Opinion
1:20-cv-288
08-01-2023
STEVEN W. WOODSON, Jr., Plaintiff v. CHARLES CRISSMAN, et al, Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ECF NOS. 100, 120, 126
RICHARD A. LANZILLO CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that the motions for summary judgment filed by Defendants Angel Gressell [ECF No. 120] and Defendants Charles Crissman, Buck Hetrick, Jodi Sheesley, and Scott C. Smith [ECF No. 126] be granted. It is further recommended that the motion for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff Steven W. Woodson, Jr. [ECF No. 100] be denied.
II. Report
A. Procedural Background
Plaintiff Steven W. Woodson, Jr., an inmate formerly incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Forest (SCI-Forest), initiated this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on September 28, 2020. ECF No. 1. In his Amended Complaint - the operative pleading in this action - Woodson alleged that prison officials violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by deliberately ignoring his frequent threats to commit acts of self-harm. See ECF No. 27 at ¶¶ 12-39. Woodson also asserted a state law negligence claim. Id. As Defendants, Woodson named Nurse Practitioner (CRNP) Angel Gressel, Psychological Services Specialists (PSS) Charles Crissman and Jodi Sheesly, and corrections officers Scott C. Smith and Buck Hetrick. Id. ¶¶ 2-6.
Woodson has since been transferred to SCI-Benner Township.
Because Gressel is not a DOC employee, she is represented by separate counsel. The remaining Defendants are DOC employees and will be collectively referred to as such throughout this Report.
In his pleading, Woodson alleged that he informed Gressel, Crissman, and Sheesly that a voice in his head was urging him to harm himself and that he was having visions of his arm “all cut up.” Id. ¶¶ 14-17, 21-23. Rather than place him under observation, Gressel, Crissman and Sheesly allegedly left him alone, resulting in him cutting himself. Id. ¶¶ 26-27. As to the corrections officers, Woodson alleged that Smith and Hetrick each became aware that he had cut himself but failed to check on him. Id. ¶¶ 30-35.
The parties filed motions to dismiss on March 29 and March 30, 2021. ECF Nos. 31, 34. On October 28, 2021, the undersigned issued Reports and Recommendations that each motion be granted in part and denied in part. ECF Nos. 43, 44. United States District Judge Susan Paradise Baxter adopted each Report on December 20, 2021, and the following claims proceeded to discovery: 1) an Eighth Amendment claim against the DOC Defendants for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need; 2) an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Gressel; and 3) a state law claim for medical negligence against Gressel, but only to the extent that it is based on a complete denial of medical care. ECF Nos. 49, 50.
Extensive motions practice took place during the discovery phase, including a partially successful motion for sanctions filed by Gressel based on Woodson's transmission of inappropriate and obscene settlement demands. See ECF Nos. 65-70, 78-79. Following the close of discovery, Woodson filed a Motion for Summary Judgment accompanied by a Concise Statement of Material Facts, supporting Brief, and Appendix of Exhibits. ECF Nos. 100-102. In addition to responding to Woodson's motion, Gressel and the DOC Defendants each filed their own Motions for Summary Judgment, again accompanied by the proper supporting documents. ECF Nos. 120-131. Woodson having responded to each Defendants' motion, see ECF Nos. 13435, 139-42, this matter is ripe for disposition.
This matter has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b).
B. Factual Background
The following factual recitation is derived primarily from Woodson's medical records and, to the extent are supported by the record, the parties' concise statements of material facts. Prior to the events underlying this action, Woodson was incarcerated at SCI-Forest with diagnoses of unspecified depressive disorder, unspecified personality disorder, and unspecified insomnia disorder. ECF No. 122 ¶¶ 24-25. Although none of these is considered a serious mental illness, Woodson received ongoing treatment including several antipsychotic and antidepressant medications. Id. ¶¶ 20, 21-23, 27.
Unspecified depressive disorder is a diagnosis given to individuals who present with symptoms of depression but do not meet the full criteria for any of the depressive disorder diagnoses. ECF No. 122 ¶ 16. Unspecified personality disorder is a diagnosis given to individuals with characteristics of a personality disorder who do not meet the full criteria for any specific personality disorder. Id. ¶ 17. Unspecified insomnia disorder is a diagnosis associated with difficulty initiating or maintaining sleep in individuals who do not meet the full criteria of an insomnia disorder. Id. ¶ 19.
