Feldman v. State, 71 S.W.3d 738, 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). The proponent does not meet that burden until the record shows that the prospective juror understood the requirements of the law and could not overcome any bias or prejudice. Woodall v. State, 350 S.W.3d 691, 696 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.) (citing Feldman, 71 S.W.3d at 747). Thus, a party seeking to exclude a prospective juror because of bias or prejudice must demonstrate, through questioning, that the prospective juror lacks impartiality.

We therefore hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's challenge for cause. To the extent appellant argues that the trial court improperly questioned Venireperson No. 25 and attempted to rehabilitate him, appellant must object on this basis before the trial court to preserve error, and here he failed to do so. SeeWoodall v. State, 350 S.W.3d 691, 695 (Tex.App.–Amarillo 2011, no pet.) (“No objection was made by Appellant's counsel that the trial court erred in any way by personally questioning prospective jurors. By failing to present this objection at trial, Appellant failed to preserve the issue for review.”); see also Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1) (stating that, to preserve error, complaining party must make timely request, objection, or motion to trial court that states grounds for complaint with specificity).

A trial court "has broad discretion in the manner it chooses to conduct voir dire, both as to the topics that will be addressed, and the form and substance of the questions that will be employed to address them." Jacobs v. State, 560 S.W.3d 205, 210-11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (footnotes omitted); see also Palacio v. State, 580 S.W.3d 447, 450 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. ref'd) ("The trial court has broad discretion over the jury-selection process."); Woodall v. State, 350 S.W.3d 691, 695 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.) (explaining that "a trial judge has inherent authority to question prospective jurors regarding their qualifications and ability to serve as fair and impartial jurors"). Appellant does not complain, for example, that he was given insufficient time to conduct his own voir dire.

Therefore, appellant has waived error, if any, to the trial court’s purported attempts to rehabilitate venireperson 64. SeeThomas v. State , 470 S.W.3d 577, 593 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015), aff'd , 505 S.W.3d 916 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (holding that the appellant waived any complaints regarding the trial court’s statements made during voir dire); Woodall v. State , 350 S.W.3d 691, 695 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.) (holding that the appellant waived error regarding the trial court’s personal questioning of prospective jurors who asserted that they would not be able to consider the full range of punishment)

We further note that "a trial judge has the inherent authority to question prospective jurors regarding their qualifications and ability to serve as fair and impartial jurors." Woodall v. State, 350 S.W.3d 691, 695 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.) (citing Gardner v. State, 733 S.W.2d 195, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)). While the challenged venirepersons initially indicated an inability to consider probation as punishment, after further instruction by the trial court each of them individually stated they could set aside their personal beliefs and consider probation.

Once a prospective juror admits his inability to consider the full range of punishment, including community supervision, a sufficient foundation has been laid to support a challenge for cause. Woodall v. State, 350 S.W.3d 691, 696 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2011, no pet. h.). And, in reviewing a decision to deny a challenge for cause, we look at the entire record to determine if there is sufficient evidence to support the ruling. Feldman v. State, 71 S.W.3d 738, 744 (Tex.Crim.App.2002).

Cortez ex rel. Estate of Puentes v. HCCI-San Antonio, Inc., 159 S.W.3d 87, 91-92 n.2 (Tex. 2005) ("Cortez next argues, citing several court of appeals opinions, that veniremembers cannot be 'rehabilitated'—that once a veniremember has expressed 'bias,' further questioning is not permitted and the veniremember must be excused. We disagree that there is such a rule, and to the extent these decisions conflict with our opinion here, we disapprove those cases."); see Woodall v.State, 350 S.W.3d 691, 696 n.9 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2011, no pet.). But bias may sometimes be shown as a matter of law, in which instance the venire person is not ordinarily subject to rehabilitation.

Once a prospective juror admits his inability to consider the full range of punishment, including community supervision, a sufficient foundation has been laid to support a challenge for cause. Woodall v. State, No. 07-10-0136-CR, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 7009, at *10 (Tex. App.-Amarillo August 29, 2011, no pet. h.). And, in reviewing a decision to deny a challenge for cause, we look at the entire record to determine if there is sufficient evidence to support the ruling. Feldman v. State, 71 S.W.3d 738, 744 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).