Paragraph E has been interpreted to mean that if there is a previous injury, upon a second injury resulting in a disability, the second injury shall be computed in relationship to the first injury and be treated as unscheduled rather than scheduled. Woods v. Industrial Commission, 91 Ariz. 14, 368 P.2d 758 (1962). Thus, if there is a previous industrially related scheduled injury and a second industrial injury, the second injury must be treated as unscheduled rather than scheduled even though the second injury would normally be a scheduled injury if it had been the first injury. Crowder v. Industrial Commission, 81 Ariz. 396, 307 P.2d 104 (1957).

The petitioner properly contends that there is a line of cases that hold that when a workman receives two successive scheduled injuries, the award must be unscheduled. See Ronquillo v. Industrial Commission, 107 Ariz. 542, 490 P.2d 423 (1971); Woods v. Industrial Commission, 91 Ariz. 14, 368 P.2d 758 (1962); Hurley v. Industrial Commission, 83 Ariz. 178, 318 P.2d 357 (1957); Crowder v. Industrial Commission, 81 Ariz. 396, 307 P.2d 104 (1957); Morris v. Industrial Commission, 81 Ariz. 68, 299 P.2d 652 (1956); McKinney v. Industrial Commission, 78 Ariz. 264, 278 P.2d 887 (1955); Ossic v. Verde Central Mines, 46 Ariz. 176, 49 P.2d 396 (1935); Meador v. Industrial Commission, 2 Ariz. App. 382, 409 P.2d 302 (1966). The petitioner contends that the provisions of A.R.S. § 23-1044, subsec.

B, par. 21. Under a long line of decisions of this Court, Woods v. Industrial Commission, 91 Ariz. 14, 368 P.2d 758; Hurley v. Industrial Commission, 83 Ariz. 178, 318 P.2d 357; Crowder v. Industrial Commission, 81 Ariz. 396, 307 P.2d 104; Morris v. Industrial Commission, 81 Ariz. 68, 299 P.2d 652; McKinney v. Industrial Commission, 78 Ariz. 264, 278 P.2d 887, the construction of § 23-1044, subsec. C, has been that the combination of two scheduled injuries, whether occurring at the same time or at different times, brings the claim within subsection C of § 23-1044.

However, only those injuries which produce financial loss to the injured party entitle him to compensation. Wood v. Industrial Commission, 91 Ariz. 14, 368 P.2d 758 (1962); Engle v. Industrial Commission, 77 Ariz. 202, 269 P.2d 604 (1954). In the instant case respondent Commission does not deny petitioner is suffering from neurosis nor does the Commission question the causal relation between the physical injury sustained by petitioner and the neurosis, for the Commission stated:

Cases which have applied the conclusive presumption have involved severe preexisting impairments such as the loss of a limb. See Woods v. Industrial Comm'n, 91 Ariz. 14, 368 P.2d 758 (1962) (prior loss of both legs); Edwards v. Industrial Comm'n, 3 Ariz. App. 290, 413 P.2d 800 (1966) (previous loss of arm). While a knee injury can certainly be serious, in our opinion Vargas' nonindustrial impairment was not of such magnitude as to create a conclusive presumption that it caused a loss of earning capacity.

81 Ariz. at 399, 307 P.2d at 106. Respondent employee also relies upon Woods v. Industrial Commission, 91 Ariz. 14, 368 P.2d 758 (1962), but we find that that case is at most, ambiguous on the point raised in this case. The award is set aside.

C, D, and E, supra. (citations omitted) All of these cases bear out the Commission's position, i.e., they require the Commission to take into consideration a previous disability as it exists at the time of a subsequent injury, and if any disability results from the subsequent injury, whether scheduled or unscheduled, or both, the Commission must treat the disabilities as general or unscheduled in nature, and base its award on loss of earning capacity only, as derived from the facts of the case. * * *.' Woods v. Industrial Commission, 91 Ariz. 14, 16, 368 P.2d 758, 759 (1962). (emphasis ours)" 12 Ariz. App. at 163, 468 P.2d at 614.

Ronquillo, supra. Where the prior condition was non-industrially related the Commission must determine whether the prior condition affected the workman's earning capacity. Wollum v. Industrial Commission, 100 Ariz. 317, 414 P.2d 137 (1966), overruled in part in Ronquillo, supra; Woods v. Industrial Commission, 91 Ariz. 14, 368 P.2d 758 (1962); McKinney v. Industrial Commission, 78 Ariz. 264, 278 P.2d 887 (1955). Apparently, the only basis upon which the hearing officer determined that the Ronquillo presumption of unscheduled disability had been overcome, and no loss of earning capacity shown, was the testimony of petitioner's employer, John McGill Johnson, a contractor who has known petitioner for some 18 years.

Dictum in the Ossic decision also set the stage for the application of this same reasoning to the successive scheduled injury situation — that is, to a situation involving successive separate accidents, the second of which involved a disability which if considered separate and apart would constitute a scheduled disability. See McKinney v. Industrial Commission, 78 Ariz. 264, 278 P.2d 887 (1955); Morris v. Industrial Commission, 81 Ariz. 68, 299 P.2d 652 (1956); Hurley v. Industrial Commission, 83 Ariz. 178, 318 P.2d 357 (1957); Woods v. Industrial Commission, 91 Ariz. 14, 368 P.2d 758 (1962); Meador v. Industrial Commission, 2 Ariz. App. 382, 409 P.2d 302 (1966). Unquestionably, when the combined effect of the successive injuries results in disabilities which do not come completely within one of the scheduled classifications, there is no way that the resulting disability can be classified as scheduled and still give meaning and effect to A.R.S. § 23-1044, subsec.

* * *." Woods v. Industrial Commission, 91 Ariz. 14, 16, 368 P.2d 758, 759 (1962). (emphasis ours)