Opinion
Civil 1:19-CV-2048
01-21-2022
TANEL D. WOODWARD, Plaintiff, v. ADAM SABO, et al., Defendants.
Rambo Judge.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Martin C. Carlson United States Magistrate Judge.
I. Introduction
This case involves a civil rights claim brought by the plaintiff, Tanel Woodward, against a Harrisburg City police officer, Adam Sabo. Woodward contends that Officer Sabo violated his Fourth Amendment rights when Officer Sabo injured him as he attempted to elude police, and additionally brings a state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. This claim stems from a traffic stop during which Woodward fled in his car and Officer Sabo used his duty weapon to shoot at the car, injuring Woodward. It is now undisputed that Woodward pleaded guilty and was convicted of recklessly endangering the police office in the course of this traffic stop. Thus, Woodward's own sworn guilty plea admissions confirm that he placed the police officer in fear of death or serious bodily injury at the time of this incident.
Officer Sabo is the only remaining defendant in this case. (See Doc. 44).
Officer Sabo filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, attaching as exhibits the criminal complaint filed against the plaintiff, as well as a docket sheet indicating that on March 25, 2021, Woodward pleaded guilty to Escape, Fleeing or Attempting to Elude Officer, Recklessly Endangering Another Person, and Driving While Operating Privileges Suspended or Revoked. (Docs. 33-1, 33-2). Thus, Officer Sabo argues that Woodward's guilty plea to the facts underlying the claim of Recklessly Endangering Another Person-that he placed Officer Sabo in danger of death or serious bodily injury-defeats Woodward's Fourth Amendment claim. (Docs. 33, 35). Alternatively, Sabo contends that his use of deadly force was reasonable under the circumstances, and moreover, that he is entitled to qualified immunity.
Because Officer Sabo's motion relied upon this extraneous, but seemingly uncontested, evidence and the parties' references to it, we notified the parties of our intention to treat the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment and gave the parties an opportunity to file supplemental briefs. (Doc. 46). The time for filing supplemental briefs has since passed, and neither party has filed any additional briefs addressing this motion through the lens of Rule 56. Accordingly, we deem this motion ripe for resolution. After consideration, and viewing this case through the summary judgment standard of review, we will recommend that the district court grant summary judgment in favor of Defendant Sabo.
II. Statement of Facts and of the Case
According to the plaintiff's complaint on December 1, 2017, Tanel Woodward was driving in an area that he concedes to be a high-crime area, and he was stopped by several vehicles at the intersection of 19th and Derry Streets in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 19, ¶¶ 9-10). According to Woodward, he was suspicious of these vehicles that were blocking him. (Id., ¶ 10). He alleges that a person emerged from one of the vehicles and brandished a weapon, after which Woodward feared for his safety and maneuvered his vehicle out of the blocked-in area and attempted to drive away. (Id.) Woodward's complaint alleges that these cars were unmarked, and the persons that emerged from the vehicles were in plain clothes, giving him no indication that these individuals were police officers. (Id.) One of the police officers, later identified as Defendant Sabo, fired his duty weapon at Woodward's vehicle and ultimately struck Woodward and injured him. (Id.)
Woodward's version of events, as set forth in his complaint, casts this incident as one in which the officers were completely unidentifiable and Woodward fled in fear for his own safety. However, other uncontested evidence from Woodward's state criminal case, including Woodward's own guilty plea admissions to recklessly endangering the officer, casts this case in a very different, undisputed light. Thus, the affidavit of probable cause attached to the criminal complaint in Woodward's state prosecution sets forth a somewhat different factual narrative. On this score, the affidavit avers that on December 1, 2017, Woodward's vehicle was identified by an Officer Henry as having fled from a traffic stop a few weeks prior. (Doc. 33-1, at 6). Thus, Officer Henry, who was operating an unmarked police vehicle, followed Woodward's vehicle and called for additional officers to assist with a traffic stop. (Id.) Officers Sabo and Bickel were driving a marked police car and assisted with the traffic stop. (Id.) Officer Henry's unmarked vehicle pulled behind Woodward's vehicle and initiated a traffic stop, after which Officer Bickel pulled the marked car in front of Woodward's vehicle to block his exit. (Id.)
