Opinion
CR-24-152
12-11-2024
STEVEN RAY WOOD APPELLANT v. STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE
Thompson Law Firm, PLLC, by: Theodis N. Thompson Jr., for appellant. Tim Griffin, Att'y Gen., by: James Hill, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE SCOTT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 64CR-21-67] HONORABLE JERRY DON RAMEY, JUDGE
Thompson Law Firm, PLLC, by: Theodis N. Thompson Jr., for appellant.
Tim Griffin, Att'y Gen., by: James Hill, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.
BRANDON J. HARRISON, CHIEF JUDGE
Steven Ray Wood appeals his conviction for second-degree battery and argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he inflicted a physical injury. We disagree and affirm Wood's conviction.
In April 2021, the State charged Wood with three counts of aggravated assault upon a certified law enforcement officer, three counts of resisting arrest, criminal impersonation, obstructing governmental operations, and disorderly conduct. These charges stemmed from Wood's actions during his arrest by three officers on 1 March 2021. In September 2023, the State amended the charges to three counts of second-degree battery and one count of resisting arrest. Wood was also charged as a habitual offender.
At a jury trial held on 19 September 2023, Officer Brittany Fletcher with the Waldron Police Department testified that she participated in Wood's arrest on 1 March 2021. During the arrest, Wood became "very violent, agitated" and began "yelling and 1 cursing." As Fletcher and other officers attempted to place Wood in a police vehicle, he kicked Fletcher in her stomach and leg. He also attempted to kick the other officers and to kick the window out of the vehicle's door. The officers opened the door to attempt to calm him, but he jumped out of the vehicle and had to be "wrestle[d]" back in the vehicle. Wood was finally subdued after the officers called for additional back up and deployed pepper spray. Fletcher said that she had bruising and soreness where she had been kicked. When asked if she considered it substantial pain, Fletcher answered yes. Officer Cheyenne King, who also participated in the arrest, described the arrest in a similar manner to Fletcher's description and stated that she also sustained "[t]he usual bumps and bruises from a 10-minute fight."
After the State rested, the defense moved for a directed verdict: "Your Honor, we don't believe that the evidence that's been presented could establish that my client committed battery on these officers. There was not video footage, no phone footage, no photos, no medical records. We have nothing to substantiate the officers' testimony as to what happened on that day." The circuit court allowed the second-degree-battery charges as to Officers Fletcher and King and the resisting-arrest charge to move forward. The directed-verdict motion was renewed at the close of evidence and again denied.
The court dismissed the third charge of second-degree battery, which concerned a third officer who had participated in the arrest.
The jury found Wood guilty of the second-degree battery of Officer Fletcher and resisting arrest. The court sentenced him to fifteen years' imprisonment and one year of imprisonment respectively, to run concurrently. Wood timely appealed.
Wood was acquitted of the second-degree battery of Officer King.
The test for determining sufficiency of the evidence is whether there is substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial, to support the verdict. Johnson v. State, 337 Ark. 196, 987 S.W.2d 694 (1999). On appeal, we consider only the evidence that supports the verdict, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. LeFever v. State, 91 Ark.App. 86, 208 S.W.3d 812 (2005). Evidence is substantial if it is forceful enough to compel reasonable minds to reach a conclusion and pass beyond suspicion and conjecture. Harmon v. State, 340 Ark. 18, 8 S.W.3d 472 (2000). We do not weigh the evidence presented at trial because as that is a matter for the jury. Swanigan v. State, 2019 Ark.App. 296, 577 S.W.3d 737. Further, the credibility of witnesses is an issue for the jury, not the court; the trier of fact is free to believe all or part of any witness's testimony and may resolve questions of conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence. Armstrong v. State, 2020 Ark. 309, 607 S.W.3d 491.
Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-13-202(a)(4)(A) (Supp. 2023) provides that a person commits battery in the second degree if the person knowingly, without legal justification, causes physical injury to or incapacitates a person he or she knows to be a law enforcement officer while the officer is acting in the line of duty. A physical injury is defined as impairment of physical condition; infliction of substantial pain; or infliction of bruising, swelling, or visible marks associated with physical trauma. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-102(14) (Supp. 2023).
Wood argues that the State's case rested on whether he caused Officer Fletcher to experience substantial pain. But, he asserts, the State did not introduce any physical evidence of an injury, such as medical records or photographs, and Fletcher did not miss any work due to her alleged injuries. In fact, the only evidence offered by the State was Fletcher's testimony and, specifically, her affirmative response to the question of whether she had experienced substantial pain. In other words, the State asked the jury to "take [Fletcher] at her word," and in so doing, the jury had to resort to speculation or conjecture to conclude that Fletcher had experienced substantial pain.
In support of his argument, Wood cites Allen v. State, 64 Ark.App. 49, 977 S.W.2d 230 (1998), in which this court held that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for second-degree battery. In Allen, an officer sustained several abrasions to his upper forehead, but he did not notice the injury until another officer pointed it out, he did not receive stitches or pain medication, and he was able to perform his duties as usual. In addition, neither the officer nor the circuit court had characterized the injury as causing substantial pain. Under these circumstances, this court held that "the testimony describing the injury and the pain associated with it" did not support a finding of "infliction of substantial pain." Id. at 54, 977 S.W.2d at 232. Likewise, Wood contends, Fletcher's testimony did not support a finding of substantial pain, and because substantial pain is "necessary to prove a physical injury," the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for second-degree battery.
First, Wood is mistaken that substantial pain is necessary to prove a physical injury; instead, infliction of substantial pain is one of three ways to cause a physical injury. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-102(14). While there was no allegation of physical impairment, the State could prove that Fletcher sustained a physical injury by showing that Wood had inflicted substantial pain or bruising, swelling, or visible marks associated with physical trauma. See id. Fletcher testified that she had bruising and soreness from Wood's assault and that she experienced substantial pain at the time. Wood argues that the State did not "introduce a single exhibit . . . to corroborate" Fletcher's testimony, but he cites no authority for the proposition that such corroboration is required.
Wood's reliance on Allen is misplaced; that case was decided in 1998, and the definition of "physical injury" was amended in 1999 to include the additional definition of "infliction of bruising, swelling, or visible marks associated with physical trauma." See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-102(14) (Supp. 1999).
As noted above, the credibility of witnesses is an issue for the jury, and it is free to believe all or part of any witness's testimony. Armstrong, supra. Further, the uncorroborated testimony of one State's witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Galvin v. State, 323 Ark. 125, 912 S.W.2d 932 (1996). Here, the jury believed Fletcher's testimony and found Wood guilty of second-degree battery. We affirm.
Affirmed.
KLAPPENBACH and MURPHY, JJ., agree.