether defendant acted as a reasonable person would present a factual issue to be resolved by a jury ( see, Davey v Ohler, supra; Woolley v Coppola, 179 A.D.2d 991, 992). Clearly, in view of these issues, summary judgment in defendant's favor was not warranted. Mikoll, J.P., Casey, Peters and Spain, JJ., concur.

Notably, in this case, Cook's deposition testimony establishes that the vehicles were 200 feet apart when he first saw the La France vehicle swaying and fishtailing, that they were still approximately 100 feet apart when it crossed the road into his lane, and that he was traveling at a speed of between 10 and 20 miles per hour. Although he applied the brakes, Cook admits that he did not attempt to steer off the road or out of the way. Given these circumstances, it would not necessarily be irrational for a trier of fact to decide that a reasonable person would have acted differently in light of the situation confronting him or her (see, Woolley v Coppola, 179 A.D.2d 991, 992). Moreover, in view of the snowy weather and slippery road conditions, a fact finder might conclude that the possibility of a driver losing control and slipping across the road was not wholly unforeseeable (see, Davey v Ohler, supra, at 727).

Similarly, we find that defendant has failed to offer proof in admissible form that plaintiff could have done something to avoid the collision or that her behavior contributed to the accident (see, e.g., Woolley v. Coppola, 179 A.D.2d 991; Gaeta v. Morgan, 178 A.D.2d 732). "A driver in [her] proper lane of travel is not required to anticipate that a car going in the opposite direction will cross over into that lane" (Gouchie v. Gill, 198 A.D.2d 862; see, Palmer v. Palmer, 31 A.D.2d 876, affd 27 N.Y.2d 945).

Drivers of motor vehicles have a duty to operate their automobiles with reasonable care in light of the actual and potential risks that may exist as a result of weather, road, traffic and other conditions. Such duty of care imposes upon drivers obligations to: maintain a safe rate of speed, keep their vehicle under reasonable control; be on a proper lookout under the conditions then prevailing to see and be aware of what is in their view; and use reasonable care to avoid accidents (National Interstate v A.J. Murphy Co., Inc., 9 A.D.3d 714, 716 [3d Dept 2004]; Woolley v Coppola, 179 A.D.2d 991, 992 [3d Dept 1992]; Oberman v Alexander's Rent-A-Car, 56 A.D.2d 814, 815 [1st Dept 1977]; lv denied 42 N.Y.2d 806 [1977]; see PJI 2:77; VTL §§ 1126 [a], 1163[a], [e], 1180[a], 1212). A driver has a common-law duty to see that which should have been seen through the proper use of his senses (Perez v State of New York, No. 2015-030-018 (Ct Cl, Scuccimarra, J., Nov. 10, 2015]; see Domanova v State of New York, 41 A.D.3d 633, 634 [2d Dept 2007]; Larsen v Spano, 35 A.D.3d 820, 822 [2d Dept 2006]; see also Barbieri v Vokoun, 72 A.D.3d 853, 856 [2d Dept 2010]).