Opinion
No. CV 06 4010811
September 20, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
I. BACKGROUND
This appeal is brought pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, General Statutes 4-183(c), from a decision of the freedom of information commission (the commission), entitled Stephen Borer v. Treasury Borough of Woodmont. In its appeal dated May 25, 2006, the Borough of Woodmont (Woodmont) claims that the commission acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, in abuse of its discretion, in excess of its statutory authority, and in violation of statutory provisions. The decision of the commission is affirmed.
The original complaint in this matter was brought by Stephen R. Borer against the treasurer of Woodmont for failing to comply fully with his request for bank records, against Woodmont itself for failing to maintain regular business hours. The commission decision in this matter lists the treasurer of Woodmont as the respondent. The record and appeal, however, list the plaintiff as the "Borough of Woodmont, Borough Clerk." The decision of the commission nonetheless is directed to the treasurer as the respondent in this case. In that matter, she was represented by counsel, along with the borough warden and the borough itself. The commission claims that the aggrieved party should be the treasurer, as its order was directed to her. Woodmont claims that only it has the authority to comply with the commission's order to maintain regular office hours. The court will not elevate form over substance in this matter. In view of the fact that the original complaint asserts that Woodmont itself failed to maintain regular office hours and the commission's order was to maintain such hours, the court will consider the matter as it relates to Woodmont, generally. Further, Woodmont, its treasurer and its warden were represented by counsel throughout these proceedings. It is for Woodmont to decide how to implement the order, whether through the services of its clerk, treasurer, warden or other proper officer.
II. FACTS
In a letter dated April 14, 2005, Stephen Borer (Borer) filed a complaint with the freedom of information commission, alleging that the treasurer of Woodmont was in violation of the Freedom of Information Act (the act) by failing to fully comply with his March 29, 2005 request for banking records. Borer also alleged that Woodmont itself failed to have regular business hours for the inspection of public records. This appeal relates to the latter issue alone.
Woodmont is a borough that provides municipal services to Woodmont residents. These services are paid for by revenue from borough taxes, as well as by an appropriation from Milford, the municipality within which it is located. According to the record in this case, the population of Woodmont is 2114 and its offices are located at the Borough Hall on Borough Hall Road in Milford. Woodmont maintains public records in the Borough Hall and the warden of the borough provides access to public records upon request.
After conducting a hearing on the complaint, the commission found that the treasurer of Woodmont had no regular office hours during which the public would have access to public records, nor does the treasurer keep such records in the office of the town clerk of the city of Milford. The commission concluded as a matter of law that Woodmont "has failed to comply with the requirements of [General Statutes] § 1-210(a) by failing to keep the public records [it] maintains in either the respondent's office or place of business, in an accessible place during regular business hours or in the office of the town clerk."
The commission further found that Woodmont had not violated the act when it denied the request for certain banking records for security reasons. This separate finding is not a subject of this appeal.
Based upon these findings of fact and conclusions of law, the commission ordered that: (1) the respondent comply with the provisions of General Statutes § 1-210(a), as interpreted by the commission; and (2) that the respondent choose either "[to] establish and maintain regular business hours which hours may be on any one day for any length of time not less than one hour per week or maintain her records, or a copy thereof, at the Milford town clerk's office." The plaintiff then brought this appeal.
III. DISCUSSION A. Scope Of Review
General Statute § 1-206(d) requires that appeals from decisions of the commission be in accordance with the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), which is codified in chapter 54 of the General Statutes at § 4-183. Section 4-183(j) provides in relevant part that: "[t]he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of evidence on questions of fact. The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (1) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of law; (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion."
The commission argues, and the court agrees, that Connecticut courts have generally restricted their role in appeals of administrative decisions. See State v. Coscuna, 59 Conn.App. 434, 442-43, 757 A.2d 659 (2000). "The function of a trial court is to look only to the materials before the agency and to determine from the record whether the facts found by the commission are supported by the record, whether they furnish justifiable reasons for the action . . . and whether it has acted illegally or has exceeded or abused its powers. Wilson Point Property Owners Ass'n. v. Connecticut Light Power Co., 145 Conn. 243, CT Page 15639 252, 140 A.2d 874, [880 (1958)]." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hartford Electric Light Co. v. Water Resources Commission, 162 Conn. 89, 107-08, 291 A.2d 721 (1971).
Ordinarily, deference is given to administrative agencies by our courts in administrative appeals because they develop expertise in their areas of specialization. The Supreme Court of Connecticut has held that, when reviewing an agency decision, the trial courts should "accord great deference to the construction given [a] statute by the agency charged with its enforcement . . ." (Citation omitted.) Connecticut Alcohol Drug Abuse Commission v. Freedom of Information Commission, 233 Conn. 28, 39, 657 A.2d 630 (1995). In the present case, however, the parties agree that the commission's interpretation of General Statutes § 1-210(a) is a question of first impression before the court. It is well established that, "when a state agency's determination of a question of law has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny . . . the agency is not entitled to special deference . . . [I]t is for the courts, and not administrative agencies, to expound and apply governing principles of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Southern New England Telephone Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 274 Conn. 119, 127, 874 A.2d 776 (2005). The court, therefore, will review the claims of law in this case de novo.