Although Woodson disputes this characterization of his mental health history, he has not adduced any evidence to refute Gressel's professional opinion in this regard. See ECF Nos. 122-1 ¶ 21; 142 ¶ 20.
On December 12, 2019, Woodson cut himself in his cell. Id. ¶ 28. He was placed in a Psychiatric Observation Cell (POC), a temporary housing location for inmates who are experiencing an immediate mental health crisis or pose an imminent threat to themselves or others. Id. ¶¶ 14, 29. While under observation, the psychology staff noted that Woodson was oriented to person, place, and time with no symptoms of mania. ECF No. 122-4 at 7. The staff encouraged Woodson to reach out to his unit psychologist and noted Woodson's frustration with the fact that, due to past predatory and manipulative behaviors, he had been denied placement in his preferred unit. Id. The staff further opined that Woodson's cutting “appear[ed] to be behavioral in nature for secondary gain.” Id. After conducting a full Mental Status Exam (MSE), Gressel determined that Woodson could be discharged from the POC to a camera cell for 72 hours with no razors or utensils. ECF No. 122 ¶ 36. Gressel also noted that Woodson reported “hearing voices, but [was] vague and unable to explain.” ECF No. 122-4 at 15.
Another medical provider noted that she had been approached by Woodson's ex-boyfriend while making rounds “and was informed that the boyfriend heard [Woodson] was in POC for cutting and that [Woodson] notified the boyfriend that he planned to cut at some point” to get back to his preferred housing unit. ECF No. 122-4 at 19.
Woodson cut himself again on December 23, 2019. ECF No. 122 ¶ 42. Gressel's progress note from that date indicates that she conducted a full MSE. ECF No. 122-4 at 34. She observed that Woodson was in good spirits, laughing and smiling, and made no mention of auditory hallucinations, depression, or anxiety. ECF No. 122 ¶ 44. Her note reflects that Woodson “vaguely provided suggestion that he has secondary gains for his actions” but would not speak about it on camera. ECF No. 122-4 at 34. By way of further clarification, he stated “that he engaged in self harm behaviors because he wants ‘transferred to another prison so I can be appropriately treated on a [Special Need Unit].”' Id. Woodson was admitted to a POC due to his “impulsivity and making poor choices for secondary gain.” ECF No. 122 ¶ 47.
A Special Needs Unit (SNU) is a housing unit for inmates with medical or intellectual vulnerabilities. ECF No. 122 ¶ 15. Woodson had previously been removed from the SNU due to “predatory and manipulative” behavior. Id. ¶3E.
Gressel assessed him again the following day, noting that he had been visited by the Psychiatric Review Team (PRT), an interdisciplinary team that meets with inmates on the active mental health roster to assess their overall wellbeing and develop appropriate goals and treatment plans. Id. ¶¶ 5-6, 50. Woodson stated that he was feeling better and was ready to go back to his unit. Id. ¶ 50. He denied suicidal ideations, expressed awareness of appropriate coping skills, and displayed no acute psychiatric symptoms that would require further POC housing. Id. Gressel noted that Woodson was open about his motive for secondary gains and was focused on being transferred to another prison and returned to the SNU. Id. ¶¶ 45, 52. He was discharged from the POC and placed in a camera cell with restrictions on razors and utensils. Id. ¶ 53. During several visits with nursing and psychology over the next several days, Woodson expressed no suicidal ideations or thoughts of self-harm. Id. ¶ 55.
On January 6, 2020, Gressel assessed Woodson and noted that he was “doing better.” Id. ¶ 56. He reported satisfaction with his current medications and denied suicidal ideations. Id. Gressel completed a full MSE, noting that Woodson was “pleasant and engaging” and displayed normal and appropriate affect, thought processes, and orientation. Id. ¶ 57. Gressel's notes reflect that she believed Woodson was stable and doing well with no acute concerns. Id. ¶ 58. After ordering and reviewing lab studies to check the levels of Woodson's psychotropic medications, Gressel planned to renew those medications and recommend a follow-up in 14-16 weeks. Id. ¶ 60. According to Woodson, Gressel also told him to “try not to hurt [him]self' and to “find something to occupy [his] mind.” ECF No. 27 ¶¶ 18-19. Following this interaction, Gressel recorded the following subjective observations:
Woodson's amended complaint incorrectly identifies the date of this interaction as January 10, 2020. ECF No. 27 ¶ 13. In response to Gressel's submission of uncontradicted evidence that she was not working at SCI Forest at any point between January 6 and January 13, 2020, see ECF No. 122 ¶ 62, Woodson concedes that this critical interaction occurred on January 6. ECF No. 134 at 6.
