Opinion
No. 1D18-5319
06-08-2020
Deangelo Marquis WOODS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Maria Ines Suber, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Sharon Traxler, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Maria Ines Suber, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Sharon Traxler, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Rowe, J.
Deangelo Marquis Woods appeals his judgment and sentence for manslaughter, robbery, and burglary with assault or battery. He argues that the trial court erred by ruling that he could not attack the credibility of a witness who died before trial by introducing evidence that the witness had prior convictions. We affirm.
The charges against Woods followed a murder investigation conducted by the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office. After the victim was shot and killed at the Roosevelt Gardens apartment complex, Detective Jessica Shouse spoke with witnesses about the shooting. Several witnesses, including Anthony Meyers, identified Woods as one of two men responsible for the shooting.
Meyers told Detective Shouse that he was willing to wear a wire to talk to Woods about the shooting. After Shouse verified Meyers’ account of the shooting, Meyers wore a wire and recorded a conversation with Woods. During the recorded conversation, Woods made several incriminating statements.
The State charged Woods with first-degree murder, along with several related charges, and the case went to trial. Meyers died before the trial, so he did not testify. The State introduced the recorded conversation between Meyers and Woods through the testimony of Detective Shouse. She stated that she was familiar with Woods’ voice and identified his voice in the recorded conversation. She testified about Meyers’ agreement to wear the wire and record his interaction with Woods. Shouse testified that she verified Meyers’ reliability before she allowed him to wear the wire.
The defense then sought to introduce evidence of Meyers’ prior criminal record to attack Meyers’ credibility. The State responded that Woods could not attack Meyers’ credibility because his recorded statements were not hearsay. Rather, the State offered Meyers’ statements to provide context for Woods’ responses. The defense disagreed, arguing that Meyers’ statements were hearsay and that Detective Shouse opened the door to attacking Meyers’ credibility by vouching for his reliability.
The trial court ruled that Woods could not attack Meyers’ credibility with evidence of his prior criminal record because the State offered Meyers’ recorded statements only to provide context for Woods’ responses. The jury found Woods guilty of manslaughter (a lesser-included offense), robbery, and burglary with assault or battery. This timely appeal follows.
Analysis
We review a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Lantz v. State , 263 So. 3d 279, 282 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). Woods argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it prevented him from attacking Meyers’ credibility with evidence of his prior convictions.
A witness’ credibility may be attacked when a hearsay statement by the witness has been admitted into evidence. § 90.806, Fla. Stat. (2016). A hearsay statement is one "other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." § 90.801, Fla. Stat. (2016).
But here, Woods identified no hearsay statement that would allow an attack on Meyers’ credibility. Meyers’ recorded statements were not hearsay because the State did not offer them for their veracity or truth. The statements were offered only to provide context for Woods’ responses. McWatters v. State , 36 So. 3d 613, 638 (Fla. 2010) (holding that the Confrontation Clause does not prevent the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than proving the truth of the matter asserted). And Detective Shouse's statement about Meyers’ reliability was also not hearsay because she made the statement while testifying at trial. Because there were no hearsay statements that would allow an attack on Meyers’ credibility, the trial court did not err in preventing Woods from introducing evidence of Meyers’ prior convictions.
Even if the trial court erred, any error was harmless. The trial court informed the jury that Meyers’ recorded statements were not substantive evidence. The court also instructed the jury to consider Meyers’ statements only as context for the statements made by Woods. Finding no abuse of discretion by the trial court, we AFFIRM Woods’ judgment and sentence.
Winokur and Nordby, JJ., concur.