Still, "when a temporary parenting plan is in place for a long time, courts may consider that when determining the details of a permanent plan." Woody v. Woody, No. E2020-01200-COA-R3-CV, 2022 WL 678976, at *20 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2022). Here, the court expressly recognized that the temporary plan had enabled Father to establish a bond with his daughter.

Davidson Pabts, LLC v. Worsham, No. M2014-01061-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 4115174, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 18, 2015) (proceeding to consider the case on the merits where the court was able to "readily discern the trial court's reasoning from the record"). See, e.g., Holston Presbytery of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Bethany Presbyterian Church, No. E2022-01337-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 4789082, at *5-6 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 27, 2023), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 20, 2023); Woody v. Woody, No. E2020-01200-COA-R3-CV, 2022 WL 678976, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2022) (soldiering on and stating that "we are mindful that this case has been ongoing for several years at this point, and proceeding to the merits will afford the parties and Harper resolution"); Roach, 2022 WL 1439349, at *4-5; Long, 642 S.W.3d at 812-17; Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n v. Kebede, No. W2019-00227-COA-R3-CV, 2020 WL 7060019, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2020) (noting the deficiency of the order the court, but soldiering on and in doing so noting "that disputes concerning this property have been fought in a multitude of cases over nearly a decade. As such, we will proceed to consider the merits of Mr. Kebede's arguments in order not to prolong this already protracted dispute."); Huggins v. McKee, 500 S.W.3d 360, 366-67 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016) (soldiering on where the case "had been awaiting resolution for nearly a decade"; in accordance with "the interest of providing the parties to this case a final resolution of the issues" the court exercised its "discretion to proceed to conside

Wife argues in response that a trial court's noncompliance with Smith does not automatically mean that its judgment must be vacated. See Huggins v. McKee, 500 S.W.3d 360, 366 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016) (exercising our discretion to proceed despite noncompliance with Smith when the case had been "awaiting resolution for nearly a decade and was previously remanded to the trial court because the trial court failed to offer an appropriate basis for its prior dismissal"); Long v. Long, 642 S.W.3d 803, 817 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2021) (exercising our discretion to proceed despite noncompliance with Smith where the divorce had "been pending for nearly seven years and has been previously remanded for the trial court to make specific findings of fact...."); Woody v. Woody, No. E2020-01200-COA-R3-CV, 2022 WL 678976, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. March 8, 2022), no appl. perm. appeal filed (proceeding on merits where trial court made some edits to the proposed order that it adopted, and the case had gone on for "several years"). Wife urges us to soldier on despite any shortcomings in the Trial Court's order.

However, we have also explained that, "[w]hile courts 'shall not draw any presumptions from [a] temporary parenting plan,' Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-406(e), when a temporary parenting plan is in place for a long time, courts may consider that when determining the details of a permanent plan." Woody v. Woody, No. E2020-01200-COA-R3-CV, 2022 WL 678976, at *20 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2022). Reading the trial judge's statement in context, he said that he "can't discount the temporary order, but it certainly is not a defining factor."