Mr. Woodson was last seen 12/24/19, when he was discharged from the POC. Today, Mr. Woodson states “I'm doing better.” He reports that his mood, energy, sleep and appetite are “okay.” Depression and anxiety are manageable. He feels his medications are effective, well tolerated and no side effects. [Abnormal Involuntary Movement Scale] completed. Fills his free time with reading and learning French, He talks about meditating and being discharged from the RHU in February or March. States he is satisfied with his current medications. Denies SI/HI. Denies AH/VH. Denies feeling hopeless/helpless.ECF No. 122 ¶ 56.
Woodson received another assessment on January 8, 2020, this time from Crissman. ECF No. 122 ¶ 63. Crissman noted that Woodson “was cooperative and appropriate throughout the interaction.” ECF No. 128 ¶ 17. Crissman's notes reflect that Woodson “reported that he is currently having desires to self harm” but that he “denied any current intent to self harm.” ECF No. 122-4 at 72-74. He “denied any thoughts of committing suicide.” Id. Crissman observed “no concerning symptomology in regard to acute [Mental Health] issues” and noted that Woodson “appear[ed] stable at [that] time per interaction.” ECF No. 128 ¶ 18.
On January 10, 2020, Sheesley met with Woodson around 9:07 a.m. in response to his request to “speak with ‘psych.'” ECF No. 122 ¶ 64; ECF No. 128 ¶ 20. Woodson reported having ‘“visions' of cutting himself' in response to a “voice inside of his head.” ECF No. 122-4 at 75. He indicated having thoughts of self-harm “for months.” Id. After confirming that Woodson had been compliant with his medications and did not have access to a razor, Sheesley spoke with Woodson for “about 30 minutes” before Woodson's primary Physician Support Specialist (PSS), Crissman, arrived on the unit. Id.
After being briefed by Sheesley, Crissman obtained Woodson's mental health history and initiated a mental health contact. ECF No. 122 ¶ 67; ECF No. 128 ¶ 25. Woodson reported that he was “hearing voices that are not his own” and added that “the voices are advocating self-harming behaviors and suicidality.” ECF No. 122 ¶ 67. Woodson also reported visual hallucinations including “seeing himself with his arms ripped off' and “seeing other[s] bleeding from their facial orifices while talking to them.” Id. After confirming that Woodson was in a camera cell with razor and utensil restrictions, Crissman planned to refer Woodson to PRT due to his reports of functional deterioration. ECF No. 122 ¶ 70; ECF No. 128 ¶ 30.
In his amended complaint, Woodson describes the subsequent events as follows:
Instead of having me put under close observation due to my two (2) very recent incidents of serious self harm (December 12, 2019 & December 23, 2019), I was left unobserved in my cell, after being told to try not to harm myself, I lost the fight and cut myself seriously. I bled for fifteen (15) minutes before help arrived. I cut myself at 11:39 a.m. according to video footage. At 11:43 I smeared blood on both my windows. At 11:47 C.O. Scott C. Smith made his rounds up to my door. C.O. Scott C. Smith walked right past my cell without stopping to check on me, thereby negating the purpose of his doing a security round cell check, further endangering my life[.]
[Shortly thereafter,] Buck Hetrick heard the inmates talking and exclaiming about me having cut myself and my putting blood on the windows. Defendant can be seen on video lifting his head, looking in my direction, then bending back down to his paperwork.Id. ¶¶ 24-37.
Two security footage videos covering this period are included in the summary judgment record. ECF No. 192-2. The first video, labeled as 352, is from a fixed camera covering the interior of Woodson's cell. ECF No. 128 ¶¶ 43-44. The second, labeled 359 KA PTZ, is a pan-tilt-zoom camera that surveys the housing unit from a location across from Woodson's cell. Id. ¶¶ 46-47. After carefully reviewing each video, the Court finds that the following descriptions offered by the DOC Defendants are accurate in all respects:
The [352] video begins at 11:38:24, at 11:38:28, Plaintiff brings his right hand up to the inside of his left forearm; it is not clear, but at some point it appears that Plaintiff begins cutting his left forearm. During this time,
Plaintiff is standing at the end of his bunk, a few steps away from the door' he does not appear to be speaking.
