Opinion
No. 10-06-00190-CR
February 7, 2007. DO NOT PUBLISH.
Appeal From the 355th District Court Hood County, Texas Trial Court No. 9943.
Before Chief Justice GRAY, Justice VANCE, and Justice REYNA.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Woodard appeals her conviction for possession of methamphetamine. See TEX. HEALTH SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(a)-(b) (Vernon 2003); see id. § 481.102(6) (Vernon Supp. 2006). We affirm. In Woodard's two issues, she contends that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient. In Woodard's first issue, she challenges the sufficiency of the evidence "to support the jury's finding of guilt on the charge contained in the Indictment." (Br. at x; see id. at 6.) In Woodard's second issue, she challenges the sufficiency of the evidence "to support the jury's finding that Woodard was in knowing possession, custody, or control of the trace amount of methamphetamine and/or that an affirmative link existed between Woodard and the methamphetamine." ( Id. at ix; see id. at 13.) On Woodard's argument, we do not perceive those to be distinct issues, and we consider them together. Also, Woodard does not separately brief the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence. An unauthorized "person commits an offense if the person knowingly or intentionally possesses a controlled substance. . . ." TEX. HEALTH SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(a). "'Possession' means actual care, custody, control, or management." Id. § 481.002(38) (Vernon Supp. 2006). "[W]hen the accused is not in exclusive possession of the place where [a controlled] substance is found, it cannot be concluded that the accused had knowledge of and control over the contraband unless there are additional independent facts and circumstances which affirmatively link the accused to the contraband." Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 406 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005) (quoting Deshong v. State, 625 S.W.2d 327, 329 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1981)). That "'affirmative links rule' . . . simply restates the common-sense notion that a person . . . may jointly possess" a place "but not necessarily jointly possess the contraband found in that" place. Poindexter at 406. Evidence of possession "must establish, to the requisite level of confidence, that the accused's connection with the drug was more than just fortuitous." Id. at 405 (quoting Brown v. State, 911 S.W.2d 744, 747 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995)). Factors which have been considered affirmative links include:
(1) presence when the search was executed;
(2) contraband in plain view;
(3) proximity to and accessibility of the contraband;
(4) accused under the influence of contraband when arrested;
(5) accused's possession of other contraband when arrested;
(6) accused's incriminating statements when arrested;
(7) attempted flight;
(8) furtive gestures;
(9) odor of the contraband;
(10) presence of other contraband;
(11) accused's right to possession of the place where contraband was found; and
(12) drugs found in an enclosed place.Rischer v. State, 85 S.W.3d 839, 843 (Tex.App.-Waco 2002, no pet.); see Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 405 n. 7, 409-412; Humason v. State, 728 S.W.2d 363, 370 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) (quoting Deshong, 625 S.W.2d at 329); Bellard v. State, 101 S.W.3d 594, 599 (Tex.App.-Waco 2003, pet. ref'd). "[N]o court has required that any specific combination of these factors be present to support a conviction for drug possession." Bethancourt-Rosales v. State, 50 S.W.3d 650, 656 (Tex.App.-Waco 2001, pet. ref'd). "[A]ffirmative links are established by the totality of the circumstances." Rischer at 843; see Oaks v. State, 642 S.W.2d 174, 178 (Tex.Crim.App. 1982). Legal Sufficiency. "The inquiry on review of the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Powell v. State, 194 S.W.3d 503, 506 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006); accord Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 161 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006); see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). "A `legal sufficiency of the evidence review does not involve any weighing of favorable and non-favorable evidence.'" Margraves v. State, 34 S.W.3d 912, 917 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (quoting Cardenas v. State, 30 S.W.3d 384, [389] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000)). "[C]ourts reviewing all the evidence in a light favorable to the verdict must assume jurors made all inferences in favor of their verdict if reasonable minds could, and disregard all other inferences in their legal sufficiency review." Evans at 165 n. 27 (quoting City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 821 (Tex. 2005)); accord Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 415 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). "When the court is faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences, it must presume — even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record — that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution." Evans at 164 n. 19 (quoting Jackson at 326); Fuentes v. State, 991 S.W.2d 267, 271 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999); Matson v. State, 819 S.W.2d 839, 846 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). Woodard points only to evidence that she argues is contrary to the verdict. In a legal-sufficiency review, however, we consider the evidence only in the light most favorable to the verdict. The State points primarily to the following evidence. Woodard was present in the van when the arresting officer stopped and searched it. The methamphetamine was in a locked box inside the van. Woodard was in the proximity of and had access to the box. Woodard claimed to own the box, and opened it. Woodard became alarmed while the officer was searching inside the box, and attempted to tell the driver of the van that the officer was searching inside the box. Woodard became upset when the officer found the pipe containing the methamphetamine in the box, before the officer told Woodard that he intended to arrest her. Marijuana was in Woodard's seat and in the box. