Opinion
C.A. No. 98A-12-002.
Submitted: January 27, 2000.
Decided: April 28, 2000.
Upon Consideration of Appellant's Appeal of Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board's Decision
Charles E. Whitehurst, Esq., Dover, Delaware. Attorney for Appellant.
Bayhealth Medical Center, Dover, Delaware. Pro Se.
Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board.
REVERSED
ORDER
1. This is an appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board ("Board") on December 2, 1998, which denied unemployment compensation benefits to the claimant, William F. Woodall ("Woodall"). The Board affirmed a decision made by an appeals referee who determined that Woodall was disqualified for unemployment benefits on the ground that he had voluntarily quit his job with the defendant, Bayhealth Medical Center ("Bayhealth"). Because the Board's decision is not supported by substantial evidence, it is reversed.
2. The facts involved in this case are essentially undisputed. Woodall was employed by Bayhealth as a master electrician from January 1987 until June 1998. His position included various supervisory duties. Woodall was not happy with his job as master electrician. On several occasions he had spoken with Mike Karolczak, the construction renovations director, about stepping down from the position of "head" electrician to become a "regular" electrician. On Thursday, May 21, 1998 he brought the subject up again. Specifically, he told Karolczak that he wanted to hand in his pager, step down from the position of head electrician and become a regular electrician. Initially, Karolczak replied to Woodall that that was fine. However, after checking with the human resources office, Karolczak called Woodall that evening and indicated that if he just turned in his pager, he would be considered as having resigned. Karolczak further indicated that Woodall had to put his intended action in writing in the form of a two-week notice. Woodall testified that Karolczak cautioned him that there may be a wage reduction. Karolczak testified that he advised Woodall not to give the two-week notice, because there may be "ramifications even loss of money." Karolczak advised Woodall that he hold off until Tuesday when they could discuss the situation. Woodall, however, was content to take a pay reduction, and on the next day he turned in a letter which read as follows:
Transcript of hearing, page 23.
Karolczak was scheduled to be off Friday, and Monday was a legal holiday.
May 22, 1998
To: Mike Karolczak Director of Plant Operations
Dear Mike:
In two weeks, Friday, June 5, 1998, I will be handing you my pager. I no longer want the responsibility for all of the electrical work throughout the hospital and surrounding buildings. You have made it very clear that there is no chance for any advancement for me in the Plant Operations. Therefore I will come to work and take my daily direction, like everyone else, from either you or Rich Willey.
Thank You.
Bill Woodall
On June 1, 1998, Karolczak gave Woodall a letter dated May 27 stating that "it seems to me that you are declining the role that you were hired here to undertake." Karolczak's letter stated that he was accepting Woodall's "resignation." Woodall was then escorted from the hospital. The next day Woodall wrote a letter to Steven R. Simmons, vice president of human resources, informing him that there had been a misunderstanding, that his letter of May 22 was not a letter of resignation and that he had never intended to resign. Simmons reiterated that Bayhealth was interpreting his letter as a letter of resignation. Further attempts by Woodall to go up the chain of command met with the same results.
3. Woodall filed a claim with the Department of Labor seeking unemployment compensation benefits. An appeals referee held a hearing and found that Woodall was not entitled to benefits under 19 Del. C. § 3315 (1) because he voluntarily terminated his employment without good cause. Woodall appealed this decision to the Board which held another hearing, adopted the findings of fact of the appeals referee, and affirmed the referee's decision denying benefits. This appeal followed.
4. On appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, the scope of the Court's review is limited to a determination of whether the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence and free from legal error. Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The appellate court does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make its own factual findings. It merely determines if the evidence is legally adequate to support the agency's factual findings.
General Motors v. Freeman, Del. Supr., 164 A.2d 686, 688 (1960); Johnson v. Chrysler Corporation, Del. Supr., 213 A.2d 64, 66-67 (1965); Longobardi v. Unemployment Insurance Appeal Bd., Del. Super., 287 A.2d 690 (1971).
Oceanport Ind. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Del. Super., 636 A.2d 892, 899 (1994); Battista v. Chrysler Corp., Del. Super, 517 A.2d 295, 297 (1986), app. dism., Del. Supr., 515 A.2d 397 (1986).
Johnson v. Chrysler, 213 A.2d at 66.
5. The appeals referee concluded that the actions of the claimant were tantamount to a resignation. He noted that there was no other job available for the claimant once he gave up his master electrician's position. He found that the claimant had voluntarily resigned his position because he was dissatisfied with his job conditions. According to the appeals referee, the claimant's unemployment was the result of his own doing and not the result of action or inaction on the part of the employer.
