, the trial court summarily dismissed the petition. The trial court relied on a line of cases, including Woodall v. Woodall, No. M2003-02046-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 2345814 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2004) and Wiser v. Wiser, No. M2013-02510-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 1955367 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2015), which stand for the proposition that "[a]n obligor spouse cannot rely on Tennessee Code Annotated ยง 36-5-121(f)(2)(B) to terminate or suspend alimony payments if the alleged cohabitation ceased before the modification petition was tried." We affirm the trial court in all respects.
Further, modification must also be justified under the factors relevant to an initial award of alimony. Woodall v. Woodall, No. M2003-02046-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 2345814, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. [Oct. 15], 2004). In the context of transitional alimony, the relevant factor is whether "the economically disadvantaged spouse needs assistance to adjust to the economic consequences of a divorce," [Tenn.
See also Woodall v. Woodall, No. M2003-02046-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 2345814, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2004) (stating that "the nature of the relationship" between alimony recipient and third person "is irrelevant to the statute").
An obligor spouse cannot rely on Tenn. Code Ann. ยง 36-5-121(f)(2)(B) to terminate or suspend alimony payments if the alleged cohabitation ceased before the modification petition was tried. The Court of Appeals addressed this issue in Woodall v. Woodall, 2004 WL 2345814 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2004), and it explained: [T]he situation that existed at the time of trial must be considered in applying the statute.
To determine whether an alimony recipient has rebutted the statutory presumption, our courts "examine the financial circumstances of the alimony recipient at the time of the modification hearing, to see whether the recipient has demonstrated a continuing need for the previously awarded amount of alimony." Hickman v. Hickman, No. E2013-00940-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 786506, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2014); see Woodall v. Woodall, No. M2003-02046-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 2345814, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2004) ("[T]he situation that existed at the time of trial must be considered in applying the statute."). For her part, Wife argues that the trial court erred in finding that she did not rebut the statutory presumption.
The clear implication is that if the situation justifying the suspension ceases to exist, the alimony recipient may seek reinstatement of support from the former spouse." Id. at *6 (quoting Woodall v. Woodall, No. M2003-02046-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 2345814 at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2004) (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks and citation omitted).Gregory v. Gregory, No. M2015-01781-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 3662182, at **4-5 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2016), no appl. perm. appeal filed.
The clear implication is that if the situation justifying the suspension ceases to exist, the alimony recipient may seek reinstatement of support from the former spouse." Id. at *6 (quoting Woodall v. Woodall, No. M2003-02046-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 2345814 at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2004) (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Additionally, we noted that there was "no authority for, and no purpose to be served by, requiring a ruling based on past cohabitation and the filing and hearing of a subsequent request for reinstatement when cohabitation ceases before the trial on the original modification petition."
An obligor spouse cannot rely on Tenn. Code Ann. ยง 36-5-121(f)(2)(B) to terminate or suspend alimony payments if the alleged cohabitation ceased before the modification petition was tried. The Court of Appeals addressed this issue in Woodall v. Woodall, 2004 WL 2345814 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2004), and it explained: [T]he situation that existed at the time of trial must be considered in applying the statute.
This Court has stated on several occasions that "the living situation at the time of trial must be considered in determining whether the statute applies." Strait v. Strait, No. E2005-02382-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 3431933 at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S., filed Nov. 29, 2006) (emphasis in original) (citing Evans v. Evans, No. M2002-02947-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 1882586 at *5-6 (Tenn. Ct. App. M.S., filed Aug. 23, 2004) and Woodall v. Woodall, No. M2003-02046-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 2345814 at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. M.S., filed Oct. 15, 2004)). Wife testified that she allowed Pekala to stay with them for a period of about four months after he was kicked out of his parents' house.
This circumstance is occasionally referred to by the courts as the "cohabitation" factor. See Woodall v. Woodall, No. M2003-02046-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 2345814, (Tenn.Ct.App. Oct. 15, 2004). As the statute provides, if the party receiving alimony in futuro lives with a third person, there is a rebuttable presumption that the third person is either contributing or receiving support from the alimony recipient and the alimony recipient does not need the amount of support previously awarded.