B. Office Hours Required Under General Statutes § 1-210
General Statutes § 1-210(a) provides in relevant part that: "all records maintained or kept on file by any public agency . . . shall be public records and every person shall have the right to . . . inspect such records promptly during regular office or business hours . . . Any agency rule or regulation, or part thereof, that conflicts with the provisions of this subsection or diminishes or curtails in any way the rights granted by this subsection shall be void. Each such agency shall keep and maintain all public records in its custody at its regular office or place of business in an accessible place and, if there is no such office or place of business, the public records pertaining to such agency shall be kept in the office of the clerk of the political subdivision in which such public agency is located . . ."
In this appeal there were no disputed facts. Woodmont conducts business at Borough Hall and, therefore, has a regular office or place of business. Woodmont, however, does not maintain regular office hours during which public records may be promptly accessed by the public. Instead, the borough warden provides access to public records by appointment, upon request. Woodmont claims its policy of access by appointment complies with the last sentence of General Statutes § CT Page 15640 1-210(a), as quoted above, since this language does not specifically require a public agency to have regular business hours. Instead, it generally requires that public records to be "in an accessible place." This language was the focus of Woodmont's argument and the commission's decision. The question before the court is whether the commission properly interpreted the accessibility requirement of this statute to include holding regular office hours by a public agency that has a regular place of business.
In its interpretation of General Statutes § 1-210(a), the commission properly concluded that General Statutes § 1-210(a) provides two alternatives for public access to records. Public agencies are required to either: (1) maintain agency records at its regular office in an accessible place; or (2) if it has no such regular place of business, it must maintain agency records in the town clerk's office of the political subdivision in which the agency is located. The commission further concluded that public records must be "accessible" during regular business hours. The commission's order mirrors this interpretation and requires Woodmont to choose either to maintain regular office hours at the Borough Hall, during which public records may be inspected and copied or, alternatively, maintain its public records at the town clerk's office where Woodmont records would be accessible along with other municipal records, presumably during their regular business hours.
Woodmont claims that, pursuant to its charter provision requiring access to public documents at all reasonable times, it complies with both the letter and spirit of state law by scheduling prompt appointments for inspections of public records. The commission, however, claims that requiring appointments to inspect or obtain copies of public records amounts to the imposition of an illegal precondition on the public's access rights, citing, inter alia, Vinette Lewinson v. Principal, Illing Middle School, Board of Education, Manchester Public Schools, FOIC Docket No. FIC 2001-041. The commission contends that requiring appointments for access to public records is a rule or regulation that conflicts with and otherwise diminishes or curtails the public's rights as guaranteed in the act and should, therefore, be void. The commission further contends that requiring the public to make appointments with the borough in order to gain access to nonexempt public records contravenes the clear intent of the act, which is to permit the public the right to access records, it desired, without fear of intimidation, retribution or being monitored.
This case does not clearly state the proposition for which it is cited. The court nonetheless considers this to be the commission's position on this issue.
As our Supreme Court has repeatedly stated, "the legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Renaissance Management Co. v. Connecticut Housing Finance Authority, 281 Conn. 227, 238, 915 A.2d 290 (2007). This requires the court "to read statutes together when they relate to the same subject matter . . . Accordingly, [i]n determining the meaning of a statute . . . we look not only at the provision at issue, but also to the broader statutory scheme to ensure the coherency of our construction . . . In applying these principles, we are mindful that the legislature is presumed to have intended a just and rational result." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Teresa T. v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 734, 748, 865 A.2d 428, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1063, 126 S.Ct. 799, 163 L.Ed.2d 631 (2005). "When more than one construction [of a statute] is possible, we adopt the one that renders the enactment effective and workable and reject any that might lead to unreasonable or bizarre results." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Graff v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 277 Conn. 645, 653, 894 A.2d 285 (2006).
Both Woodmont and the commission have focused their arguments upon the requirement in § 1-210(a) that agencies "maintain all public records in its custody at its regular office or place of business in an accessible place . . ." Read in isolation, this language does not specifically require that a public agency hold regular office hours for access to public records. The other statutory language, however, contained within General Statutes § 1-210(a), provides the public the right to access public "records promptly during regular business hours . . ." The logical corollary to the public's right of access to records during regular business hours is the responsibility of a public agency to establish regular hours of business for that right of access to be effectuated. To hold otherwise would be inconsistent with this clearly stated public right of access to public "records promptly during regular business hours . . ."
