Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-2481 SECTION "C" (5)
April 14, 2004
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is plaintiff's Motion to Stay. (Rec. Doc. 16). Defendants oppose this Motion. (Rec. Doc. 17). Oral argument was had on April 14, 2004.
After a thorough review of the law, the record, the Motion, and the memoranda filed in support thereof and in opposition thereto, plaintiff's Motion to Stay is
DENIED. I. BACKGROUND
According to Plaintiffs, Irma Woodard, complaint, she was driving a 1991 Mitsubishi Mirage and proceeding east on Highway 90. At the same time, a 1990 Chevrolet 1500 being driven by Michael Ippolitto was proceeding west on the same road. Ippolitto was stopped by a flagman, Kevin Helmer, employed by the State of Louisiana through the Department of Transportation and Development. A 1995 GMC 18-wheeler, owned by Defendant Warden Farms Trucking, LLC ("Warden"), and driven by Warden's employee, Defendant Marion Isaac, followed closely behind Ippolitto.
Plaintiff alleges that Isaac was following too closely behind Ippolitto and, as a result, was unable to stop his vehicle in time to avoid hitting Ippolitto. Rather than hit Ippolitto, Isaac swerved the 18-wheeler into the eastbound lane and struck the front left side of plaintiff's vehicle. Upon impact, Plaintiff was thrown about the car.
Plaintiff claims that she has suffered multiple personal, psychological and emotional injuries of a past, present, and continuing nature. Plaintiff has undergone medical treatment since the accident and will undergo further treatment. She has been limited from her normal activities as a result of the accident.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff brought suit in this Court on September 2, 2003, asserting that this Court has diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. She claims that she was injured by the negligence of Isaac and the negligence of Warden. She also claims that Warden is vicariously liable for the negligence of its employee, Isaac, who was acting in the course and scope of his employment. Last, she claims that the insurance policy provided by Sentry Select Insurance Company covers this accident.
Defendants answered the complaint on October 17, 2003. In the answer, Defendants claimed that Ippolitto and the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development were the sole causes of the accident.
On November 18, 2003, Plaintiff filed suit in State court suing the same Defendants asserting the same theories of recovery but adding Kevin Helmer and the State of Louisiana through the Department of Transportation and Development. Plaintiff did not sue Michael Ippolitto.
Initially, the Court scheduled a telephone status conference on January 16, 2004. That conference, however, was cancelled when Plaintiff informed the Court that he would request a stay of the matter. Plaintiff filed the Motion to Stay on January 21, 2004 and set it for hearing on March 31, 2004. The Motion was subsequently rescheduled by the Court due to a scheduling conflict. Defendants oppose the Motion and filed their opposition on March 24, 2004.
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS
The Motion itself and its supporting memorandum requests the Court to stay the proceedings in this case until the Plaintiff can ascertain through State court discovery whether her claims against the State of Louisiana and Kevin Helmer have any merit. Plaintiff has suggested that, should she find that the claims are meritorious, she will dismiss the federal suit voluntarily and proceed in State court.
Defendant opposes this case relying on cases which apply a standard which is inapplicable to the current dispute. That standard, enunciated in Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491 (1942), provides that, in declaratory actions, a federal court has discretion to stay or dismiss the action when a state court suit between the same parties presenting the same issues can adequately settle the dispute. The Fifth Circuit has held that this standard applies only to actions solely for declaratory relief, PPG Indus., Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 478 F.2d 674, 679 (5th Cir. 1973), and that it does not apply, and that the standard enunciated in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) applies, to actions which seek coercive relief, unless the request for coercive relief is either frivolous or is made solely to avoid application of the Brillhart standard. Black Sea Inv., Ltd. v. United Heritage Corp., 204 F.3d 647, 652 (5th Cir. 2000); West Side Transport, Inc. v. APAC Mississippi, Inc., 237 F. Supp.2d 707, 713 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 15, 2002). Coercive relief includes suits seeking injunctions as well as suits seeking damages. In this case, Plaintiff has sought only coercive relief as he has not requested that this Court render a declaratory judgment of any sort. As such, the Colorado River standard applies.
Aside from the declaratory action exception noted above, Colorado River embodies the fourth and, as of this date, the last judicially created exception to the general rule that, where the district court has jurisdiction to hear a case, it has a "virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given [it]." Colorado River Water Conservation District, 424 U.S. at 818. The exceptions to this general rule collectively have been widely referred to as the abstention doctrine. The doctrine of abstention, under which a District Court may decline to exercise or postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction, is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it. County of Allegheny v. Frank Marshall Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1959). Abdication of the obligation to decide cases can be justified under this doctrine only in the exceptional circumstances where the order to the parties to litigate in State court would clearly serve an important countervailing interest. Id.
While this fourth type of abstention, referred to as Colorado River abstention, is the only abstention applicable to the current case, a review of the other types of abstention may be helpful. The first type of abstention, widely known as Pullman abstention, as derived from Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), is appropriate "in cases presenting a federal constitutional issue which might be mooted or presented in a different posture by a state court determination of pertinent [and unsettled] state law." County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. at 189.
The second type of abstention, referred to either as Burford abstention, as derived from Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) or, in particularized cases, eminent domain abstention, Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593 (1968), allows abstention when there have been presented difficult issues of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the case at bar. Louisiana Power Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
The third type of abstention, referred to as Younger abstention, as derived from Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), is appropriate where, absent bad faith, harassment, or a patently invalid state statute, federal jurisdiction has been invoked for the purpose of restraining state criminal proceedings or proceedings similar to criminal proceedings, such as nuisance proceedings antecedent to a criminal prosecution, Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975), or the collection of state taxes, Great Lakes Dredge Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943).