The affidavit then states that Officer Sabo exited the vehicle and was in a position between the marked police car and the front of Woodward's vehicle, and that upon realizing he was in a dangerous position, Officer Sabo pulled his weapon from his holster. (Id.) Woodward then attempted to flee, first backing his vehicle into Officer Henry's unmarked vehicle and then pulling forward at a high rate of speed toward Officer Sabo and the marked police car. (Id.) Officer Sabo shot at Woodward's vehicle, striking it twice and injuring Woodward. (Id.) Woodward fled and ultimately abandoned his vehicle. (Id.) Woodward was later found and arrested at Hershey Medical Center after his mother had brought him there to treat a gunshot wound to his arm. (Id., at 7; Doc. 19, ¶ 12).
Based on this incident, Woodward was charged in a criminal complaint with aggravated assault, escape, fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, recklessly endangering another person, and driving while operating privileges are suspended or revoked. (Doc. 33-1, at 2-5). The aggravated assault charge was withdrawn, and Woodward pleaded guilty to the remaining charges on March 25, 2021. (Doc. 33-2, at 5). Specifically, as it pertains to the instant case, the facts underlying the charge of recklessly endangering another person to which Woodward pleaded guilty were as follows:
[O]n or about said date, the defendant, Tanel Woodward did recklessly engage in conduct which placed or may have placed Harrisburg Police Officer Sabo and Officer Bickel in danger of death or serious bodily injury by attempting to flee a traffic stop at 19th and Derry Streets. Officer Sabo was placed in fear for his life when he thought he was going to be run over by the vehicle Tanel Woodward was operating.(Doc. 33-1, at 4). At the time of his plea proceeding, Woodward specifically acknowledged and agreed that he committed the offense of reckless endangerment as part of his sworn guilty plea. Woodward was ultimately sentenced to 18 to 36 months imprisonment on these charges.
Despite this guilty plea acknowledging that he had recklessly endangered Officer Sabo, Woodward filed the instant civil rights complaint on December 2, 2019, and filed an amended complaint on December 2, 2020, which is now the operative pleading in this case. (Docs. 1, 19). Woodward's complaint alleged violations of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and named as defendants Officer Sabo, Harrisburg City Police Commissioner Thomas Carter, and the City of Harrisburg. (Doc. 19). The City and Commissioner Carter have since been dismissed (Docs. 40, 44), and the only remaining claims are a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim and a state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Officer Sabo.
As we have noted, Officer Sabo filed a motion to dismiss, which referenced extraneous documents including the criminal complaint, attached affidavits, and a docket sheet indicating the plaintiff pleaded guilty to four of the charges filed against him. Thus, we notified the parties of our intention to treat the motion as a motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and gave the parties an opportunity to file supplemental briefs addressing the claims through the lens of a summary judgment motion. (Doc. 46). Neither party has done so, and the time for filing supplemental briefs has passed. Accordingly, we deem the motion ripe for resolution, and after consideration, we will recommend that the court grant summary judgment in favor of Defendant Sabo.
III. Discussion
A. Motion for Summary Judgment - Standard of Review
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Through summary adjudication, a court is empowered to dispose of those claims that do not present a “genuine dispute as to any material fact, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), and for which a trial would be “an empty and unnecessary formality.” Univac Dental Co. v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., No. 07-0493, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31615, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2010). The substantive law identifies which facts are material, and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis that would allow a reasonable fact finder to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id., at 248-49.
The moving party has the initial burden of identifying evidence that it believes shows an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 145-46 (3d Cir. 2004). Once the moving party has shown that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's claims, “the non-moving party must rebut the motion with facts in the record and cannot rest solely on assertions made in the pleadings, legal memoranda, or oral argument.” Berckeley Inv. Group. Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006), accord Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). If the non-moving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial, ” summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Summary judgment is also appropriate if the non-moving party provides merely colorable, conclusory, or speculative evidence. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. There must be more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the non-moving party and more than some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Id., at 252; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In making this determination, the Court must “consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 794 (3d Cir. 2007).
