However, the court also remarked that the "[r]emoteness factor would be less significant when the sexual abuse is generational or intrafamilial, and if the prior incidents were similar to the current act." Id. at 346, n.3. SeeStrohm v. State , 985 So. 2d 640, 642 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (seventeen years prior); Woodard v. State , 978 So. 2d 217, 220 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (seventeen years prior); Cann v. State , 958 So. 2d 545, 546 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (over ten years prior). In another category of cases, where the collateral act is more serious than the charged crime, courts are likely to exclude the collateral evidence as unsimilar and unfairly prejudicial under section 90.403.
Courts are also less likely to find an error harmless where the State relies on the erroneously admitted evidence during its closing argument. See McKeown v. Stale, 16 So.3d 247, 249 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (holding that erroneous admission of officer's irrelevant testimony was not harmless, in part, because the State "compounded the error by repeating the improper testimony during closing argument."); Deville v. State, 917 So.2d 1058, 1059-60 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (holding that error was not harmless, in part, because the State mentioned the inadmissible evidence during its closing argument); Woodard v. State, 978 So.2d 217, 220 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (holding, in child molestation case, that the erroneous admission of collateral act evidence was not harmless, in part, because the State referred to it during both the opening statement and closing argument). The evidence taken as a whole, together with the abhorrent nature of the crimes for which Tripoli was charged, leads us to conclude that the error was not harmless.
Laura Anstead, Tallahassee, for Appellee. Prior report: 978 So.2d 217. PER CURIAM.