6. In this case, the Court finds that the decision of the appeals referee, adopted by the Board, is not supported by substantial evidence. When Woodall spoke to Mr. Karolczak on May 21, he was speaking in terms of wanting to take a reduction in position from head electrician to a regular electrician. When Karolczak informed him that simply turning in his pager would be considered a resignation. Woodall did not turn it in. In other words, when it was brought to the claimant's attention that just handing in his pager would be an act of resigning, he avoided that course of action. Karolczak informed the claimant that a two-week letter was needed. Woodall testified that Karolczak's caution against giving the two-week letter was due to the fact that he could receive a reduction in pay. In his testimony, Karolczak did not dispute Woodall's account of their conversations, and agreed that he had indicated that "there could be ramifications, even loss of money." The reference to "loss of money" in this context is consistent with reduction in position, not resignation. Woodall explained that he went ahead with the letter because he was willing to receive a reduction in pay. When Woodall asked Karolczak directly at the hearing whether Karolczak ever indicated that the two-week letter could result in loss of job, Karolczak gave a rather vague and indirect answer, not a direct answer. When the claimant became aware that Karolczak had chosen to characterize his letter as a resignation, he immediately notified his employer that there was a misunderstanding and that he had not intended to resign. However, none of the Bayhealth representatives who reviewed the matter ever addressed the context of the conversations between Woodall and Karolczak which led to the May 22 letter being submitted. None of the employers' representatives who reviewed the matter ever came to grips with the claimant's contention that his letter was being misinterpreted.
7. In order for there to be substantial evidence to support a finding that the claimant resigned voluntarily, there must be evidence in the record which adequately supports the conclusion that Woodall resigned as a result of his own personal choice or with his full consent. A more recent formulation is that in a voluntary resignation situation, the employee must have had a conscious intention to leave or terminate his employment. The evidence in this case does not adequately support the conclusion that the claimant voluntarily resigned. The employee in this case submitted a letter which he thought, based upon his interaction with the construction renovations director, was the way to take a demotion from head to regular electrician. The employer, beginning with Karolczak and continuing with each representative thereafter, simply made a decision to chose to characterize the letter as a resignation. Whether or not Woodall would have decided to go ahead and resign if it had been made clear to him that a reduction in position was not an option, or whether he would have decided to stick it out until he could find another job, is unknown based on this record. The first mention that taking a reduction to regular electrician was not an option came only after Woodall had submitted his May 22 letter. The issue is whether he voluntarily resigned based on this record, and this record does not adequately support a conclusion that he did so.
Anchor Motor Freight, Inc. v. Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, Del. Super., 325 A.2d 374, 376 (1974).
Andress v. F. Schumacher Co. Del., C.A. No. 93A-03-007, Herlihy, J. (Nov. 3, 1993) (Mem. Op.).
In his summary of the evidence the appeals referee states that the May 27 letter from Karolczak to Woodall indicated that there was no other position at Bayhealth to which Woodall could be assigned. The contents of the letter are undisputed. When the Court reads the letter, the Court finds that it recites the circumstances at the time the claimant was hired, emphasizes that the claimant continued to be the head, or responsible, electrician after other electricians were hired, and that nothing had changed the fact that the claimant was the one responsible for electrical requirements. The letter falls short of indicating, however, that there was no other position at the hospital to which the claimant could be assigned. More importantly, nothing in the letter indicates that the claimant was informed before submitting his May 22 letter that a reassignment was not an option, or possible option.
8. The facts in this case are distinguishable from that line of cases in which employees actually or constructively quit their jobs either by unilaterally trying to change their job conditions, giving ultimatums, walking off the job or the like. For example, an employee's letter to his employer stating that he demanded a contract by a certain date or he would resign, after which the employee no longer reported to work, demonstrated the clear intent to resign. Likewise, an employee's unilateral decision to curtail work duties and walk off the job constitutes substantial evidence of "a conscious intention to terminate . . . employment." Here the employee was taking steps which he thought would result in his being allowed to have a lowered level of responsibility. His conversations with the construction renovations director gave him a false sense that reducing his level of responsibility was or may be an option. The evidence does not support the conclusion that he had a conscious intention to resign or terminate his employment.
Nichols v. Red Clay School District, Del. Super., C.A. No. 93A-11-003, Alford, J.(Sept. 14, 1994) (ORDER).
State Department of Transportation v. Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board v. Foraker, Del. Supr., 663 A.2d 488 (1995).
THEREFORE, the decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.