Opinion
Civil 3:23-CV-1388-X-BK
07-28-2023
WOODSON INTERNATIONAL CHEVRON, PLAINTIFF, v. SOCIAL SECURITY AD, DEFENDANT.
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
RENEE HARRIS TOLIVER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Special Order 3, this case was referred to the United States magistrate judge for case management, including the issuance of findings and a recommended disposition where appropriate. The Court granted pro se litigant Jeral Durant Henderson's motion to proceed in forma pauperis but did not issue process in this case. Doc. 7. Upon review of the relevant pleadings and applicable law, this action should be DISMISSED.
I. BACKGROUND
Henderson has a lengthy and abusive filing history. On June 27, 2023, District Judge Ed Kinkeade dismissed one of his recent cases as frivolous and barred him from filing future actions in forma pauperis without first obtaining leave of court to do so. See Henderson v. Dart Internal Affairs, No. 3:23-CV-1086-K-BK (N.D. Tex. June 27, 2023).
On June 22, 2023, Henderson filed this action on behalf of Woodson International Chevron along with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Doc. 3; Doc. 4. Henderson signed both the complaint and motion to proceed in forma pauperis but did not list himself as a plaintiff. His one-page complaint is incoherent and nonsensical. Doc. 3 at 1. Henderson references the social security website and claims he has “proof” of an “ethical situation” and “serious crimes.” Doc. 3 at 1. He also encloses an Identity Theft Affidavit (IRS Form 14039), which he personally signed. Doc. 3 at 2-3.
Upon review of the complaint, the Court concludes that, if Henderson intends to sue on his own behalf, he fails to present a cognizable claim and his factual contentions are both delusional and deficient. Thus, ay such claims should be dismissed as frivolous. Further, any claims Henderson has attempted to assert on behalf of Woodson International Chevron should be dismissed without prejudice to the business entity retaining its own counsel and filing its own case if appropriate.
II. ANALYSIS
Henderson's complaint is subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). That statute provides, among other things, for the sua sponte dismissal of a complaint if the Court finds that it is frivolous or malicious. A complaint is frivolous when it is based on an indisputable meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions are “clearly ‘baseless.'” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The latter category encompasses allegations that describe “fanciful, fantastic, and delusional” scenarios, or that “rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 33.
The Court must always liberally construe pleadings filed by pro se litigants. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (noting pro se pleadings “must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”); Cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.”). Even under this most liberal construction, however, Henderson has failed to state a cognizable legal claim or anything that can be construed as such. Henderson offers no supporting legal authority and, as illustrated here, his factual contentions are clearly inadequate to support any cognizable claim. SeeDenton, 504 U.S. at 33. His allegations also border on the irrational and incredible. Id.
Moreover, Henderson is not a licensed attorney and, thus, neither qualified nor permitted to represent a business entity before this Court. See Southwest Express Co., Inc. v. Interstate Com. Comm'n, 670 F.2d 53, 55-56 (5th Cir. 1982) (business entities must be represented by licensed counsel in a civil proceeding). “‘28 U.S.C.A. § 1654 . . . only allows for two types of representation: that by an attorney admitted to the practice of law . . . and that by a person representing himself.'” Gonzales v. Wyatt, 157 F.3d 1016, 1021-22 (5th Cir. 1998)) (citations omitted); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(a) (requiring that every pleading, motion, and other paper must be signed by an attorney or by a party personally if the person is unrepresented).
III. LEAVE TO AMEND
Ordinarily, a pro se plaintiff should be granted leave to amend his complaint before dismissal, but leave is not required when he has already pled his “best case.” Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2009). As discussed here Henderson's apparent claims are fatally infirm. Based on the most deferential review of his complaint, it is unlikely that, given the opportunity, he could allege cogent and viable legal claims. Thus, the Court concludes that granting leave to amend under these circumstances would be futile and cause needless delay.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, any claims Henderson has attempted to assert on his own behalf should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, any claims Henderson attempts to assert on behalf of Woodson International-Chevron should be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to refiling through licensed counsel.
Finally, as noted above and reiterated here, Henderson has been barred by this Court from filing future actions in forma pauperis in this or any other federal court, without first obtaining leave of court to do so, and any case filed, removed, or transferred without the applicable filing fee, in which he is the plaintiff, should not be reviewed by the Court. See Henderson v. Dart Internal Affairs, No. 3:23-CV-1086-K-BK (N.D. Tex. June 27, 2023). However, in light of Henderson's blatant attempt to avoid the application of Court's prefiling sanction in this case, the Court should also order that the prefiling sanction imposed in case number 3:23-CV-1086-K-BK, also apply to any future actions filed by Henderson on behalf of any entity or another person.
SO RECOMMENDED.