Opinion
1:20-cv-288 Erie
10-28-2021
STEVEN W. WOODSON, Jr., Plaintiff v. C. CRISSMAN, et al., Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS [ECF NO. 31]
RICHARD A. LANZLLO, United States Magistrate Judge.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 31] be granted as to Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim. Defendants' motion should be denied as moot as to Plaintiffs official capacity and negligence claims, as those claims have been voluntarily dismissed.
This matter has been referred to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
II. Report
A. Background
Plaintiff Steven W. Woodson, Jr., an inmate incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Forest (SCI-Forest), initiated this pro se civil rights action on September 28, 2020. See ECF No. 1. In his Amended Complaint - the operative pleading in this action - Woodson alleges that prison officials violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by deliberately ignoring his frequent threats to commit acts of self-harm. See ECF No. 27 at ¶¶ 12-39.
Woodson also asserts a state law negligence claim. Id. As Defendants, Woodson named Psychological Services Specialists (PSS) Charles Crissman and Jodi Sheesly and corrections officers Scott C. Smith and Buck Hetrick. Id. ¶¶ 2-6. Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Forsythe seeks declaratory relief and compensatory and punitive damages. Id. ¶¶ 52-59.
Woodson also sued a non-DOC employee, Nurse Practitioner Angel Gressel. ECF No. 27 ¶ 5. Gressel filed a separate motion to dismiss. ECF No. 34.
In his pleading, Woodson alleges that on January 10, 2020, he informed Gressel, Crissman and Sheesly that a voice in his head was urging him to harm himself and that he was having visions of his arm “all cut up.” Id. ¶¶ 14-17, 21-23. Woodson maintains that he had previously engaged in acts of self-harm on December 12, 2019 and December 23, 2019. Id. ¶ 24. Rather than place him under observation, Gressel, Crissman and Sheesly left him alone. Id. As a result, Woodson cut himself and ended up bleeding for fifteen minutes before help arrived. Id. ¶¶ 26-27.
While performing his rounds, Smith passed by Woodson's window and declined to stop and check on him despite the presence of blood on Woodson's window. Id. ¶¶ 30-31. Shortly thereafter, Hetrick heard several inmates talking about Woodson having cut himself, looked in the direction of his cell, and then returned to his paperwork without checking on Woodson. Id. ¶¶ 34-35. Woodson was eventually taken to medical approximately 16 minutes after having cut himself. Id. ¶ 38.
Presently pending before the Court is Defendants' partial motion to dismiss. ECF No. 31. Woodson responded by filing an unsworn affidavit [ECF No. 38] and a motion to dismiss certain claims against Smith and Hetrick [ECF No. 37]. As such, this matter is ripe for disposition.
B. Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff will be likely to prevail on the merits; rather, the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). A complaint should only be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12 (b)(6) if it fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (rejecting the traditional 12 (b)(6) standard established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). In making this determination, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002).
While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286). See also McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania., 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”).
Expounding on the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases, the Third Circuit has articulated the following three-step approach:
First, the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.' Second, the court should identify allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.' Finally, ‘where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.'Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). This determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Finally, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the allegations in the complaint must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). If the court can reasonably read a pro se litigant's pleadings to state a valid claim upon which relief could be granted, it should do so despite the litigant's failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (petition prepared by a prisoner may be inartfully drawn and should be read “with a measure of tolerance”).
C. Analysis
Defendants' partial motion to dismiss challenges the legal sufficiency of Woodson's Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim, his negligence claim, and any claims against them in their official capacities. Defendants' motion does not challenge the sufficiency of Woodson's pleading as to his Eighth Amendment claim.
In response, Woodson filed a motion consenting to the dismissal of his negligence claims and his official capacity claims. ECF No. 37. The Court granted Woodson's motion on October 25, 2021. ECF No. 42. Because Woodson's negligence claim and his official capacity claims have already been dismissed from this action, with prejudice, Defendants' motion to dismiss those claims should be denied as moot.
As to his equal protection claim, Woodson maintains that Defendants “failure to take into account [his] past and very recent instances of self-harm and protect [him] from [him]self, as they have others in a similar position and are supposed to protect everyone, amounts to denial of equal protection.” ECF No. 27 ¶¶ 47, 49. To establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must ordinarily allege “that he was treated differently than other similarly situated inmates, and that this different treatment was the result of intentional discrimination based on his membership in a protected class.” Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286 (3d Cir 2016) (citing Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277, 294 (3d Cir. 2015)). Although Woodson alleges, in conclusory fashion, that he was treated differently than unidentified “others” in the prison, he has not pleaded any facts suggesting that this difference in treatment resulted from his race, religion, or other prohibited consideration. This deficiency is fatal to his claim.
To the extent that Woodson may be attempting to proceed under a “class of one” equal protection theory, he must establish that: “he was treated differently than others similarly situated as a result of intentional or purposeful discrimination . .. [and] that his treatment was not ‘reasonably related to [any] legitimate penological interests.'” Brayboy v. Johnson, 2018 WL 6018863, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2018) (quoting Hollandv. Taylor, 604 F.Supp.2d 692, 701 (D. Del. 2009)). In the specific context of prison discipline, this means that he must “demonstrate disparities in [treatment] that are not reasonable related to legitimate state interests.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 612 F.2d 766, 775 (3d Cir. 1979). Woodson has made no attempt to meet this burden and, as such, his equal protection claim should be dismissed.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motion to dismiss [ECF No. 31] be GRANTED as to Woodson's equal protection claim. Defendants' motion should be denied as moot in all other regards, as Plaintiff has consented to the voluntary dismissal of his negligence and official capacity claims.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).