Wood v. Vroman

2 Citing cases

  1. Estate of Gerow v. Thies

    No. 348221 (Mich. Ct. App. Jul. 2, 2020)

    They do not and cannot yield ultimate truth. Absolute certainty in matters of causation is a rarity."); Harrison v Lorenz, 303 Mich 382, 391-392; 6 NW2d 554 (1942) ("The testimony of this witness was not rendered incompetent because he could not state with positive certainty as to the exact location of the leak."); Wood v Vroman, 215 Mich 449, 461; 184 NW 520 (1921) ("The plaintiff was not required to prove to an absolute certainty that the infection was caused by the introduction of the germs in the pus."); Birou v Thompson-Brown Co, 67 Mich App 502, 510; 241 NW2d 265 (1976) ("It is not necessary for an expert witness to state an opinion in terms of absolute certainty for it to be admissible."). Aside from the caselaw, the governing statute, MCL 600.2912a(2), provides the applicable standard: "In an action alleging medical malpractice, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that he or she suffered an injury that more probably than not was proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant or defendants."

  2. Groesbeck v. Henry Ford Health Sys.

    No. 307069 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2013)

    The fact that a health-care professional exercises medical judgment when committing a negligent act does not prohibit lay jurors from evaluating on the basis of common knowledge and experience the reasonableness of the health-care professional's action; for example, surgeons certainly exercise medical judgment while performing surgery, but, "if a foreign object is left within the body of a patient on whom an operation has been performed, to his injury, laymen may properly decide the question of negligence without the aid of experts." Roberts v Young, 369 Mich 133, 138; 119 NW2d 627 (1963), citing Wood v Vroman, 226 Mich 625, 198 NW 228 (1924); LeFaive v Asselin, 262 Mich 443, 247 NW 911 (1933); Taylor v. Milton, 353 Mich 421, 92 NW2d 57 (1958). Finally, although Karunakar used medical judgment for the gait assessment, lay jurors using common knowledge and experience can determine without expert testimony whether Karunakar acted unreasonably by holding onto Groesbeck—an 86-year-old, 110-pound, first-day-rehabilitation patient who had just suffered a minor stroke and had a history just several hours earlier of vomiting, dizziness, and difficulty standing—with only one hand as Groesbeck walked and by allowing Groesbeck to fall.