At 11:41:48, Plaintiff moves to the window and looks out; it appears he may be talking to another inmate.
At 11:43:02, Plaintiff brings his left forearm up to the window and, after several attempts, smears blood on the window. At this point, Plaintiff has stopped cutting himself.
From 11:43:31 to 11:43:454, and then from 11:46:13 to 11:46:20, and then from 11:46:24 to 11:46:35, it appears that Plaintiff may be cutting himself again however, Plaintiff does not appear to be speaking or calling out to anyone.
At 11:46:49, Plaintiff sits on the toilet between the door and the end of his bunk. It cannot be determined if he is cutting himself, but it appears that he is not speaking or calling out to anyone.
Plaintiff remains seated on the toilet until the [first] video ends at 11:49:00.ECF No. 128 ¶ 45.
[The 359 KA PTZ] video also begins at 11:38:24, no one can be seen in the common areas until at 11:47:37, a Corrections Officer, identified as CO Scott, is seen on the video, walking in from the cells opposite Plaintiffs cell.
At about 11:47:53, the Corrections Officer is seen on the video, walking in front of Plaintiff s cell.
At about 11:478:57, the Corrections Officer is seen on the video, turning and proceeding up the stairs to the upper tier of cells.
After walking past all of the cells on the upper tier of cells, the Corrections Officer exits the housing unit from the upper tier at about 11:48:48.
The 359 KA PTZ video ends at 11:49:00.Id. ¶ 48.
Following the incident, Woodson was admitted to the POC by a psychiatrist, Richard Camacho. ECF No. 122 ¶ 73. Dr. Camacho performed a full MSE and noted that Woodson was normal aside from a labile affect and poor insight/judgment. ECF No. 122-4 at 89. He also noted that Woodson had displayed normal behavior all morning: “Collaborative information from phlebotomy staff reports that he was doing well in the morning when he was drawn blood for test. He was observed to be ‘normal' his usual self and laughing with CO's in AM.” Id. Psychiatry ordered Woodson to be placed under close observation with only a smock, blanket, and reading materials. Id. at 86. He received six sutures for his wrist wound. Id.
Woodson met with another psychiatrist, Ingrid Renberg, three days later. Id. at 95. At that time, Woodson reported that he was feeling better and denied further thoughts of self-harm. Id. The psychiatrist noted that he had been calm and appropriate in the POC with normal sleep, appetite, and compliance with medications. Id. Woodson refused to discuss the incident due to the presence of security staff but indicated that he felt ready to return to his regular cell. Id. Dr. Renberg slightly altered his medications and discharged him back to his regular unit. ECF No. 122 ¶¶ 79-80.
C. Standards of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) requires the court to enter summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Under this standard “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A disputed fact is “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome of the case under applicable substantive law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257; Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (3d Cir. 1991).
When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact remains for trial, the court must view the record and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in favor of the nonmoving party. Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1993); Clement v. Consol. Rail Corp., 963 F.2d 599, 600 (3d Cir. 1992); White v. Westinghouse Electric Co., 862 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1988). To avoid summary judgment, however, the nonmoving party may not rest on the unsubstantiated allegations of his or her pleadings. Instead, once the movant satisfies its burden of identifying evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must to go beyond his pleadings with affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or other record evidence to demonstrate specific material facts that give rise to a genuine issue. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
Further, under Rule 56, a defendant may seek summary judgment by pointing to the absence of a genuine fact issue on one or more essential claim elements. The Rule mandates summary judgment if the plaintiff then fails to make a sufficient showing on each of those elements. When Rule 56 shifts the burden of production to the nonmoving party, “a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. See Harter v. G.A.F. Corp., 967 F.2d 846, 851 (3d Cir. 1992).
D. Analysis
As noted above, Woodson primarily contends that Gressel and the DOC Defendants displayed deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs on January 10, 2020, when he engaged in an act of self-harm. Woodson also asserts a professional liability negligence claim against Gressel based on an alleged complete denial of care. For the reasons set forth below, summary judgment should be granted in favor of Defendants as to each of these claims.
1. Deliberate indifference (Medical Defendants)
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment extends to deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (stating that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment”) (internal quotation omitted). To establish a violation of the constitutional right to adequate medical care, a plaintiff is required to allege facts that demonstrate: (1) a serious medical need, and (2) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need. Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). Such indifference is manifested by an intentional refusal to provide care, delayed medical treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed medical treatment, a denial of reasonable requests for treatment that results in suffering or risk of injury, Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993), or “persistent conduct in the face of resultant pain and risk of permanent injury.” White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 109 (3d Cir. 1990).
