Opinion
Case No. 4:19-cv-00007-SMR-CFB
01-30-2020
David WOODY, Kendra Jackson, L.W., D.E.J., D.A.J., E.W., and K.W., Plaintiffs, v. JASPER COUNTY ANIMAL RESCUE, Jasper County Sheriff John Halferty, Jacob Halferty, Marc Headdington, and Janice Bragg, Defendants.
Jaysen Christopher McCleary, Attorney At Law, Jaysen McCleary, Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiffs. Jack William Leverenz, Allison J. Frederick, Carmoney Law Firm, PLLC, Des Moines, IA, for Defendant Jasper County Animal Rescue. Jason C. Palmer, Benjamin Russell Erickson, Bradshaw Fowler Proctor & Fairgrave, P.C., Des Moines, IA, for Defendants John Halferty, Jacob HalfertyMarc Headdington, Janice Bragg.
Jaysen Christopher McCleary, Attorney At Law, Jaysen McCleary, Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiffs.
Jack William Leverenz, Allison J. Frederick, Carmoney Law Firm, PLLC, Des Moines, IA, for Defendant Jasper County Animal Rescue.
Jason C. Palmer, Benjamin Russell Erickson, Bradshaw Fowler Proctor & Fairgrave, P.C., Des Moines, IA, for Defendants John Halferty, Jacob HalfertyMarc Headdington, Janice Bragg.
ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER
STEPHANIE M. ROSE, JUDGE Before the Court is a motion by Plaintiffs David Woody, Kendra Jackson, and their minor children L.W., D.E.J., D.A.J., E.W., and K.W., asking the Court to reconsider its December 17, 2019 Order, in which the Court denied Plaintiffs' motion to reconsider its August 2, 2019 Order, in which the Court denied Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand. Thus, Plaintiffs present a motion to reconsider an order on a motion to reconsider. Should the Court deny the motion, Plaintiffs present in the alternative a purported new motion to remand, which incorporates all previous arguments Plaintiffs have made on the issue. If the Court also denies this alternative new motion, Plaintiffs insist they will only proceed in this case on their state-law claims. Plaintiffs request a hearing on their motion, but the Court finds the issues can be resolved without it. See LR 7(c).
[ECF No. 37].
[ECF No. 36].
[ECF No. 32].
[ECF No. 25].
[ECF No. 12].
To the extent Plaintiffs' motion is one for reconsideration, it must be denied. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not describe a "motion for reconsideration." Peterson v. The Travelers Indem. Co. , 867 F.3d 992, 997 (8th Cir. 2017). Still, "[u]nder the last clause of Rule 54(b), a non-final order ‘is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.’ " Interstate Power Co. v. Kan. City Power & Light Co. , 992 F.2d 804, 807 (8th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted); see also Julianello v. K-V Pharm. Co. , 791 F.3d 915, 923 n.3 (8th Cir. 2015) (finding that Rule 54, rather than Rule 60, provided the proper framework for analyzing a motion to reconsider an order issued before the entry of final judgment). The Court has not entered final judgment in this matter, and because the Court's December 17, 2019 Order did not resolve any portion of this suit, it is non-final. Cf. Nelson v. Am. Home Assurance Co. , 702 F.3d 1038, 1043 (8th Cir. 2012) (finding summary judgment order was non-final because it resolved only part of the dispute). It has been explained that:
The standard to be applied in considering a motion to reconsider under Rule 54(b) is not clear, but "it is typically held to be less exacting than would be a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), which is in turn less exacting than the standards enunciated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)." It is generally held that a court may amend or reconsider any ruling under Rule 54(b) to correct any " ‘clearly’ or ‘manifestly’ erroneous findings of facts or conclusions of law." A motion to reconsider under Rule 54(b), however, may not "serve as a vehicle to identify facts or raise legal arguments which could have been, but were not, raised or adduced during the pendency of the motion
of which reconsideration was sought."
Jones v. Casey's Gen. Stores , 551 F. Supp. 2d 848, 854–55 (S.D. Iowa 2008) (citations omitted); cf. Hagerman v. Yukon Energy Corp. , 839 F.2d 407, 414 (8th Cir. 1988) ("Motions for reconsideration serve a limited function: to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence. Such motions cannot in any case be employed as a vehicle to introduce new evidence that could have been adduced during pendency of the summary judgment motion.... Nor should a motion for reconsideration serve as the occasion to tender new legal theories for the first time.").
In their motion and brief, Plaintiffs fail to present any manifest errors of law or fact or newly discovered evidence. Instead, they use the motion as an opportunity to present arguments that they could have, but did not, advance in their original Motion to Remand or their first motion to reconsider. This is not a proper purpose for a motion to reconsider, and thus the motion is DENIED.
As for Plaintiffs' alternative new motion to remand, this is not the first matter before the Court in which Plaintiffs' counsel has filed a second motion seeking the same relief that his client pursued in an earlier-denied motion. In Hildreth v. City of Des Moines , the plaintiffs—who were represented by the same attorney representing Plaintiffs in this lawsuit—filed a second motion for sanctions based on the same conduct alleged in their first motion for sanctions, which the Court had denied. See Order on Second Motion for Sanctions & Attorney Fees & Motion to Seal Filings, Hildreth v. City of Des Moines , 4:17-cv-00374-SMR-CFB (S.D. Iowa Mar. 27, 2018). There, as here, the plaintiffs "provide[d] no authority for the Court to rule on a ‘second’ motion seeking the same relief as the first." Id. at 1. The Court construed the second motion for sanctions as a motion to reconsider the Court's order denying the first motion for sanctions. See id.
The Court likewise construes Plaintiffs' alternative new motion to remand as no more than a motion to reconsider the Court's ruling on their first Motion to Remand. And again, Plaintiffs do no more in this new motion than present arguments that they could have, but did not, previously advance in support of their first Motion to Remand. They have not identified any manifest error of law or fact, nor do they present newly discovered evidence. The alternative new motion to remand is DENIED.
The Court wishes to address one argument Plaintiffs make in their alternative motion. Plaintiffs argue this Court lacks original subject matter jurisdiction over this case because 95% of Plaintiffs' claims are state-law claims. That argument misunderstands a fundamental tenet of removal based on federal question subject matter jurisdiction, namely that "[i]f even one claim in the complaint involves a substantial federal question, the entire matter may be removed." Pet Quarters, Inc. v. Depository Trust and Clearing Corp. , 559 F.3d 772, 779 (8th Cir. 2009).
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Finally, Plaintiffs insist they will proceed in this case only on their state law claims. If Plaintiffs wish to forgo their federal claims, they must file a motion to dismiss them. Otherwise, the claims will remain in this case until they are decided on the merits or are otherwise dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.