Opinion
CIVIL NO. CCB-06-0705.
September 17, 2007
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Donna G. Woods ("Woods") has brought suit against Stewart Title Guaranty Company ("Stewart") alleging that Stewart overcharged her and others who refinanced their homes within 10 years of obtaining valid title insurance on the same property by not providing them discounted "reissue" rates as required by Stewart's rates filed with the Maryland Insurance Commission. The factual background and legal theories are discussed in the court's prior opinion dismissing claims for negligent misrepresentation and civil conspiracy, but permitting Woods' claim for money "had and received" to proceed. ( 2006 WL 2135518) (D. Md. July 28, 2006). Now pending is Woods' motion for class certification, opposed by Stewart. The issues have been fully briefed and no oral hearing is necessary. The motion will be granted.
Woods asks the court to certify the following class:
All persons or entities in Maryland who, within 10 years of an owner's title insurance policy having previously been purchased in connection with a mortgage or fee interest, purchased or refinanced the identical mortgage or fee interest, and were charged a title insurance premium by Stewart that exceeded the applicable premium discount or "reissue rate" for the title insurance on file with the Maryland Insurance Administration that such persons or entitles should have been charged.
As recognized in the earlier opinion, the statute of limitations precludes recovery of damages for any transaction prior to March 16, 2003, three years prior to the filing of this suit.
To obtain class certification, Woods must meet all four requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a), and at least one of the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b). Gunnells v. Healthplan Serv., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 423 (4th Cir. 2003). Woods seeks certification under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(1), (2), and (3). Stewart's numerous objections to certification focus primarily on the alleged need for individualized factual determinations and the management difficulties likely to result from the decentralized record-keeping of its network of agents.
Judge Davis of this court recently and thoroughly analyzed the question of class certification in a case virtually identical to this, where the defendants raised virtually identical objections. Mitchell-Tracey v. United Gen. Title Ins. Co., 237 F.R.D. 551 (D. Md. 2006). Judge Davis conditionally certified a class under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(1), (2), and (3). Id. at 559-60. The Fourth Circuit denied the petition for review of his order. Other courts have reached the same or similar result as Judge Davis. See, e.g., Cohen v. Chicago Title Ins., Co., 242 F.R.D. 295 (E.D. Pa. 2007); Dubin v. Sec. Union. Title Ins. Co., 832 N.E.2d 815 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005). Conditional class certification has been recognized as appropriate by the Fourth Circuit even in cases involving "formidable" management concerns, see Gunnells, 348 F.3d at 426.
Having carefully reviewed the parties' arguments, I find myself in agreement with Judge Davis's reasoning in Mitchell-Tracey. In the interests of judicial economy, I will adopt rather than repeat his findings, and I will therefore conditionally certify the class in this case.
Like the court in Cohen v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 242 F.R.D. 295, 302 (E.D. Pa. 2007), I will somewhat modify the class definition.
In summary, the class is numerous — well above 100 — making joinder impracticable. Commonality and typicality are satisfied by the central shared issues of law and fact, despite the presence of some individually distinguishable circumstances, for the reasons explained by Judge Davis. Mitchell-Tracey, 237 F.R.D. at 557-58. Ms. Woods can adequately represent the class ( see Woods Dep. Tr. at 128-29). She has no interest antagonistic to the class and is represented by attorneys who are qualified, experienced, and able to conduct the litigation. Mitchell-Tracey, 237 F.R.D. at 558. Finally, the subsections of Rule 23(b) are satisfied, at least as to 23(b)(2) and (3). The claims are based on an alleged pattern of repeated behavior by the defendants; both equitable and monetary relief is sought; and the essential legal and factual issues are common to the class, predominating over any individual questions. The potential manageability concerns, which are the most significant of the defendants' arguments, are not sufficient to outweigh the clear advantages of a class action in this case. Cohen, 242 F.R.D. at 301-02; Mitchell-Tracey, 237 F.R.D. at 560.
A separate Order follows.
ORDER
For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum, it is hereby ORDERED that:1. the plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class (docket entry no. 40) is Granted;
2. a class is conditionally certified under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b) consisting of:
All persons or entities in Maryland, who, within 10 years of an owner's title insurance policy having previously been purchased in connection with a mortgage or fee interest, purchased or refinanced the identical mortgage or fee interest, and were charged a title insurance premium by Stewart that did not include the applicable premium discount or "reissue rate" for title insurance on file with the Maryland Insurance Administration.
3. a conference call to discuss the schedule in this case has been set for October 4, 2007, at 4:30 p.m., to be initiated by chambers.