Moreover, a party who seeks to resist a summary judgment motion by citing to disputed material issues of fact must show by competent evidence that such factual disputes exist. Further, “only evidence which is admissible at trial may be considered in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Countryside Oil Co., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 928 F.Supp. 474, 482 (D.N.J. 1995). Similarly, it is well-settled that: “[o]ne cannot create an issue of fact merely by . . . denying averments . . . without producing any supporting evidence of the denials.” Thimons v. PNC Bank, NA, 254 Fed.Appx. 896, 899 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Thus, “[w]hen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported . . ., an adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations or denial.” Fireman's Ins. Co. of Newark New Jersey v. DuFresne, 676 F.2d 965, 968 (3d Cir. 1982); see Sunshine Books, Ltd. v. Temple University, 697 F.2d 90, 96 (3d Cir. 1982). “[A] mere denial is insufficient to raise a disputed issue of fact, and an unsubstantiated doubt as to the veracity of the opposing affidavit is also not sufficient.” Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455, 458 (3d Cir. 1969). Furthermore, “a party resisting a [Rule 56] motion cannot expect to rely merely upon bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions.” Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 341 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing Ness v. Marshall, 660 F.2d 517, 519 (3d Cir. 1981)).
Finally, it is emphatically not the province of the court to weigh evidence or assess credibility when passing upon a motion for summary judgment. Rather, in adjudicating the motion, the court must view the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the opposing party, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992). Where the non-moving party's evidence contradicts the movant's, then the non-movant's must be taken as true. Id. Additionally, the court is not to decide whether the evidence unquestionably favors one side or the other, or to make credibility determinations, but instead must decide whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; see also Big Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1363. In reaching this determination, the Third Circuit has instructed that:
To raise a genuine issue of material fact . . . the opponent need not match, item for item, each piece of evidence proffered by the movant.
In practical terms, if the opponent has exceeded the “mere scintilla” threshold and has offered a genuine issue of material fact, then the court cannot credit the movant's version of events against the opponent, even if the quantity of the movant's evidence far outweighs that of its opponent. It thus remains the province of the fact finder to ascertain the believability and weight of the evidence.Id. In contrast, “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
B. Woodward's Claims Should Be Dismissed.
As we have noted, Officer Sabo first contends that the facts underlying the reckless endangerment claim to which Woodward pleaded guilty defeat Woodward's claim that the shooting violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Further, Officer Sabo argues that his use of deadly force was reasonable under the circumstances, and moreover, that he is entitled to qualified immunity.
After consideration, we agree that Woodward's Fourth Amendment claim fails because Officer Sabo is entitled to qualified immunity. We also conclude that because Woodward's § 1983 claim fails, the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's state law claim. Accordingly, we will recommend that the court grant summary judgment in favor of Defendant Sabo.
1. Woodward's Fourth Amendment Claim Fails.
Woodward's Fourth Amendment claim asserts that Officer Sabo used excessive force against him when he shot at Woodward's vehicle and injured him. However, in order to prevail upon this claim Woodward must do more than simply allege a colorable claim. Rather, he must also show that his rights were so clearly established in this factual context-where he has admitted to recklessly endangering the officer at the time of this traffic stop-that Officer Sabo would not be entitled to qualified immunity.
We conclude that Woodward has not and cannot meet this burden on the undisputed facts of this case, where the plaintiff has admitted under oath that he recklessly endangered the police officer at the time he was shot. Therefore, Officer Sabo is entitled to qualified immunity from damages and this case should be dismissed.
“Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages liability unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012). A qualified immunity analysis involves two questions: whether the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and whether that right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011). Lower courts have the discretion to decide which question to analyze first. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). The Supreme Court has cautioned courts to “think carefully before expending scarce judicial resources to resolve difficult and novel questions of constitutional or statutory interpretation that will have no effect on the outcome of the case.” Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 735.
