Opinion
Case No. CIV-20-302-D
05-06-2020
MARCUS D. WOODSON, Plaintiff, v. JEORLD BRAGGS, JR. and SCOTT CROW, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Marcus D. Woodson, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1). Chief United States District Judge Timothy D. DeGiusti referred this matter for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C). It is recommended that the Petition be DISMISSED sua sponte.
I. GROUNDS FOR HABEAS RELIEF
Petitioner is incarcerated at Lexington Assessment and Reception Center (LARC). (ECF No. 1:1). Petitioner contends his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated when his case manager changed his classification from level 4 to level 1 after he had been placed in short-term administrative segregation for two alleged rule violations: disrespect to staff and possession of a weapon. According to Petitioner, his case manager simply assumed he had been convicted of these charges, moved him to the segregation unit and changed his classification from level 4, a classification that allowed him to earn credits towards early release, to level 1, a classification that precluded award of such credits. (ECF No. 1:7).
Petitioner contends, however, that he was later found "not guilty" of the charges after a disciplinary hearing held on March 16, 2020. But then, according to Petitioner, Respondent Braggs ordered a rehearing after which he was apparently found guilty. Petitioner alleges he was left in the segregated housing unit even though he "had no pending misconduct and no segregation days in which to justify placement." (ECF No. 1:7).
II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT
This Court is required to review habeas petitions promptly and to "summarily dismiss [a] petition without ordering a responsive pleading," Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 656 (2005), "[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court." See R. 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in United States District Courts (Section 2254 Rules). Binding Tenth Circuit law imposes a requirement on habeas petitioners to exhaust available remedies "whether [the] action is brought under § 2241 or § 2254," Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 866 (10th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, when it plainly appears on the face of a habeas petition that the petitioner has not exhausted available administrative or state court remedies before filing the habeas petition in federal court, that petition may be dismissed upon filing pursuant to Rule 4.
Pursuant to Section 2254 Rules, Rule 1(b) ("The district court may apply any or all of these rules to [other types of] habeas corpus petitions"); Boutwell v. Keating, 399 F.3d 1203, 1211 n. 2 (10th Cir. 2005) (district court acted within its discretion by applying Section 2254 Rules to a § 2241 petition). For clarification, the application of Rule 1(b) does not impose a different, or more stringent, legal standard on § 2241 claims. The rule simply allows the Court to review a habeas petition sua sponte before ordering a response.
III. DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
Although 28 U.S.C. § 2241 does not contain an explicit exhaustion requirement, exhaustion of available administrative and state court remedies is required before petitions brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 will be entertained by a federal court. See Garza v. Davis, 596 F.3d 1198, 1203 (10th Cir. 2010); Wilson v. Jones, 430 F.3d 1113, 1117 (10th Cir. 2005); Montez, at 866 ("A habeas petitioner is generally required to exhaust state remedies whether his action is brought under § 2241 or § 2254."). The exhaustion requirement is satisfied when the petitioner has sought relief through all available administrative and state court remedies. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006).
Oklahoma law provides for judicial review of ODOC disciplinary actions that result in the revocation of earned credits: "In those instances of prison disciplinary proceedings that result in the revocation of earned credits, the prisoner, after exhausting administrative remedies, may seek judicial review in the district court of the official residence of the Department of Corrections." Okla. Stat. tit 57, § 564.1. Petitioner does not contend that any earned credits were revoked. Rather, he is challenging his demotion to a classification level that will prevent him from earning future credits. --------
In this case, Petitioner admits he has not exhausted his administrative remedies. Petitioner contends that "prisoners in Oklahoma cannot file a direct judicial appeal in the state courts challenging classification and disciplinary board/committee decision. No remedy available. Exhaustion futile." (ECF No. 1:3; 4.) As for Petitioner's contention that there are no available remedies, he is mistaken.
The Oklahoma Department of Corrections (ODOC) has a process for challenging a disciplinary conviction. See DOC Policy 060125 § VIII, "Appeal Process." This policy details the steps an inmate must take to appeal a disciplinary conviction. Thus, before this Court can entertain a § 2241 petition, the facts and arguments underlying Petitioner's claim must first be presented to the appropriate prison officials through the administrative remedies available within the ODOC. Petitioner's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies, alone, requires dismissal of his petition without prejudice.
IV. ADDITIONAL GROUND FOR DISMISSAL
Additionally, however, this Court should dismiss the petition because Petitioner has failed to state a claim for habeas relief. The Tenth Circuit has determined that, because an inmate has no constitutionally protected liberty interest in the opportunity to earn good time credits, he has no liberty interest in any particular classification level. Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1262 (10th Cir. 2006) (an inmate "has no constitutionally-protected liberty interest in earning . . . credits."); Davis v. Ward, No. 03-6034, 2004 WL 233302, *2 (10th Cir. Feb. 9, 2004) (misconduct conviction did not "inevitably affect the duration of [inmate's] sentence" because prison officials retain the discretion to assign and reassign inmates to a particular class level, after considering a number of different factors); see also Wilson v. Oklahoma, No. 09-6058, 2009 WL 1863678, *2 (10th Cir. Jun. 30, 2009) ("Mr. Wilson is merely arguing for a right to the possibility of earning credits at a higher rate and early release. No such right exists under the Constitution.") (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979)). Therefore, the reduction in Petitioner's classification level as a result of his disciplinary convictions did not implicate his due process rights, and his Petition does not state a claim for habeas relief.
V. RECOMMENDATION AND NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
Based upon the foregoing analysis, it is recommended that the Petition (ECF No. 1) be DISMISSED without prejudice.
The parties are advised of their right to file an objection to this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by May 26, 2020, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. The parties are further advised that failure to make timely objection to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate review of both factual and legal issues contained herein. Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120, 1123 (10th Cir. 2010).
VI. STATUS OF REFERRAL
This Report and Recommendation terminates the referral by the District Judge in this matter.
ENTERED on May 6, 2020.
/s/_________
SHON T. ERWIN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE