1979), have been held applicable to corporations based on this section. Woodruff Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Weis Butane Gas Co., 221 Ark. 686, 255 S.W.2d 420 (1953); East Texas Motor Freight Lines v. Wood, 218 Ark. 211, 235 S.W.2d 882 (1951); Harger v. Oklahoma Gas Electric Co., 195 Ark. 107, 111 S.W.2d 485 (1937). It is true that 27-609's list of actions excluded from its coverage includes Ark. Stat. Ann. 27-608 (Repl.

As a matter of fact we have held to the contrary. In Woodruff Electric Coop. Corp. v. Weis Butane Gas Co., 221 Ark. 686, 255 S.W.2d 420, the litigation between two domestic corporations grew out of a collision in Lee County between a truck belonging to Woodruff Electric and one belonging to Weis Butane Co. Both corporations sued the other in what they considered the county of their residence, but Woodruff Electric first obtained service on the suit it had filed in Woodruff County. Woodruff Electric was originally organized to operate only in Woodruff County and in its articles of incorporation, Augusta, in Woodruff County, was designated its principal office.

But in 1952, in the case of Healey Roth v. Huie, 220 Ark. 16, 245 S.W.2d 813, this court held that a suit in a transitory cause of action was not commenced until the sheriff had actually served the summons. Subsequently, Healey Roth was followed in several cases, including Woodruff Electric Cooperative Corp. v. Weis Butane Gas Co., 221 Ark. 686, 255 S.W.2d 420; Carnes, Admx. v. Strait, Judge, 223 Ark. 962, 270 S.W.2d 920; Carpenter v. Baskin, 224 Ark. 315, 273 S.W.2d 25; Rhinehardt v. Light, Judge, 225 Ark. 1045, 287 S.W.2d 463; Hicks v. Wolfe, Judge, 228 Ark. 406, 307 S.W.2d 784. The statute, however, still read that the action was commenced when the complaint was filed in the proper court and summons issued.

See an excellent discussion in In re Merrymeeting Products Corporation (N.D. Me., 1956), 139 F. Supp. 625, 629. See also Sweeny v. Keystone Driller Co. (Ohio), 170 N.E. 436; First National Bank v. Wilcox (Wash.), 130 P. 756; Giesler v. Sedro Hardwood Co. (Wash.), 9 P.2d 1104; Woodruff Electric Cooperative Corp. v. Weis Butane Gas Co. (Ark.), 255 S.W.2d 420; In re Riverdale Production (S.D., N.Y.), 107 F. Supp. 87; FairbanksShovel Co. v. Wills, 240 U.S. 642, 60 L.Ed. 841; Guterman v. Rice (1st Cir., 1941), 121 F.2d 251. The cases have been strict in refusing to recognize a change of corporate residence that is not accomplished in the manner required by the controlling statutes, even though, in fact, there has been a move or a change of principal office.

The appellees are Woodrow James (an individual) and Weis Butane Gas Company (hereinafter called "Weis Butane") For first appeal, see Woodruff Electric Cooperative Corporation v. Weis Butane Gas Company and Woodrow James, 221 Ark. 686, 255 S.W.2d 420. This case resulted from a series of traffic mishaps which occurred on U.S. Highway 79 about 31,, miles west of Marianna. At the place of the traffic mishaps the highway runs in an east and west direction; the concrete pavement is 23 feet wide with a suitable gravel shoulder, dirt shoulder and borrow pit on each side of the highway.