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold that a rational finder of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Woodard possessed the methamphetamine as alleged. Evidence of Woodard's possession was legally sufficient. Factual Sufficiency. "There is only one question to be answered in a factual sufficiency review: Considering all of the evidence in a neutral light, was a jury rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?" Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 415 (quoting Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004)); accord Prible v. State, 175 S.W.3d 724, 730-31 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 481 (2005). "We set aside the verdict only if the evidence is so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust, or the contrary evidence is so strong that the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt could not have been met." Prible at 731; accord Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); see Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 595 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003); see also Watson at 414-15. "A clearly wrong and unjust verdict occurs where the jury's finding is `manifestly unjust,' `shocks the conscience,' or `clearly demonstrates bias.'" Prible at 731 (quoting Santellan v. State, 939 S.W.2d 155, 164 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997)). "A decision is not manifestly unjust merely because the jury resolved conflicting views of the evidence in favor of the State." Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 410 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). "[A]n appellate court must first be able to say, with some objective basis in the record, that the great weight and preponderance of the . . . evidence contradicts the jury's verdict before it is justified in" reversing for factual insufficiency of the evidence. Watson at 417. "[T]he jury is the exclusive judge of the facts. . . ." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.13 (Vernon 1981). "In deciding whether the evidence is sufficient to link the defendant to contraband, the trier of fact is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony." Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 406. "[A] factfinder may disbelieve some or all of a witness's testimony, even when that testimony is uncontradicted." Hernandez v. State, 161 S.W.3d 491, 501 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005) (citing State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 857 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000)); accord Masterson v. State, 155 S.W.3d 167, 171 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1330 (2006). The reviewing court must "exercise appropriate deference in order to avoid substituting its judgment for that of the jury, particularly in matters of credibility." Drichas v. State, 175 S.W.3d 795, 799 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005); accord Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 133 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). "The reviewing court should not substantially intrude upon the jury's role as the sole judge of the weight and credibility of witness testimony." Ortiz v. State, 93 S.W.3d 79, 88 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002); accord Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 648 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). Woodard points primarily to the following evidence. Woodard testified that both she and the driver owned the box, that it had belonged to Woodard's mother, that it had been in storage for the previous five years, that Woodard did not know what was inside it, and that Woodard had not opened it because she did not know the lock's combination. The pipe containing the methamphetamine was not visible from the outside of the box. The amount of methamphetamine was 0.01 grams. At the time of Woodard's arrest, she did not appear to be under the influence of a controlled substance. There was no odor of methamphetamine. Woodard was cooperative and voluntarily consented to the search of the box. Woodard did not attempt to flee. No fingerprint evidence was introduced. Besides the State's evidence noted above, the State points to evidence that the State impeached Woodard's testimony with evidence that Woodard was a convicted felon. Considering all of the evidence in a neutral light, we hold that the jury was rationally justified in finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Woodard possessed the methamphetamine as alleged. Evidence of Woodard's possession was factually sufficient. The evidence of possession of methamphetamine was legally and factually sufficient. We overrule Woodard's issues. Having overruled Woodard's issues, we affirm. Affirmed