An official's conduct violates clearly established law when, “at the time of the challenged conduct, ‘[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear' that every ‘reasonable official would [have understood] that what he is doing violates that right.'” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). The Supreme Court has stated that this standard does not require a case directly on point, but requires that “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741. “When properly applied, [qualified immunity] protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Id. at 743 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)); see also Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S.Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015).
The dispositive question that the court must ask is “whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.” Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S.Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742). The inquiry “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Id.; see also Davenport v. Borough of Homestead, 870 F.3d 273, 281 (3d Cir. 2017). This “clearly established” standard ensures that an official can reasonably anticipate when his or her conduct may give rise to liability, and “protects the balance between vindication of constitutional rights and government officials' effective performance of their duties.” Reichle, 566 U.S. at 664.
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that claims against law enforcement officers that allege the use of excessive force in the context of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other “seizure” are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's “reasonableness” standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). Indeed, “[t]he use of excessive force is itself an unlawful ‘seizure' under the Fourth Amendment.” Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 496 (3d Cir. 2006). In assessing such a claim for a Fourth Amendment violation under § 1983, the inquiry is whether the force used by the law enforcement officers was objectively reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.
The Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard applies not only to the use of excessive force generally, but the use of deadly force. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985). On this score, the Supreme Court has held that while the use of deadly force on every occasion to prevent a suspect from fleeing is constitutionally unreasonable, “[w]here the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force.” Id. at 11.
Here, Officer Sabo contends that Woodward's guilty plea to recklessly endangering another person defeats his Fourth Amendment claim. We agree. Under the Pennsylvania Crimes Code one engages in reckless endangerment when “he recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.” 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2705. In this case, the reckless endangerment charge as to which Woodward pleaded guilty specifically alleged that:
[T]the defendant, Tanel Woodward did recklessly engage in conduct which placed or may have placed Harrisburg Police Officer Sabo and Officer Bickel in danger of death or serious bodily injury by attempting to flee a traffic stop at 19th and Derry Streets. Officer Sabo was placed in fear for his life when he thought he was going to be run over by the vehicle Tanel Woodward was operating.(Doc. 33-1, at 4).
Therefore, the facts underlying this guilty plea necessarily stated that Woodward placed Officer Sabo in danger of threat or serious bodily injury. (Id.) The preclusive effect of a state court guilty plea is governed by Pennsylvania law, which provides that “[o]perative facts necessary for criminal convictions are admissible as conclusive facts in civil suits arising from the same events and circumstances.” DiJoseph v. Vuotto, 968 F.Supp. 244, 247 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (citing Folino v. Young, 568 A.2d 171, 172 (Pa. 1990)); see also Shaffer v. Smith, 673 A.2d 872, 874 (Pa. 1996) (“[I]t is well established that a criminal conviction collaterally estops a defendant from denying his acts in a subsequent civil trial”); Commw. Dep't of Transp. v. Mitchell, 535 A.2d 581, 585 (Pa. 1987).
Under Pennsylvania law, a guilty plea is equivalent to a conviction by a jury. See Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 535 A.2d 581, 585 (Pa. 1987).
In this case, the fact that Woodward pleaded guilty to placing Officer Sabo in danger of death or serious bodily injury would appear to render Officer Sabo's use of deadly force constitutionally reasonable under Garner. Moreover, Woodward does not actually dispute that he put Officer Sabo in danger, but rather argues that Officer Sabo's conduct was unreasonable, and that his own actions were warranted, because he was in fear for his safety from the police. (Doc. 43, at 3-4). However, it is well settled that the “reasonableness” inquiry focuses on the use of force “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, ” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, rather than the plaintiff's subjective interpretations of the incident.
However, even if we were to conclude that Officer Sabo actions in some colorable way may have violated Woodward's Fourth Amendment rights, we cannot conclude that the contours of this right was clearly established at the time of the December 1, 2017 incident, in the context of an episode where it is undisputed that Woodward recklessly endangered the officer in the course of his flight. Rather, “‘[t]he Supreme Court has consistently held that officers either did not violate the Fourth Amendment or were entitled to qualified immunity when they used deadly force during' a dangerous car chase.” Desabetino v. Biagini, 844 Fed.Appx. 481, 484 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Bland v. City of Newark, 900 F.3d 77, 83-84 (3d Cir. 2018)).
