See Harper, 494 U.S. at 230; Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134 (1993); United States v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947, 954 (6th Cir. 1998); see also Joanne R. Propst, "Restoring Competency: Does the state have the right to force anti-psychotic medications on the mentally ill pretrial-detainee?", 49 Drake L. Rev. 147, 162-63 (2000). The Tenth Circuit has described this Fifth Amendment right as the "freedom from physical and mental restraint of the kind potentially imposed by antipsychotic drugs." Bee, 744 F.2d at 1393; accord Woodland v. Graves, 820 F. Supp. 1497, 1504-05 (D.Utah 1993). Second, there is the First Amendment interest in free expression: the drugs may interfere with Mr. Santonio's ability to communicate ideas.
We agree with the conclusion of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals that the state's interest in bringing a defendant to trial can be an "overriding justification" for involuntary medication under Riggins. Accord Woodland v. Angus, 820 F. Sup. 1497, 1511 (D.Utah 1993). Presumably, if the defendant was a present danger to himself or others, the state would make such a claim in its motion to medicate the defendant, because proof that the defendant is a danger to himself or others is sufficient to allow the state to pursue medically appropriate involuntary treatment of the defendant to alleviate that danger without consideration as to whether such medication is necessary to bring the defendant to trial.
Litigation ensued, and after substantial proceedings and hearings the policy absent a requirement of dangerousness was held to be unconstitutional as applied to the pretrial detainee in that case. Woodland v. Angus, 820 F. Supp. 1497 (D.Ut. 1993). Whether the dangerousness requirement is mandatory as applied to incompetent, civilly committed and institutionalized patients was a matter of uncertainty during the pendency of that litigation, and has remained so even after the court's ruling in March 1993.
To forcibly medicate Brandon, therefore, the government must satisfy strict-scrutiny review and demonstrate that its proposed approach is narrowly tailored to a compelling interest. See Greaves, 744 F.2d at 1395; Woodland v. Angus, 820 F. Supp. 1497, 1509 (D. Utah 1993)("the reduced standard of review applied by the Court in Harper is not appropriate in resolving th[e] case" where the government seeks to medicate an individual in order to render him competent to stand trial); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 154. We do not find the Supreme Court's opinion in Riggins determinative as to the appropriate standard of review to apply in this case.
It does not follow, however, that the government has an essential interest in prosecuting every alleged crime so as to justify involuntary medication in all cases. See Brandon, 158 F.3d at 961; Woodland v. Angus, 820 F.Supp. 1497, 1513 (1993) (stating that "the State's interest is not in trying plaintiff under any circumstances, but in trying plaintiff fairly and accurately"). Nor is the Court articulating a bright line test for determining which crimes trigger an essential interest in bringing a defendant to trial.
It does not follow, however, that the government has an essential interest in prosecuting every alleged crime so as to justify involuntary medication in all cases. See Brandon, 158 F.3d at 961; Woodland v. Angus, 820 F. Supp. 1497, 1513 (1993) (stating that "the State's interest is not in trying plaintiff under any circumstances, but in trying plaintiff fairly and accurately"). Nor is the Court articulating a bright line test for determining which crimes trigger an essential interest in bringing a defendant to trial.
Plaintiffs contend that the Harper and Riggins decisions reject deference to professional judgment. Plaintiffs also rely here on the decision in Woodland v. Angus, 820 F. Supp. 1497 (D.Utah 1993). However, Woodland is of little value in the present analysis for several reasons.
( People v. Drew (1978) 22 Cal.3d 333, 342.) In Woodland v. Angus (D. Utah 1993) 820 F. Supp. 1497, 1502, footnote 5, the court noted: ". . . [ΒΆ] Whether plaintiff has been found incompetent to stand trial is not dispositive of his medical competence.
These concerns, which Gomes forcefully presents, were carefully articulated by Justice Kennedy in his concurrence in Riggins, 504 U.S. at 138-45, 112 S.Ct. 1810, and have been repeated in subsequent decisions. See Brandon, 158 F.3d at 961; United States v. Santonio, No. 2:00-CR-90C, 2001 WL 670932, at *3 (D.Utah May 3, 2001); Woodland v. Angus, 820 F.Supp. 1497, 1510 n. 15 (D.Utah 1993). Justice Kennedy was particularly troubled that the side effects of these drugs might, by making the defendant look bored or unfeeling, prejudice the jury and affect the outcome of the trial.
The Hospital's actions are justified. Jurasek's reliance on Woodland v. Angus, 820 F. Supp. 1497 (D. Utah 1993), is misplaced. In Woodland, the court determined the Hospital's December 1991 policy was unconstitutional because it did "not require a finding that [the patient] is dangerous to himself, other, or property."