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asserting Rule (h) right to non-jury four months after service of original complaint with jury demand and defendant's subsequent answer that also claimed right to jury trial
Summary of this case from Price v. Gulf South Pipeline Co.Opinion
Civ. No. 99-1661, SECTION "C" (1).
February 11, 2000.
ORDER AND REASONS
Plaintiff Martin Woodard moves the Court to review and reconsider United States Magistrate Judge Sally Shushan's denial of his Motion for Leave to File Third Supplemental and Amending Complaint. See Rec. Doc. 41. Woodward proposes to amend his complaint to include a statement of jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(h) ("Admiralty and Maritime Matters") and thereby avert a jury trial in this matter. Defendants, Diamond Offshore Drilling, Inc. and Diamond Offshore Management Compan, wish to preserve jury trial in this matter and thus oppose Woodard's proposed amendment and also his present Motion to Review. For the reasons explained below, the Court DENIES Woodward's Motion to Review and thereby AFFIRMS the Magistrate Judge's denial of Woodward's Motion for Leave to File Third Supplemental and Amending Complaint.
I. BACKGROUND
Woodard filed the original complaint on May 27, 1999 alleging Jones Act and general maritime law jurisdiction pursuant to 46 App. U.S.C. § 688 and 28 U.S.C. § 1333 respectively. In his Seaman's Complaint, Woodard did not specifically invoke this Court's diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 but did allege that he is a Mississippi domiciliary and that Defendant Diamond Offshore Drilling is a foreign corporation. Woodard specifically prayed for trial by jury. See Rec. Doc. 1. Accompanying the original complaint, Woodard's attorney signed a standard form used when filing cases in this Court on which the box "YES" was checked next to the words "JURY DEMAND." See id. Diamond Offshore Drilling answered Woodard's complaint on June 16, 1999 and therein demanded trial by jury. See Rec. Doc. 2. On June 23, 1999, Woodard filed a supplemental and amended complaint. See Rec. Doc. 6. Once again, in its July 1, 1999 response, Diamond Offshore Drilling asserted a jury demand. See Rec. Doc. 8. Thereafter, Woodard filed a second supplemental and amended complaint on September 7, 1999 adding Diamond Offshore Management Company, also alleged to be a foreign corporation, as an additional party defendant and reiterating the original prayer including the jury demand. See Rec. Doc. 12. Both Defendants answered the second supplemental and amended complaint on September 17, 1999 and once again requested trial by jury. See Rec. Doc. 13. As explained above, Woodard has now moved to once again supplement and amend his complaint to state jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(h) and thereby avert the previous demands for a jury trial. See Rec. Doc. 25. Magistrate Judge Sally Shushan denied Woodard's motion, Rec. Doc. 41, and now this Court must rule on whether that denial was proper.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Rewiew
Federal law affords a magistrate judge broad discretion in the resolution of nondispositive pretrial matters. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a); 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(A). Thus, a district court reverses a magistrate judge's ruling on such matters only where the court finds the ruling to be "clearly erroneous or contrary to law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a); 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(A). See also Castillo v. Frank, 70 F.3d 382, 385 (5th Cir. 1995); Moody v. Callon Petroleum Operating Co., 37 F. Supp.2d 805, 807 (E.D. La. 1999). Therefore, Woodard must clear a high hurdle for this Court to grant the instant motion.
B. Discussion
It is clear that there is no right to trial by jury where a complaint alleges an action to be within a court's jurisdiction in admiralty rather than within its jurisdiction at law. See T.N.T Marine Service v. Weaver Shipyards Dry Docks, 702 F.2d 585, 587-88 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 847, 104 S.Ct. 151, 78 L.Ed.2d 141 (1983). See also Harrison v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, 577 F.2d 968, 987 (5th Cir. 1978) (third-party defendant could not emasculate plaintiffs election to proceed in admiralty by bringing in diverse fourth-party defendant where plaintiff never alleged diversity as a jurisdictional basis for suit); Romero v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 515 F.2d 1249, 1252-53 (5th Cir. 1975) (mere addition of diversity as an alternate jurisdictional basis in pretrial order would not convert non-jury trial to jury trial where plaintiff had all along pled action under admiralty and maritime jurisdiction).