Colorado River abstention is appropriate only when the federal court and the State court, exercising concurrent jurisdiction, have before them the same case involving the same parties and the same issues. Colorado River Water Conservation District, 424 U.S. at 818. Even then, the circumstances permitting the dismissal of a federal suit due to the presence of a concurrent state proceeding for reasons of wise judicial administration are considerably more limited than the circumstances for abstention under Pullman, Burford, and Younger. Id. The former circumstances, although exceptional, do nevertheless exist. Id. The Supreme Court has not prescribed a "hard and fast rule" governing the appropriateness of Colorado River abstention, but it has set forth six factors that may be considered and weighed in determining whether exceptional circumstances exist that would permit a district court to decline exercising jurisdiction: (1) assumption by either court of jurisdiction over a res; (2) the relative inconvenience of the forums; (3) the avoidance of piecemeal litigation; (4) the order in which jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent forums; (5) whether and to what extent federal law provides rules of decision on the merits; and (6) the adequacy of the state proceedings in protecting the rights of the party invoking federal jurisdiction. Murphy v. Uncle Ben's. Inc., 168 F.3d 734, 738 (5th Cir. 1999). In assessing the propriety of abstention according to these factors, a federal court must keep in mind that "the balance [should be] heavily weighted in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction." Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 16 (1983).
Given the exceptional nature of Colorado River abstention and the virtually unflagging obligation of this Court to exercise its jurisdiction, Colorado River abstention is inappropriate in this case.
First, neither Court has assumed jurisdiction over a res in order to exercise its respective jurisdiction. Although it has been held that a court first assuming jurisdiction over property may exercise that jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts, Danovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 412 (1964), neither court has assumed jurisdiction over property in order to exercise its jurisdiction. To be sure, both actions are in personam actions, that is, actions against a person, not against a property. The absence of an exercise of jurisdiction by either court over a res weighs against abstention. Black Sea Investment, Ltd., 204 F.3d at 650. Accordingly, the first factor weighs against abstention.
Because the federal and state courts in this case are in approximately the same geographic location within the state, the second factor, the relative inconvenience of the forums weighs against abstention. Murphy, 168 F.3d at 738.
The third factor is the avoidance of piecemeal litigation. Piecemeal litigation has oft been confused with duplicative litigation. The prevention of duplicative litigation is not a factor to be considered in an abstention determination. Evanston Ins. Co. v. Jimco, Inc., 844 F.2d 1185, 1192 (5th Cir. 1988). Duplicative litigation, wasteful as it may be, is a necessary cost of our nation's maintenance of two separate and distinct judicial systems possessed of frequently overlapping jurisdiction. Black Sea Investment, Ltd., 204 F.3d at 650. The real concern at the heart of the third Colorado River factor is the avoidance of piecemeal litigation, and the concomitant danger of inconsistent rulings with respect to a piece of property. Evanston Ins. Co., 844 F.2d at 1192. When, as here, no court has assumed jurisdiction over a disputed res, there is no such danger. Id. This factor, therefore, weighs against abstention. Id.
The fourth factor, the order in which jurisdiction was obtained, seems to weigh against abstention since the federal court was the first court to obtain jurisdiction. However, "priority should not be measured by which complaint was filed first, but rather in terms of how much progress has been made in the two actions." Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. at 26. In the present federal action, no progress has been made. To be sure, the Court has not even held a scheduling conference and, as a result, has not issued a scheduling order. According to the representations of the parties, discovery has begun in State court. Nevertheless, neither case is significantly underway. It is true that, when state and federal suits are proceeding at approximately the same pace, the fourth factor weighs against abstention, Murphy, 168 F.3d at 738-39. One should also keep in mind that any lack of progress in this case is due to plaintiff's request that the Court not hold a scheduling conference. Accordingly, this factor weighs against abstention even though the State court proceeding is a little further along than this proceeding.
The fifth factor asks whether state or federal law will be applied. The instant case involves only issues of state law. Nevertheless, "[t]he absence of a federal-law issue does not counsel in favor of abstention." Evanston Ins. Co., 844 F.2d at 1193. "[The] task in cases such as this is not to find some substantial reason for the exercise of federal jurisdiction . . .; rather, the task is to ascertain whether there exist `exceptional circumstances,' the `clearest of justifications/ that can suffice under Colorado River to justify the surrender of that justification." Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. at 26. Thus, "the presence of state law issues weighs in favor of surrender only in rare circumstances." Evanston Ins. Co., 844 F.2d at 1193. In accord with this necessity for extraordinary circumstances, a mere lack of clarity in applicable state law does not counsel in favor of abstention. Black Sea Investment, Ltd., 204 F.3d at 650. In this case, a simple personal injury case arising from an automobile accident, the applicable state law is well settled, clear, and easy to apply. This factor, therefore, weighs against abstention.
Last, the sixth factor is whether the rights of the party who invoked federal jurisdiction will be adequately protected in State Court. In analyzing this factor, the Court should keep in mind that Plaintiff invoked the jurisdiction of both courts. This factor weighs against abstention.
Therefore, all six Colorado River factors counsel against abstention.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, as the Colorado River abstention doctrine should be exercised in only exceptional circumstances, and as this Court has a virtually unflagging obligation to exercise its jurisdiction in cases where it has jurisdiction, and as heavy weight is afforded by the case law in favor of exercising jurisdiction, the fact that the six factors weigh against abstention makes it clear that abstention would be inappropriate.
Plaintiffs Motion to Stay is DENIED.