Opinion
20-P-913
12-09-2021
WOODSPRING SUITES BOSTON MA SAUGUS, LLC v. Kelechi LINARDON.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The defendant, Kelechi Linardon, appeals from a judgment entered by a Housing Court judge after a bench trial, awarding the plaintiff, WoodSpring Suites Boston MA Saugus, LLC, possession and damages. Concluding that the Housing Court had subject matter jurisdiction and that the judge acted within his discretion in not excusing the defendant's lateness in demanding a jury trial and requesting discovery, we affirm.
The defendant also filed a notice of appeal from the judge's denial of her amended motion for reconsideration, new trial, or relief from judgment. The defendant raises no issue concerning that motion in her briefing before this court, except to the extent that the motion judge determined that the Housing Court had subject matter jurisdiction.
1. Subject matter jurisdiction. "[A] party has the right to raise subject matter jurisdiction at any time." Cohen v. Cohen, 470 Mass. 708, 713 (2015), quoting ROPT Ltd. Partnership v. Katin, 431 Mass. 601, 607 (2000). We review de novo. See Merchants Ins. Group v. Spicer, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 262, 266 (2015).
The Housing Court has jurisdiction of summary process cases "as [are] concerned directly or indirectly with the health, safety, or welfare, of any occupant of any place used, or intended for use, as a place of human habitation." G. L. c. 185C, § 3. Furthermore, "[t]he Housing Court's jurisdiction broadly encompasses ‘all contract and tort actions which affect the health, safety and welfare of the occupants or owners thereof.’ " Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n v. Gordon, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 527, 532 (2017), quoting G. L. c. 185C, § 3. The instant dispute, regarding whether the defendant can be expelled from her housing in a long-term residential hotel, easily falls within this jurisdiction. Far from being limited to landlord-tenant disputes, the Housing Court's jurisdiction extends to summary process claims after foreclosure, Bank of N.Y. v. Bailey, 460 Mass. 327, 331 (2011), claims to use and occupy a freestanding garage near a residential condominium, McElligott v. Lukes, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 61, 62 (1997), and claims of trespass on residential housing, Gordon, supra. Accord LeBlanc v. Sherwin Williams Co., 406 Mass. 888, 897 (1990) ("the Housing Court remains a court of limited jurisdiction with its expertise in the area of housing"); Police Comm'r of Boston v. Lewis, 371 Mass. 332, 338 (1976) (Legislature's "objective was to establish a separate, specialized court with expertise in the area of housing"); West Broadway Task Force, Inc. v. Commissioner of Dep't of Community Affairs, 363 Mass. 745, 753 (1973) (Housing Court may "handle all criminal and civil matters regarding housing").
2. Jury trial. In a summary process action, the demand for a jury trial "shall be made with the request for transfer" to the Housing Court, Rule 4 of the Uniform Summary Process Rules (1982), or no later than the date on which the answer is due, Rule 8(1) of the Uniform Summary Process Rules (1980). "Generally the right to a jury trial may be waived by failure to make a timely demand." CMJ Mgt. Co. v. Wilkerson, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 276, 282 (2017). Accord Arthur D. Little, Inc. v. Commissioner of Health & Hosps. of Cambridge, 395 Mass. 535, 545 (1985). To the extent that relief from such waiver is permissible under Mass. R. Civ. P. 39 (b), 365 Mass. 801 (1974), in a summary process action, the judge's discretion "is ‘largely unlimited.’ " Senior Hous. Props. Trust v. HealthSouth Corp., 447 Mass. 259, 270 (2006), quoting Reporter's Notes to Mass. R. Civ. P. 39 (b), Mass. Ann. Laws, Rules of Civil Procedure at 649 (LexisNexis 2005).
The defendant here informed the judge that she was accompanied by an attorney when she filed the notice of transfer. Although she stated that a clerk told her not to file an answer in the District Court, she nowhere suggests that the clerk instructed her not to request a jury trial in, or with, her notice of transfer. Indeed, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss within four days of the District Court entry day, showing that she was capable of filing pleadings before hearing from the Housing Court. Under these circumstances, we cannot discern that the judge abused her largely unlimited discretion in not excusing the late demand for a jury trial.
3. Discovery. In general, discovery requests in summary process cases must be made at the time the answer is due. Rule 7(a) of the Uniform Summary Process Rules (1993). Late discovery requests "shall not be allowed unless on motion and for good cause shown." Id. We review the judge's determination in this regard for an abuse of discretion. See Dray v. Vardenski, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 861, 861 (1976). Accord Asian Am. Civic Ass'n v. Chinese Consol. Benevolent Ass'n of New England, Inc., 43 Mass. App. Ct. 145, 152 (1997).
As with the jury demand, the defendant has provided no reason why she did not at least serve the plaintiff with discovery requests in a timely manner. Even if she believed that filing the discovery request with the court pursuant to rule 7(a) of the Uniform Summary Process Rules was premature, she has offered no explanation why she waited over a month to serve her discovery requests on the plaintiff. We discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's denial of the late discovery requests.
Judgment affirmed.
Order dated March 29, 2019, denying in part defendant's motions for reconsideration affirmed.