In fact, the Supreme Court has repeatedly cloaked officers in qualified immunity in circumstances where they use deadly force in the face of what they reasonably perceive as a threat to the safety of themselves and others. See e.g., Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015).
In particular, the Supreme Court has conferred qualified immunity upon a police officer who shot and injured a fleeing suspect who later pleaded guilty to the offense of eluding arrest in a manner indicating “a wanton or wilful disregard for the lives ... of others.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 197 (2004). In doing so, the Court found that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity in this setting where the plaintiff's guilty plea framed the legal issue as one in which the officer deployed his weapon to shoot a “felon, set on avoiding capture through vehicular flight, when persons in the immediate area are at risk from that flight.” Id. at 200. In this setting, the Court reasoned that qualified immunity was appropriate given the Court's earlier admonition in Garner-that it is reasonable for an officer to use deadly force to prevent a suspect from fleeing “[w]here the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others.” Garner, 471 U.S. at 11.
Like the plaintiff in Brosseau, Woodward pleaded guilty to offenses involving the use of his vehicle to endanger others at the time that he was shot and injured by a police officer. Therefore, as in Brosseau, Woodward's excessive force claim fails as a matter of law on qualified immunity grounds. Simply put, given Woodward's guilty plea to reckless endangerment we cannot conclude that Officer Sabo's use of force to prevent Woodward from fleeing the traffic stop violated clearly established law. Rather, the facts show that Officer Sabo fired at Woodward's vehicle after Woodward backed into Officer Henry's police vehicle and then pulled forward at a high rate of speed. Officer Sabo was standing in between his marked police vehicle and the front of Woodward's vehicle. Moreover, the facts as admitted by Woodward in his guilty plea establish that Officer Sabo was placed in danger of death or serious bodily injury when Woodward attempted to flee the scene of the traffic stop.
Accordingly, we cannot conclude that Officer Sabo violated clearly established law when he used deadly force in a situation where he had probable cause to believe Woodward presented a danger to him. Thus, Officer Sabo is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
2. Woodward's State Law Claim Fails.
Finally, Woodward asserts a state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Sabo. We note that the proposed disposition of the plaintiff's federal legal claim, in turn, suggests the appropriate course for the court to follow in addressing any ancillary state law claims that the plaintiff may wish to pursue against this defendant. In a case such as this, where the jurisdiction of the federal court was premised on alleged federal claims which are found to be subject to dismissal, the proper course generally is for “the court [to] decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if-... the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (holding that when federal causes of action are dismissed, federal courts should not separately entertain pendent state claims).” Bronson v. White, No. 05-2150, 2007 WL 3033865, *13 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 2007) (Caputo, J.) (adopting report and recommendation dismissing ancillary malpractice claim against dentist); see Ham v. Greer, 269 Fed.Appx. 149, 151 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing United Mine Workers, 383 U.S. at 726 and Tully v. Mott Supermkts., Inc., 540 F.2d 187, 196 (3d Cir. 1976).) (“Because the District Court appropriately dismissed [the inmate's] Bivens claims, no independent basis for federal jurisdiction remains”). As the Supreme Court has aptly observed:
Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law. Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well.United Mine Workers, 383 U.S. at 726 (footnotes omitted).
Here, we have found that Woodward's federal claim is subject to dismissal. Therefore, in the exercise of our discretion in this district, we should decline to assert supplemental jurisdiction over potential ancillary state law claims in this case where all potential federal claims brought before us failed as a matter of law. Accordingly, we recommend that this pendent state law claim be dismissed.
IV. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT the defendants' motion to dismiss, which we are treating as a motion for summary judgment (Doc. 33) be GRANTED, and that summary judgment be granted in favor of Defendant Sabo.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.