Allegations of deliberate indifference must satisfy “a high threshold.” Anderson v. Bickell, 2018 WL 5778241, at *2 (3d Cir. Nov. 2, 2018). It is well-settled that “an inmate's dissatisfaction with a course of medical treatment, standing alone, does not give rise to a viable Eighth Amendment claim.” Tillery v. Noel, 2018 WL 3521212, at *5 (M.D. Pa. June 28, 2018) (collecting cases). Such complaints fail as constitutional claims because “the exercise by a doctor of his professional judgment is never deliberate indifference.” Gindraw v. Dendler, 967 F.Supp. 833, 836 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (citing Brown v. Borough of Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[A]s long as a physician exercises professional judgment his behavior will not violate a prisoner's constitutional rights.”)). “Therefore, where a dispute in essence entails nothing more than a disagreement between an inmate and doctors over alternate treatment plans, the inmate's complaint will fail as a constitutional claim under § 1983.” Tillery, 2018 WL 3521212, at *5 (citing Gause v. Diguglielmo, 339 Fed.Appx. 132 (3d Cir. 2009) (characterizing a dispute over medication as the type of “disagreement over the exact contours of [plaintiffs] medical treatment” that does not violate the constitution)).
Similarly, “the mere misdiagnosis of a condition or medical need, or negligent treatment provided for a condition, is not actionable as an Eighth Amendment claim because medical malpractice standing alone is not a constitutional violation.” Tillery, 2018 WL 3521212, at *5 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106). “Indeed, prison authorities are accorded considerable latitude in the diagnosis and treatment of prisoners.” Durmer, 991 F.2d at 67 (citations omitted). Thus, “courts have consistently rejected Eighth Amendment claims where an inmate has received some level of medical care.” Hensley v. Collins, 2018 WL 4233021, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2018) (quoting Clark v. Doe, 2000 WL 1522855, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 2000)). See also Wisniewski v. Frommer, 751 Fed.Appx. 192 (3d Cir. Oct. 3, 2018) (noting that “there is a critical distinction ‘between cases where the complaint alleges a complete denial of medical care and those alleging inadequate medical treatment.'”) (quoting Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 535 (3d Cir. 2017)).
Applying these principles to the instant case, the Court finds ample evidence in the record to establish that Gressel, Crissman, and Sheesley each exercised medical judgment and provided Woodson with “some level of medical care” prior to the self-harm incident on January 10, 2020. Hensley, 2018 WL 4233021, at *3. Each will be analyzed in tum.
a. Gressel
Woodson's medical records indicate that Gressel met with and personally assessed Woodson on four separate occasions during the month prior to his injury, including on January 6, 2020. On that date, Gressel noted that Woodson was "doing better," felt his medications were effective, and denied suicidal ideations. ECF No. 122 ¶¶ 57-61. Contrary to Woodson's averment that Gressel did nothing more than tell him to "try not to hurt [him]self," the record indicates that she performed a full MSE and noted that his appearance, hygiene, speech, eye contact, motor activity, thought content, and attention were normal; his behavior was cooperative; his mood was euthymic; his affect was appropriate to the situation; his thought process was logical/goal directed; he had no delusions, suicidal ideations, homicidal ideations, or memory impairment; and he was oriented within normal limits with fair insight and judgment. Id. She also ordered and reviewed lab studies, renewed Woodson's medications, and planned to schedule him for a routine follow up with psychiatry. Id. Based on this interaction, there is no question that Woodson received some level of care from Gressel.
To the extent that Woodson complains that Gressel should have placed him under closer observation, it is well-settled that an inmate's objection to the type of care provided by prison physicians in the exercise of their medical judgment is precisely the type of "disagreement between an inmate and doctors over alternate treatment plans" that falls well short of a constitutional violation. Tillery, 2018 WL 3521212, at *5. Indeed, these types of claims frequently arise - and are routinely rejected - in the prison setting. See, e.g., Foye v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 675 Fed.Appx. 210, 215 (3d Cir. 2017) (medical defendants were not deliberately indifferent for failing to order a specific test at the inmate's request); Rhines v. Bledsoe, 388 Fed.Appx. 225, at 227 (3d Cir. 2010) (decision not to order diagnostic test was not deliberate indifference). It is apparent from her notes that Gressel believed Woodson's self-harming inclinations were being appropriately managed. Because Gressel's decision not to intervene more aggressively in Woodson's care stemmed from an exercise of medical judgment, that decision did not violate the constitution. Gindraw, 967 F.Supp. at 836 ("[A]s long as a physician exercises professional judgment his behavior will not violate a prisoner's constitutional rights.")).