However, the question raised by Woodard's attempt to supplement and amend his complaint is: Whether a plaintiff, "through the device of amending [his] complaint to state admiralty and maritime claims under Rule 9(h), effectively withdraw[s] [his] demand for jury trial without compliance with the specific procedures set forth in [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] . . . 39(a) for the withdrawal of such demands?" Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 469 F.2d 897, 902 (5th Cir. 1972), rehearing en banc on other matters, 510 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied by 423 U.S. 839, 96 S.Ct. 69, 46 L.Ed.2d 58 and sub. nom by Starnes v. Penrod Drilling Co., 423 U.S. 839, 96 S.Ct. 68, 46 L.Ed.2d 58 (1975).
The Fifth Circuit has explicitly considered this question on two occasions: first in Johnson, supra and later in Rachal v. Ingram Corp., 795 F.2d 1210 (1986). In Johnson, the court concluded that a plaintiff could not unilaterally withdraw his jury demand in a Jones Act case brought also under diversity jurisdiction by later amending his complaint with a 9(h) statement of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction only. See 469 F.2d at 902-03. Rather, the court held that a plaintiff must employ the procedures in Rule 39(a), which require a party seeking to convert a jury trial to a non-jury trial to obtain the approval of all other parties or to move the court asserting that a right to jury trial does not exist. See id. at 903. In Rachal, on the other hand, the plaintiff not only did not plead diversity as a basis for federal jurisdiction, but rather a nondiverse defendant was named; hence, diversity jurisdiction did not exist. The plaintiff asserted his claim under the Jones Act and the general maritime law under Rule 9(h) and demanded a jury trial pursuant to the Jones Act's statutory grant to seamen to elect trial by jury, the only possible basis for a jury trial in that case. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs later amendment, designating his suit as arising under Rule 9(h) only, was sufficient to constitute a withdrawal of his original jury demand without employing the procedures in Rule 39(a) required in Johnson. See 795 F.2d at 1213-17. The Rachal court distinguished Johnson because diversity jurisdiction in Johnson provided an independent basis for both parties to demand trial by jury, whereas the only right to a jury trial in Rachal arose under the plaintiffs Jones Act prerogative to elect trial by jury. See id. at 1213. Thus, in Rachal, "because there was no diversity, [defendant] . . . had no [Seventh Amendment] right to a jury trial. Any jury trial right that [defendant] may have [had] arose only because [plaintiff] demanded a jury trial." Id. at 1214.
The Jones Act provides in part that "[a]ny seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury . . ." 46 App. U.S.C. § 688 (emphasis added).
In the case at bar, Woodard did not specifically invoke this Court's diversity jurisdiction. In his complaint, he invoked jurisdiction under the Jones Act and the Savings to Suitors Clause, 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1). He stated however the domicile of each party in both the original and the second supplemental complaint, which showed diversity of citizenship in fact. This distinguishes this case from Rachal. Woodard demanded a jury trial, which, under the circumstances, was available to him under both the Jones Act and diversity jurisdiction. Diamond Offshore Drilling and Diamond Offshore Management, the Defendants, likewise both demanded a jury trial, to which they were entitled under diversity jurisdiction. Having properly invoked their Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, the Defendants cannot be deprived of that right by Woodard's unilateral change of mind.
III. CONCLUSION
This Court finds that Magistrate Judge Shushan came to a correct conclusion under the controlling law as explained above. Her ruling was neither "clearly erroneous" nor "contrary to law."
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff Martin Woodard's Motion to Review Magistrate Judge's Order is hereby DENIED. IT IS THUS FURTHER ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge's denial of Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Third Supplemental and Amending Complaint is hereby AFFIRMED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 11th day of February, 2000.