C. Home Rule
Under General Statutes § 7-148, Woodmont claims that it has the municipal authority to establish the duties and policies of its municipal employees. Under the commission's ruling in this matter, the treasurer of Woodmont is required to hold regular business hours to provide the public with access to her records. To the extent that the commission ordered a specific Woodmont officer to hold regular office hours, namely the treasurer, the commission's order is overruled. Although the specific complaint in this case relates to banking records which, in this case, were promptly and fully provided in accordance with the act by the treasurer, the general complaint concerning regular business hours is viewed by this court as directed toward Woodmont, generally. With this in mind, it is for Woodmont to decide which of its officers or employees is best suited to implement the commission's order for access to public records, should it decide to continue to maintain public records at the Woodmont Borough Hall.
General Statutes § 7-148(c)(5)(C) authorizes municipalities to "[p]rovide for the employment of and prescribe the salaries, compensation and hours of employment of all officers and employees of the municipality and the duties of such officers and employees not expressly defined by the Constitution of the state, the general statutes, charter or special act . . ."
Additionally, Woodmont claims that it has adopted a municipal charter that, pursuant to General Statutes § 7-188(a), is deemed to be its organic law. The Woodmont charter specifically provides for access to public records "upon request at all reasonable times." The court, however, finds that the charter is inconsistent with the specific language of General Statutes § 1-210(a), which provides for access to public "records promptly during regular business hours . . ." To the extent that a municipal charter is inconsistent with a specific right provided to the public by statute, the charter must yield to the statutory right. See General Statutes § 7-188(a).
General Statutes § 7-188(a) provides in relevant part that "[a]ny municipality . . . shall have the power to . . . adopt and amend a charter which shall be its organic law and shall supersede any existing charter . . . but which shall not otherwise be inconsistent with the Constitution or general statutes . . ."
This finding also addresses Woodmont's argument that the commission was without authority to hear the appeal without a violation of a right conferred by the act.
D. Alternative Order to Maintain Public Records at the Town Clerk's Office
Woodmont also claims that the language of General Statutes § 1-210(a) does not permit the commission to order its records to be maintained by the town clerk's office. Specifically, the statute provides that "[e]ach such agency shall keep and maintain all public records in its custody at its regular office or place of business in an accessible place and, if there is no such office or place of business, the public records pertaining to such agency shall be kept in the office of the clerk of the political subdivision in which such public agency is located . . ." Woodmont claims that an order to maintain public records at the town clerk's office may only apply, pursuant to this statute, when an agency has no place of business. Since Woodmont has a regular place of business, it claims that there is no statutory authority to order that its records be held by the town clerk.
In interpreting statutory language, the court may read statutes together when they relate to the same subject matter to ensure a coherent and rational construction. Teresa T. v. Ragaglia, supra, 272 Conn. 748. The provisions examined by the court in this case not only relate to the same subject matter, they are all contained within subsection (a) of General Statutes § 1-210. The court, therefore, must read these provisions together to determine their proper meaning.
The essential right established in this statutory subsection is the public's right to access public records during regular business hours, which is a clearly stated right under the specific language of the statute. To hold that a borough with a regular place of business can avoid the public's right to access during regular business hours, at its regular office or at the town clerk's office, because the responsibility to hold regular office hours is not restated in each and every related provision in the act is inconsistent with the clear meaning of the statute and would undermine that essential statutory right granted to the public by its clear language. The legislature need not repeatedly restate the public's right to access public records during regular business hours to preserve that right, and other language of the statute should be read in a manner that is consistent and harmonious with that right, especially when that language is within the same subsection of the statutory provision under examination by the court.
In its ruling in this matter, the commission determined that the term "accessibility" included access during regular business hours. This court has determined that, as a matter of statutory construction, the right of public access to "records promptly during regular business hours" includes the corollary responsibility of a public agency to have regular business hours. The court, therefore, finds that if public records are not accessible at a public agency's regular place of business during regular business hours, they are not "in an accessible place" within the meaning of the act. It, therefore, follows that if the records are not "accessible" at a regular place of business within the meaning of the act, they are required by General Statutes § 1-210(a) to be kept in the office of the town clerk. Again, Woodmont may choose to have regular business hours at its Borough Hall or it may choose to use the town clerk's office as a repository for its public records, making the commission's order less intrusive on Woodmont's governmental authority and municipal prerogatives.
IV. CONCLUSION
The court affirms the commission's conclusion that the act requires access to public records during regular business hours at an agency's regular place of business or, if this is deemed to be too burdensome, the agency may choose to maintain their records at the office of the town clerk. To the extent that the treasurer of Woodmont alone is ordered to provide regular office hours for access to Woodmont's public records, the commission's order is overruled.