Opinion
Record No. 2113-93-3
Decided: May 10, 1994
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
Affirmed.
(J. Douglas Fleenor, on brief), for appellant.
(James W. Osborne, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee Uninsured Employers' Fund.
No brief for appellees Street Whited Coal Company, Inc. and Virginia Coal Producers Group.
Present: Judges Baker, Elder and Fitzpatrick
Pursuant to Code Sec. 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
Robert Woolford (claimant) contends that the Workers' Compensation Commission (commission) erred in denying his application alleging a change in condition on the basis that he failed to prove that his psychiatric condition and resulting disability were causally related to his compensable July 22, 1986 industrial accident.
Upon reviewing the record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the commission. Rule 5A:27. As the parties are familiar with the facts of this case, we recite them only as necessary to explain our decision.
On appellate review, we must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below. R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). "General principles of workman's compensation law provide that '[i]n an application for review of any award on the ground of change in condition, the burden is on the party alleging such change to prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.' " Great Atl. Pac. Tea Co. v. Bateman, 4 Va. App. 459, 464, 359 S.E.2d 98, 101 (1987) (quoting Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Reeves, 1 Va. App. 435, 438-39, 339 S.E.2d 570, 572 (1986)). Unless we can say as a matter of law that claimant's evidence was sufficient to sustain his burden of proof, the commission's findings are binding and conclusive upon us. Tomko v. Michael's Plastering Co., Inc., 210 Va. 697, 699, 173 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1970).
Upon reviewing the January 20, 1992 report and deposition testimony of psychiatrist Dr. Mary Scharf, the commission found that she had failed to establish that claimant's depression was causally related to the 1986 accident. In doing so the commission stated:
Although she acknowledged that the facts surrounding the shooting incident in 1979 might affect her diagnosis, Dr. Scharf did not determine whether the shot was self-inflicted or, if not, who shot the claimant. The fact that the claimant may be disabled as the result of his depressive disorder, which arose after the accident, does not, in itself, meet the burden of proving that the disorder naturally resulted from the accident. Dr. Scharf's diagnosis that the claimant's disability results "primarily" from the 1986 accident is based on her admittedly incomplete medical history and, thus, is of little probative value. See Clinchfield Coal Co. v. Bowman, 229 Va. 249, 251-52, 329 S.E.2d 15, 16 (1985).
The commission, in its role as fact finder, was entitled to determine what weight, if any, was to be given to Dr. Scharf's opinion. "It lies within the commission's authority to determine the facts and the weight of the evidence, and its findings in that regard, when supported by credible evidence, will not be disturbed on appeal." Rose v. Red's Hitch Trailer Servs., Inc., 11 Va. App. 55, 60, 396 S.E.2d 392, 395 (1990).
Dr. Scharf admitted in her deposition testimony that she had not discussed the shooting incident in depth with claimant even though, when she initially saw him in 1990, he was having nightmares about the shooting incident and the industrial accident. Moreover, she did not discuss the 1986 accident in detail with claimant. Dr. Scharf also admitted that it was not her objective in treating claimant to determine which of these events was the most contributing cause of claimant's psychiatric condition. In fact, she conceded that she could not determine what percentage each of these traumatic incidents might have contributed to causing claimant's psychiatric condition. Dr. Scharf based her entire opinion regarding causation on the fact that claimant told her that he had not had any psychiatric problems until after the 1986 industrial accident and that his symptoms seemed to fluctuate with his physical condition.
Based upon the lack of any substantial basis for Dr. Scharf's opinion and the incomplete medical history ascertained by her, we cannot say as a matter of law that the commission erred in disregarding her opinion and in finding that claimant failed to establish a causal link between his psychiatric condition and the 1986 industrial accident.
For the reasons stated, we affirm the commission's decision.
Affirmed.