Opinion
Docket No. 99-CV-228-B-S
May 30, 2001.
ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
Before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions (Docket #54). Defendant United States of America has opposed the Motion and asked that the Court award Defendant its costs associated with responding to Plaintiffs' Motion. For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES the Motion for Sanctions.
I. BACKGROUND
The Court directs interested parties to its more comprehensive discussion of the facts and claims in this case contained in Wood v. United States, 115 F. Supp.2d 9, 12-17 (D.Me. 2000) (denying Defendant's first motion for summary judgment). Since the Court's issuance of that order, the parties have conducted further discovery and the United States filed a second motion for summary judgment (Docket #37). In conjunction with the second motion for summary judgment, the United States filed a reply brief (Docket #51) and a reply statement of material facts (Docket #52). To support this reply statement of material facts, Defendant filed a sworn declaration by Norman Laberge, an environmental engineer employed at Cutler Naval Station, dated April 3, 2001 (the "First Laberge Declaration" or "First Declaration" (Ex. 28 (attach. to Def. Reply SMF (Docket #52)).)
Plaintiffs' pending Motion for Sanctions alleges that Mr. Laberge actually believed this first Declaration was misleading and that he was forced to sign it under duress. Plaintiffs assert that Defendant filed the First Laberge Declaration in an effort to "change LaBerge's deposition testimony and to re-cast documents [provided by Mr. Laberge] in a more favorable light." (Pls. Mot. for Sanctions at 6 (Docket #54).) In support of their Motion, Plaintiffs have submitted a second sworn declaration by Mr. Laberge, dated April 13, 2001, (the "Second Laberge Declaration" or "Second Declaration" (Docket #57)), in which Mr. Laberge describes in great detail his involvement in this case and his various meetings with Defense counsel. Without recounting all of these details, it suffices to say that Mr. Laberge believes "that the Navy made major mistakes in the administration, management, supervision, and inspection of the Abhe Svoboda project" and further believes that he has been subject to retaliation for expressing these opinions with regards to the Abhe Svoboda project. (Id. at 2.) As a result, the interactions between Mr. Laberge and Mr. Moore, the Assistant United States Attorney representing Defendant, apparently have been marked by mutual distrust. In relevant part, Mr. Laberge's Second Declaration describes a meeting held on April 3rd during which Mr. Moore produced the First Declaration for Laberge's signature. Mr. Laberge claims that he initially expressed concern about the substance of this declaration. According to Mr. Laberge, Mr. Moore made "a few minor changes" to the First Declaration in response to his expressed concerns, after which Laberge signed it "with some reservation and under some duress." (Second Laberge Decl. at 2 (Docket #57).)
Stripped to its essence, Plaintiffs' Motion takes issue with the way in which Defense counsel allegedly contrived the First Laberge Declaration in an attempt to clarify unofficial minutes taken by Mr. Laberge at a meeting on April 15, 1999. According to these minutes, a Navy employee indicated at the meeting that the Navy "had increased its liability on safety issues related to Abhe Svoboda by becoming too involved in the process." (Ex. E. (attach. to Pls. Mot. for Sanctions (Docket #54)).) In the First Declaration, Mr. Laberge explains that this "statement about the Navy `becoming too involved in the process' did not refer to supervision of employees of Abhe Svoboda, Inc. by Naval personnel." (First Laberge Decl. ¶ 3.) In the Second Declaration, Mr. Laberge suggests that this explanation of the minutes contained in the First Declaration is not entirely accurate. (See Second Laberge Decl. at 3.)
In connection with this Motion, Defendant has supplied sworn declarations from the other two persons present at the April 3rd meeting with Laberge, Mr. Blanchette and Mr. Moore. (See Exs. A C (attach. to Obj. of United States to Pls. Mot. for Sanctions (Docket #60)).) According to Mr. Blanchette's declaration, Mr. Laberge appeared completely satisfied with his First Declaration after his requested changes were incorporated and there was no indication that Mr. Laberge was under "even the slightest duress" when he signed the First Declaration. (Blanchette Decl. ¶ 7 (Ex. A).) Mr. Moore's declaration concurs with this description of the circumstances surrounding Mr. Laberge's signing of the First Declaration on April 3, 2001.