b. Sheesley
Woodson's claim against Sheesley is based on a single, brief interaction. According to Woodson's medical records, Sheesley visited him on the morning of January 10 in response to "a call from unit control that Woodson wanted to speak with 'psych.”' ECF No. 128 1 20. She spoke with him for approximately thirty minutes. In documenting this interaction, Sheesley noted that Woodson expressed "vague ... self harming thoughts" and described "having visions of self harming behavior." ECF No. 128 1 21. Despite these inclinations, his affect "was appropriate with thought content" and he "smiled and laughed several times during the 30-minute conversation." Id. After confirming that Woodson was on a razor restriction, Sheesley documented the contact and referred Woodson directly to his regular PSS, Crissman, who had arrived on the unit. No reasonable jury could conclude that Sheesley violated Woodson's constitutional rights simply by speaking with and counseling him until the arrival of his regular PSS.
c. Crissman
Crissman met with Woodson at least twice in the days surrounding the incident. On January 8, 2020, Crissman visited Woodson at his cell door to provide psychological support. ECF No. 129-2 at 6. His notes from that meeting indicate that Woodson was “cooperative and appropriate throughout the interaction” and reported “no current suicidal/assaultive ideation/intent.” Id. Woodson reported having desires to self-harm but denied any current intent to self-harm. Id. At Crissman's suggestion, Woodson agreed to complete a Cognitive Processing Therapy (CPT) workbook and psychological self-assessment. Id. Crissman's impression was that Woodson displayed “no concerning symptomology in regard to acute [mental health] issues” and “appear[ed] stable at [that] time per interaction.” Id.
Crissman's next contact with Woodson occurred on January 10, 2020, after he arrived on Woodson's unit and received a briefing from Sheesley. During that meeting, Crissman obtained Woodson's mental health treatment history and reviewed self-assessment that he provided to Woodson on January 8. He noted that Woodson self-reported body disconnection, loss of time, feelings of derealization, and “checking out” on a daily basis. ECF No. 129-2 at 14. Woodson also reported “visual hallucinations that include ‘seeing himself with his arms ripped off” and “hearing voices that are not his own ... advocating self-harming behaviors and suicidality.” Id. Although Woodson reported “having thoughts of self-harming and suicide,” he “denied any intent or plan to self-harm or commit suicide.” Id.
After meeting with Woodson, Crissman met with the Licensed Psychologist Manager (LPM) to review Woodson's observed and documented symptomology. Id. at 16. Crissman noted that Woodson was currently “active in his mental health treatment” and was “currently celled in a camera cell and has current restrictions for shaving/razor possession.” Id. Based on the foregoing, Crissman determined that Woodson should be referred to his Psychological Review Team for further treatment due to his reported functional deterioration. Id.
As with Gressel, Woodson complains that Crissman should have placed him under closer observation. Woodson also argues that Crissman (and the remaining Corrections Defendants) . took no action at all in response to his self-harming ideations:
In all of the Corrections Defendants prolonged argument in their Briefs in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, nothing is said about “ACTIVELY” doing anything WITH Plaintiff other [than] listening to him talk and filing some paperwork. Defendant Crissman said in his brief, page 10, that Plaintiff reported thoughts of self-harm and suicide. But. . . What. Was. Done? to help - to actively help - Plaintiff overcome those thoughts and desires? Neither Crissman or Sheesley say what, because NOTHING was.ECF No. 135 at 6.
Although Woodson's claim against Crissman present a closer call, it still amounts to a mere disagreement over the type of care provided by a prison physician in the exercise of his medical judgment. It is evident from his notes that Crissman understood that Woodson was experiencing some functional deterioration but did not believe that Woodson had any current plan to harm himself. Nor did Crissman have any reason to believe that Woodson - who was in a camera cell and under razor restrictions - had the capability of harming himself. Based on his assessments, Crissman plainly believed that Woodson was stable and that follow up care could be scheduled with his PRT. Indeed, Crissman was in the process of arranging these additional steps at the time that Woodson cut himself.
