"Under Georgia law a manufacturer is not an insurer that its product is, from a design viewpoint, incapable of producing injury." Woods v. A.R.E. Accessories, Inc., 815 S.E.2d 205, 209 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Banks, 450 S.E.2d at 675). Instead, the "reasonableness" test lying at the heart of risk-utility analysis imposes liability for a design defect only where the manufacturer has failed to adopt a reasonable alternative design that would have reduced foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product.

Id. at 735 (1). Jones v. NordicTrack, Inc., 274 Ga. 115, 118 (550 S.E.2d 101) (2001) (footnote omitted); see Woods v. A.R.E. Accessories, LLC, 345 Ga.App. 887, 890 (815 S.E.2d 205) (2018) ("The 'heart' of a design defect case under the risk-utility analysis is the reasonableness of selecting from among alternative product designs and adopting the safest feasible one. Thus, the risk-utility analysis includes the consideration of whether the defendant failed to adopt a reasonable alternative design which would have reduced the foreseeable risks of harm presented by the product.

It concluded Tahsin had shown other misuses of the stand that could have caused the stand to collapse, such as Mr. Crews's failure to wear the safety harness and his failure to properly install the stand. It is true that under Georgia law a plaintiffs misuse of a product can break the chain of causation. Chi. Hardware & Fixture Co. v. Letterman, 510 S.E.2d 875, 878 (Ga.Ct.App. 1999); see also Woods v. A.R.E. Accessories, LLC, 815 S.E.2d 205, 210 (Ga.Ct.App. 2018) ("[A] product that causes harm as a result of unforeseeable misuse is not defective."). But a manufacturer remains liable for a defect which under foreseeable conditions is likely to cause injury.

Also cutting against Thurmond's argument that his "carelessness" was foreseeable is the fact that of the approximately 500 units of the Vactor 2103 sold there has not been another injury like Thurmond's since Vactor began selling the product in 1993. See Woods v. A.R.E. Accessories, LLC, 815 S.E.2d 205, 211 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018) (finding that a particular misuse was not foreseeable, in part, because "nothing in the record" showed reports of a similar incident). "It would impose too heavy a responsibility" to hold Vactor to "guard against"—as here—"what is unusual and unlikely to happen" or "only remotely and slightly probable."

Id. at 735 (1), 450 S.E.2d 671.Jones v. NordicTrack, Inc. , 274 Ga. 115, 118, 550 S.E.2d 101 (2001) (footnote omitted); seeWoods v. A.R.E. Accessories, LLC , 345 Ga. App. 887, 890, 815 S.E.2d 205 (2018) ("The ‘heart’ of a design defect case under the risk-utility analysis is the reasonableness of selecting from among alternative product designs and adopting the safest feasible one.

“A manufacturer has a duty to exercise reasonable care in the manufacture . . . of its products ‘so as to make products that are reasonably safe for intended or foreseeable uses.'” Woods v. A.R.E. Accessories, LLC, 345 Ga.App. 887, 889 (2018) (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Batten, 264 Ga. 723, 724 (1994)). A duty to warn of certain dangers arises when a manufacturer “knows or reasonably should know of a danger” arising from a use of the product.

Defendants note that, consistent with Georgia law, the strict liability instruction told the jury that a manufacturer has a "continuing duty to adequately warn of defects in a product even after the product has left the control of the manufacturer[.]" Doc. 10589 at 19; see Ga. Pattern Jury Instruction § 62.683 (citing Chrysler v. Batten, 450 S.E.2d 208, 211 (Ga. 1994)); Woods v. A.R.E. Accessories, LLC, No. A18A0292, 2018 WL 2354925, at *2 (Ga. Ct. App. May 24, 2018) ("[A] manufacturer which (before or after the sale of its product) knows or reasonably should know of a danger arising from use of the product 'has a duty to give warning of such danger.'") (quoting Batten, 450 S.E.2d at 211).

"Accordingly, a product manufacturer has no duty to ... warn against harm caused by an unforeseeable misuse of its product[.]" Woods v. A. R. E. Accessories , 345 Ga. App. 887, 891, 815 S.E.2d 205 (2018). Appellants argue that because Pinnacle placed warnings on the light curtain and in the operating manual against using the light curtain with a full-revolution clutch press, the misuse of the light curtain was obviously foreseeable.

In so ruling, we note that the question whether there was an unforeseeable misuse of the product by the injured plaintiff goes to the substantive merits of a products liability action and can be addressed in that context. See Woods v. A. R. E. Accessories , 345 Ga. App. 887, 891, 815 S.E.2d 205 (2018). In this regard, we have explained that "a product manufacturer has no duty to design or warn against harm caused by an unforeseeable misuse of its product, and a product that causes harm as a result of unforeseeable misuse is not defective."

Contrary to the majority's new rule, the existing rule is that "reasonably foreseeable product use or misuse is a factor in considering whether a manufacturer may be liable for a defective product which was a proximate cause of harm resulting from the failure to adopt a reasonable alternative design ... to reduce the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product." Woods v. A.R.E. Accessories , 345 Ga. App. 887, 891, 815 S.E.2d 205 (2018) (emphasis supplied). And application of the majority's new rule drawing a crucial distinction between negligent and intentional misuse is problematic, at least to this case.