II. STANDARD FOR IMPOSITION OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS
In relevant part, Rule 11 states that an attorney who files "a pleading, written motion or other paper" certifies that "to the best of [the attorney's] knowledge . . . formed after a reasonable inquiry under the circumstances" that the filing's "factual contentions have evidentiary support." Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b). To the extent a party believes any provision of Rule 11(b) has been violated, it may file a motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1). This portion of Rule 11 specifically requires that a party seeking sanctions first file its motion with the opposing party in order to give the party an opportunity to cure the defect. If the challenged filing is not withdrawn or corrected within twenty-one days after receipt of the Rule 11 motion, then the moving party may file its motion for sanctions with the Court. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(c)(1)(A). This provision is commonly known as the "safe harbor" provision of Rule 11.
In substance, when determining whether an attorney has violated a provision of Rule 11, the Court must consider the allegedly problematic filing in context. As the First Circuit has explained,
Whether a litigant breaches his or her duty to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the facts and the law "depends on the objective reasonableness of the litigant's conduct under the totality of the circumstances." The factors to be assessed may include "the complexity of the subject matter, the party's familiarity with it, the time available for the inquiry, and the ease (or difficulty) of access to the requisite information."
Lichtenstein v. Consol. Servs. Group, Inc., 173 F.3d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting Navarro v. Nunez, 968 F.2d 1421, 1425 (1st Cir. 1992).
III. DISCUSSION
In short, the Court finds that neither the procedural posture of Plaintiffs' Motion nor the substantive allegations warrant the imposition of sanctions pursuant to Rule 11. With regard to the procedural posture, the Court takes note of Plaintiffs' failure to comply with the Rule 11 safe harbor provisions. Plaintiffs justify their failure to comply by suggesting that they had to file the Motion for Sanctions before the Court ruled on Defendant's pending Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket #37). However, Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike (Docket #53) adequately alerted the Court to Plaintiffs' substantive allegations regarding the reliability of the First Laberge Declaration. Similarly, Plaintiffs could have sought relief pursuant to Rule 56. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(g). Given these alternative mechanisms for immediately alerting the Court of Plaintiffs' objections to the First Laberge Declaration, the Court finds Plaintiffs' failure to comply with the safe harbor provision inexcusable.
That said, the Court notes that more than twenty-one days have passed since Defendant was alerted to Plaintiffs' Motion. Nonetheless, Defendant has not taken steps to withdraw or correct the First Laberge Declaration that it filed in support of its reply brief. Rather, Defendant maintains that all of the statements within the First Laberge Declaration meet the requirements of Rule 11. Considering the totality of the circumstances at the time Defense counsel filed the First Laberge Declaration, the Court similarly concludes that it was completely reasonable for Mr. Moore to believe that the First Laberge Declaration was accurate and truthful and, therefore, had evidentiary support.
Moreover, even when read in light of the Second Laberge Declaration, the First Laberge Declaration still appears to have evidentiary support. Mr. Laberge has not said that his First Declaration is false. Rather, he now claims that one particular sentence in the declaration "would have been much clearer" if he had made further revisions before signing it. For better or for worse, this sort of after-the-fact realization is commonly experienced with regard to all types of writings.
To the extent that this was Mr. Laberge's perception of the First Declaration at the time he was signing it, he apparently made no attempt to communicate his apprehension to Mr. Moore. In fact, when Mr. Moore asked if the First Declaration was truthful and accurate, Mr. Laberge responded in the affirmative. (See Blanchette Decl. ¶ 6.) Under these circumstances, the Court concludes that Mr. Moore had every reason to believe that Laberge's First Declaration was truthful and accurate.
In fact, lawyers and even judges often realize, in hindsight, that their respective briefs or orders "would have been clearer" if they had only made further revisions.
Under the unique circumstances alleged by Plaintiffs, it was appropriate for Plaintiffs' counsel to seek to clarify the First Laberge Declaration in order to press its position that material issues of fact remain. See Perez v. Volvo Car Corp. 247 F.3d 303, 314-15 (1st Cir. 2001). However, Plaintiffs' premature filing of a motion for sanctions was inappropriate. Moreover, the Court finds that Defense counsel's filing of the First Laberge Declaration complied with both the letter and the spirit of Rule 11.
IV. CONCLUSION
Therefore, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions. Pursuant to its discretion, the Court finds that an award of costs associated with opposing Plaintiffs' Motion is not warranted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(c)(1)(A). Thus, each party shall bear its own costs associated with this Motion.
Given this ruling on the merits, the Court finds Defendant's Letter, dated April 16, 2001 (Docket #55), which the Clerk construed as a motion to strike Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions, is MOOT.
SO ORDERED.