The county then filed a motion to reconsider in light of West v. Kirkham (1992), 147 Ill.2d 1, a supreme court case that the county contended virtually overruled the Dinges case. The trial court held that West and Wood v. Village of Grayslake (1992), 229 Ill. App.3d 343, "effectively eliminated" the rationale relied upon by the trial court when it denied the county's motion to dismiss. Thus, the trial court, on reconsideration, granted the county's motion to dismiss counts IV, V and VI of plaintiffs' first amended complaint. After the trial court ordered that there was no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal of that order, plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal.

(Emphasis in original.) West, 147 Ill.2d at 8, 167 Ill.Dec. 974, 588 N.E.2d 1104; see also Wood v. Village of Grayslake, 229 Ill.App.3d 343, 354, 170 Ill.Dec. 590, 593 N.E.2d 132 (1992) (“West * * * holds that section 3–104 of the Tort Immunity Act absolutely immunizes a local public entity from failing to provide traffic control devices even if the governmental unit had notice of the hazardous condition of the roadway.”). ¶ 70 Based on our supreme court's rationale in West, we too reject the plaintiff's contention here, that the City's section 3–104 immunity did not attach because the City was placed on notice about the hazard by the 1999 IDOT report.

Further, if the opponent to a section 2-619 motion does not counter the proofs offered in support of the motion and the movant's showing of undisputed facts would entitle the movant to judgment as a matter of law, a dismissal pursuant to section 2-619 is proper. Wood v. Village of Grayslake, 229 Ill. App. 3d 343, 350 (1992). To properly state a cause of action for legal malpractice, plaintiffs must allege in their complaint: (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship that establishes a duty on the part of the attorney; (2) a negligent act or omission constituting a breach of that duty; (3) proximate cause establishing that "but for" the attorney's negligence, the plaintiffs would have prevailed in the underlying action; and (4) damages.

) Thus, the plaintiff's allegation of negligence against the City of Urbana for its failure to provide a particular traffic control device is conduct expressly immunized by section 3-104. See Wood v. Village of Grayslake (1992), 229 Ill. App.3d 343, 354. The court in West rejected plaintiff's contention that the immunity described in section 3-104 no longer attaches once the municipality has notice that the lack of a particular traffic control device creates a dangerous condition.

When reviewing the propriety of the trial court's decision to grant a section 2-619 motion, the reviewing court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint. ( Wood v. Village of Grayslake (1992), 229 Ill. App.3d 343, 348.) Therefore, the reviewing court is concerned solely with a question of law and should review the trial court's ruling de novo. Nikolic, 242 Ill. App.3d at 99.

The motion should be granted and the complaint dismissed if, after construing the documents in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court finds that no set of facts can be proved which would entitle the plaintiff to recover. ( Wood v. Village of Grayslake (1992), 229 Ill. App.3d 343, 348; Nagy v. Beckley (1991), 218 Ill. App.3d 875, 878.) When reviewing the propriety of a section 2-619 dismissal, all well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint are taken as true. ( Elliott v. L R S L Enterprises, Inc. (1992), 226 Ill. App.3d 724, 727.

Thus, the County's failure to correct the erroneous traffic control marking was simply a negligent oversight and not the sort of decision immunized by section 3-104. "Because of the above distinctions, to hold the County liable in the instant case does not reflect the type of second-guessing that West prohibits." 356 Ill. App. 3d at 276; see, e.g., Wood v. Village of Gray slake, 229 Ill. App. 3d 343, 354 (1992) (holding that section 3-109 immunizes the failure to initially provide traffic control devices, but not the failure to maintain existing traffic control devices). The record in the underlying case demonstrates that, in 1993, the County negligently replaced the erroneous two-direction passing zone on Galena Road.

These cases are also distinguishable from the general rule applied at an intersection with merely inoperative traffic signals, where the law requires that the lights be treated as a stop sign ( 625 ILCS 5/11-305(e) (West 2002)), and the defendant's conduct does nothing to change the driver's perception of the intersection. See, e.g., Quirke, 266 Ill. App.3d at 668 (the defendant city's conduct was not the proximate cause of the collision where the driver failed to treat the inoperative traffic light as a stop sign); Quintana v. City of Chicago, 230 Ill. App.3d 1032, 1035 (1992) (same); see also Wood v. Village of Grayslake, 229 Ill. App.3d 343, 356 (1992) (the defendant municipalities had a right to assume that a driver would not violate statutory duty to stop at a stop sign and that she would check for oncoming traffic before proceeding into the intersection). CONCLUSION

-------- section 2-619 motion was properly granted because allegations in complaint were "negated and defeated by the affirmative matter [contained in an affidavit] that [the affiant] was not plaintiff's employer and had no authority to hire or discharge plaintiff"); Milz v. M.J. Meadows, Inc. , 234 Ill. App. 3d 281, 287, 175 Ill.Dec. 276, 599 N.E.2d 1290 (1992) ("Whether a duty exists is a question of law to be determined by the court [citation], and the nonexistence of a duty may be the basis for a section 2-619 motion to dismiss [citations]."); Wood v. Village of Grayslake , 229 Ill. App. 3d 343, 349, 170 Ill.Dec. 590, 593 N.E.2d 132 (1992) ("The issue of whether the defendant owed plaintiff a duty of care is a question of law to be determined by the trial court which is properly asserted in a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619."). ¶ 19 To state a cause of action for negligence, a complaint must allege facts that establish (1) the existence of a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) a breach of that duty, and (3) an injury proximately caused by that breach.

"[W]here a party moving for dismissal pursuant to section 2-619 files supporting affidavits containing well-pleaded facts and the party opposing the motion files no counteraffidavits, the facts set forth in the movant's affidavits are accepted as true despite any contrary assertions in the nonmovant's pleadings." Wood v. Village of Grayslake, 229 Ill. App. 3d 343, 349-50 (1992). Therefore, the trial court properly accepted the facts set forth in defendant's supporting affidavit as true despite any assertions to the contrary in plaintiffs' pleadings, and the court properly dismissed the complaint as a matter of law, finding there were no genuine issues of material fact to preclude dismissal.