Opinion
Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-CR-1567
03-18-2021
Chad D. WOOD, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
Attorney for Appellant: Ryan P. Dillon, Dillon Legal Group PC, Franklin, Indiana Attorneys for Appellee: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Benjamin J. Shoptaw, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
Attorney for Appellant: Ryan P. Dillon, Dillon Legal Group PC, Franklin, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Benjamin J. Shoptaw, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Sharpnack, Senior Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] Chad D. Wood appeals his conviction of possession of marijuana, a Class B misdemeanor. We affirm.
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-11 (2018).
Issue
[2] Wood presents one issue for our review, which we restate as: whether the trial court erred by admitting evidence that Wood claims was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On November 21, 2018, Officer Hayden of the Mooresville Police Department responded to a call from a gas station clerk concerning two suspicious men. One of the men had attempted to buy lottery tickets at the station with his credit card, but the card was declined. When Officer Hayden arrived at the station, the clerk identified a vehicle parked at one of the gas pumps as the men's vehicle. Officer Hayden walked over to the vehicle and spoke with the driver, Wood, and his passenger, Dustin Chadwick, through the open car window. As the officer did so, she smelled the odor of raw marijuana coming from inside the vehicle. At that time, Officer Hayden requested an additional officer. When Officer Schultz arrived, he smelled the odor of raw marijuana as he approached the vehicle. The officers asked the two men to exit the vehicle, and Officer Schultz asked Wood about the odor coming from the vehicle. In response, Wood informed Officer Schultz that there was a glass jar containing a small amount of marijuana in the vehicle and that the marijuana belonged to him. The officers then searched the vehicle and located a glass jar containing a green leafy substance that was later determined to be marijuana.
[4] Based upon this incident, the State charged Wood with possession of marijuana as a Class B misdemeanor and possession of marijuana as a Class A misdemeanor. Prior to trial, Wood moved to suppress his statement and any items obtained as a result of his statement, and the court denied the motion after a hearing. At a bench trial, Wood objected to the same evidence. The trial court overruled the objection, and Wood was found guilty of the B misdemeanor. He was sentenced to thirty days. Wood now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[5] Wood contends his statement was the result of a custodial interrogation such that he should have been advised of his Miranda rights. Because he was not so advised, Wood argues his statement and the fruits of the subsequent search should not have been admitted at his trial.
[6] As a general matter, we review a trial court's decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion. Nicholson v. State , 963 N.E.2d 1096, 1099 (Ind. 2012). However, when a defendant's challenge to the admission of evidence implicates the constitutionality of the search or seizure of the evidence, it raises a question of law, which we review de novo. Guilmette v. State , 14 N.E.3d 38, 40-41 (Ind. 2014).
[7] Miranda warnings protect an individual's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Sauerheber v. State , 698 N.E.2d 796, 801 (Ind. 1998). To that end, the Miranda warnings requirement is triggered when a person is both (1) in custody and (2) subject to interrogation. Scanland v. State , 139 N.E.3d 237, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Statements obtained from the custodial interrogation of a suspect who has not been advised of his Miranda rights are generally inadmissible. Id.
Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
Although briefly alleging that his rights under the Indiana Constitution were violated alongside his federal constitutional rights, Wood did not advance any state constitutional argument or analysis separate from that based on the U.S. Constitution. Any state constitutional claim is thus waived. See Francis v. State , 764 N.E.2d 641, 646-47 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (where defendant failed to provide analysis of state constitutional claim separate from analysis under Federal Constitution any claim of error was waived).
[8] In distinguishing between custodial and noncustodial encounters, the ultimate inquiry is whether there was a " ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.’ " State v. Brown , 70 N.E.3d 331, 336 (Ind. 2017) (quoting Stansbury v. California , 511 U.S. 318, 322, 114 S. Ct. 1526, 128 L. Ed. 2d 293 (1994) ). Courts look to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether a person was in custody. Brown , 70 N.E.3d at 335.
[9] Here, Officer Hayden testified that, after speaking with the gas station clerk, she "didn't have anything criminal," but she walked over to Wood's vehicle for a "consensual encounter" to "see what was going on" and explain the situation. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 42. Upon smelling marijuana coming from the vehicle, she and Officer Schultz asked the men to step out of the vehicle. At that time, Officer Schultz asked about the odor, and Wood made the statement concerning the glass jar.