In short, it appears that Gressel, Sheesley, and Crissman each made a medical decision that Woodson's mental health issues, while active and real, did not present an acute risk of self-harm at the time that each assessed him. Even if ultimately incorrect, that exercise of medical judgment does not represent deliberate indifference. Tillery, 2018 WL 3521212, at *5 (“[T]he mere misdiagnosis of a condition or medical need, or negligent treatment provided for a condition, is not actionable as an Eighth Amendment claim because medical malpractice standing alone is not a constitutional violation.”) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106). Summary judgment should be granted in favor of each of these Defendants.
2. Deliberate indifference (Corrections Defendants)
Woodson's claims against Smith and Hetrick challenge their response to the cutting incident on January 10, 2020. Woodson maintains that: 1) Smith displayed deliberate indifference during his rounds that morning by failing to notice the blood on his window and check on him; and 2) Hetrick intentionally delayed in calling for help once he learned that Woodson had injured himself.
Woodson's claim against Smith is quickly dismissed. The undisputed evidence of record, including the video footage of Smith's security check, belies any inference that Smith ever became aware that Woodson had injured himself. Woodson's entire case against Smith rests on Woodson's belief that, per prison policy and job description, Smith was obligated “to check (by looking into the cells) to ensure an inmate is not dead, dying, trying to kill/hurt himself or another inmate and is not trying to escape.” ECF No. 135 at 6. However, even assuming that Smith was performing his job in a negligent manner by not spending more time looking into cells, it is well-established that such negligence does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999) (“It is well-settled that claims of negligence or medical malpractice, without some more culpable state of mind, do not constitute ‘deliberate indifference.'”); Shears v. SCI Forest, 2022 WL 16744453, at *10 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 2022) (holding that “there is no plausible constitutional violation associated with the lack of adherence to prison regulations”). In the absence of any evidence that Smith knew Woodson was in danger, no reasonable trier of fact could infer that Smith's behavior violated the constitution.
As to Hetrick, Woodson accuses him of deliberate indifference based on his response to reports from inmates that Woodson had cut himself. According to Woodson, Hetrick “was aware of Plaintiff s [injury]” and “decided to call [another corrections officer] .. . and let him deal with it.” ECF No. 135 at 7. Woodson also alleges that Hetrick waited to call Wells until “he finished his paperwork on the block.” Id.
Despite ample opportunity to do so, Woodson has failed to adduce any evidence to support his contention that Hetrick delayed in calling for help. The incident log for the morning of January 10, 2020, states only that: “Hetrick the A-pod officer notified unit control and Sgt. Wells [that] I/M Woodson (MM6796) was cutting his left arm. Medical and Main Control were notified and the I/M was handcuffed and taken to triage.” ECF No. 129-2 at 58. The video footage of Woodson's cell establishes that he cut himself at approximately 11:38 a.m., but that no one learned of his injury until at least 11:49 a.m., when the video ends. Based on the timeline set forth in the incident report, Woodson's injury was reported within five minutes thereafter:
1154-SGT Wells and control notified
1155-SGT Wells at cell
1155-Medical notified
1159-I/M escorted to unit triage
1203-Medical on scene
1212-I/M escorted to Medical for treatmentId. at 59. Given that Hetrick almost certainly learned of Woodson's injury between 11:49 a.m. and 11:54 a.m., the record establishes that help arrived on the scene within no more than five minutes. Based on this timeline, no reasonable factfinder could accept Woodson's unsupported allegation that Hetrick significantly delayed before calling for help. Summary judgment is warranted.
3. Professional negligence
In addition to his medical indifference claim, Woodson alleges that Gressel's failure to prevent him from harming himself amounted to medical negligence. Because he failed to file a Certificate of Merit, as required by Pennsylvania law, the Court has restricted Woodson's medical negligence claim to the discrete issue of whether Gressel's treatment amounted to a “complete denial of care.” See ECF No. 44 at 6-7 (citing Rule 1042.3 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure); ECF No. 49 at 3. As recounted thoroughly above, the undisputed evidence of record plainly demonstrates that it did not. Summary judgment should be granted in favor of Gressel on this claim.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the motions for summary judgment filed by Defendants Angel Gressell [ECF No. 120] and Defendants Charles Crissman, Buck Hetrick, Jodi Sheesley, and Scott C. Smith [ECF No. 126] be granted. It is further recommended that the motion for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff Steven W. Woodson, Jr. [ECF No. 100] be denied.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).