A consensual encounter occurs when a police officer makes a casual and brief inquiry of a citizen, which involves neither an arrest nor a stop and in which the Fourth Amendment is not implicated. Powell v. State , 912 N.E.2d 853, 859 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
[10] Without any additional analysis, Wood asserts that at the time he made the statement he was not free to leave; therefore, he was in custody. Appellant's Br. p. 7. While it is true that the encounter evolved into an investigatory stop in which the officers briefly detained Wood and Chadwick to investigate the marijuana odor, to the extent Wood is claiming that a seizure under the Fourth Amendment is akin to custody under the Fifth Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear this is not the case.
Pursuant to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, police may, without a warrant or probable cause, briefly detain an individual for investigatory purposes if, based upon specific and articulable facts, the officer has reasonable suspicion that criminal activity has or is about to occur. Powell v. State , 912 N.E.2d 853, 859 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
[T]he United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a person temporarily detained in an ordinary traffic stop is not in custody for the purposes of Miranda . Pennsylvania v. Bruder , 488 U.S. 9, 10, 109 S. Ct. 205, 102 L. Ed. 2d 172 (1988) (citing Berkemer v. McCarty , 468 U.S. 420, 439-40, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1984) ). In Berkemer , the U.S. Supreme Court made clear that a traffic stop "significantly curtails the ‘freedom of action’ of the driver" and that "[c]ertainly few motorists would feel free to disobey a direction to pull over or leave the scene of a traffic stop without being told they might do so." Berkemer , 468 U.S. at 436-37, 104 S. Ct. 3138. Thus, it concluded that a traffic stop is a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Nevertheless, the Court declined to find that this seizure was custody for Miranda purposes. Id. at 437, 104 S. Ct. 3138.
Brown , 70 N.E.3d at 336. Our Supreme Court has similarly held that, although in the context of an investigatory stop a person is at least temporarily not free to leave, he or she is ordinarily not considered to be in custody. Meredith v. State , 906 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. 2009). Rather, established law allows an officer making an investigatory stop to detain a person upon reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and to ask questions to determine identity and verify or disprove the officer's suspicions. Id.
[11] There are several other factors, however, that courts look to in order to determine whether and when an investigatory stop transforms into a custodial encounter. These factors include whether the defendant was read his Miranda rights; whether he was handcuffed, restrained in any way, or told he was a suspect in a crime; the vigorousness of the law enforcement interrogation; whether police suggested the defendant should cooperate, implied adverse consequences for noncooperation, or suggested that he was not free to go about his business; and the length of the detention. State v. Janes , 102 N.E.3d 314, 318 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. In short, the inquiry is whether the circumstances demonstrate "objectively overpowering, coercive, or restraining police behavior" to the degree associated with a formal arrest. Meredith , 906 N.E.2d at 873.
[12] Although Wood and Chadwick were, at least momentarily, not free to leave, the record reveals nothing more than an ordinary investigative detention. The men exited the vehicle but were not handcuffed or restrained in any way, and there was no evidence that the officers drew or aimed a weapon at Wood or his passenger. The two men simply stood nearby while officers conducted the search of the vehicle. Officer Schultz's question regarding the odor emitting from the vehicle was of a general nature. He testified that he "just asked [Wood] about the odor that I was smelling coming from the vehicle" and that Wood then made the statement about the glass jar. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 74. Even when the marijuana was found, Officer Hayden did not arrest Wood but simply verified his correct address, informed him a summons would be mailed to him, and released him from the scene. Treatment of this sort cannot fairly be characterized as the functional equivalent of a formal arrest. Accordingly, we conclude Wood was not in custody when he made his statement to Officer Schultz. Because Wood's statement was not the product of a custodial interrogation, it was not error for the trial court to admit it at trial.
Conclusion
[13] For the reasons stated, we conclude Wood was not in custody at the time he made the statement to Officer Schultz, and, therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting into evidence the statement and items seized during the search.
[14] Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Mathias, J., concur.