Wood v. State

26 Citing cases

  1. Patterson v. State

    191 S.E.2d 584 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972)   Cited 8 times
    In Patterson v. State, 126 Ga. App. 753 (191 S.E.2d 584) (1972) defendant was a guest in the kitchen of a house being searched pursuant to a warrant.

    The validity of the search of the defendant's person must rest on the warrant that was issued, i. e., to search the person and the premises of another person. The search warrant was not directed to the search of other persons who might be found on the premises as was so in Wood v. State, 224 Ga. 121 ( 160 S.E.2d 368) and Willis v. State, 122 Ga. App. 455 ( 177 S.E.2d 487). Code Ann. § 27-309 provides: "In the execution of the warrant the person executing the same may reasonably detain or search any person in the place at the time: (a) to protect himself from attack, or (b) to prevent the disposal or concealment of any instruments, articles or things particularly described in the warrant." This statutory provision implicitly presupposes that a valid warrant is in existence before authorizing a search of other persons present at the place.

  2. Watts v. State

    274 Ga. 373 (Ga. 2001)   Cited 25 times
    Holding that Supreme Court precedent " required the [s]tate to produce at least the warrant and supporting affidavit in order to meet its initial burden"

    At the hearing, Watts specified what the claimed omissions were, and the prosecutor expressly conceded the accuracy of most of his allegations. See Wood v. State, 224 Ga. 121, 125 (2) ( 160 S.E.2d 368) (1968). Counsel for the State then proceeded to explain to the trial court why the conceded omissions did not undermine the warrant.

  3. Hamilton v. State

    239 Ga. 72 (Ga. 1977)   Cited 165 times
    In Hamilton v. State, 239 Ga. 72, 75 (235 S.E.2d 515) (1977), our Supreme Court held that "before evidence of independent crimes is admissible two conditions must be satisfied. First, there must be evidence that the defendant was in fact the perpetrator of the independent crime.

    Where do we stop? The prosecution in this case got three out of four safely in evidence. Would the result be the same with two out of four, or only one out of four? I cannot honestly say that this jury was not significantly influenced by the illegal admission of this evidence of an independent crime. If you doubt that the Bacon doctrine is being eroded, read the following cases: Cf. Rosborough v. State, 209 Ga. 362 (2) ( 72 S.E.2d 717) (1954); Howard v. State, 211 Ga. 186 (3) ( 84 S.E.2d 455) (1954); Wilson v. State, 212 Ga. 412 (2) ( 93 S.E.2d 354) (1956); Wood v. State, 224 Ga. 121 (5) ( 160 S.E.2d 368) (1968) with Campbell v. State, 234 Ga. 130 ( 214 S.E.2d 656) (1975); Allanson v. State, 235 Ga. 584 (1) ( 221 S.E.2d 3) (1975); and Fears v. State, 236 Ga. 660 (1) ( 225 S.E.2d 4) (1976). These cases show a remarkable trend, in my judgment, towards the liberal admission into evidence of independent crimes. If this is to be the new rule, why not just say, boldly and plainly, that the barrier has been lifted and defendants will now be tried on their record irrespective of any connection with the alleged crime on trial.

  4. State v. Banks

    223 Ga. App. 838 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 29 times
    In Banks, which is physical precedent only, the officers asked a man standing on a corner near an apartment complex his purpose for being there and then, dissatisfied with his response, proceeded to pat him down.

    Terry, 392 U.S. at 24; Brown v. State, 181 Ga. App. 768, 770 ( 353 S.E.2d 572). A Terry pat-down is authorized when the officer reasonably believes that it is necessary to protect the officer from attack. Wood v. State, 224 Ga. 121, 124 ( 160 S.E.2d 368); Dowdy v. State, 209 Ga. App. 311, 312 ( 433 S.E.2d 293). Consequently, even if we were inclined to credit the State's argument that Officer Gray could have reasonably suspected appellee of loitering in violation of OCGA § 16-11-36 (but see Bell v. State, 252 Ga. 267, 271 ( 313 S.E.2d 678): "The offense of loitering is committed only when the actor engages in conduct `not usual for law abiding individuals' which creates `a reasonable alarm or immediate concern for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity'"), there is nothing in this record from which one could reasonably believe appellee was armed and dangerous.

  5. Dowdy v. State

    209 Ga. App. 311 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 8 times

    In this state, a Terry pat-down search is authorized when the officer reasonably believes that it is necessary to protect him from attack. Wood v. State, 224 Ga. 121, 124 ( 160 S.E.2d 368). Based upon the information known to the officers, e.g., Dowdy was a passenger in a stolen car, and the hour of the night, it was reasonable for the police officers to take precautions for their own safety, including the pat-down search.

  6. Benham v. State

    196 Ga. App. 241 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 1 times

    "A citizen does not, by mere presence at a suspect place, lose his constitutional right from unreasonable search of his person and his property to which he otherwise would be entitled." Collins v. State, 187 Ga. App. 430, 431-432 ( 370 S.E.2d 648), citing United States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581 (2) ( 68 SC 222, 92 LE 210) and Wood v. State, 224 Ga. 121, 124 ( 160 S.E.2d 368). Even searches of "other persons" on premises being searched under a warrant are illegal, absent independent justification for a search of the person. Bundy v. State, 168 Ga. App. 90 ( 308 S.E.2d 213); Childers v. State, 158 Ga. App. 613 ( 281 S.E.2d 349); Wyatt v. State, 151 Ga. App. 207, 208 ( 259 S.E.2d 199); Hayes v. State, 141 Ga. App. 706, 708 ( 234 S.E.2d 360); Smith v. State, 139 Ga. App. 129, 130 (1) ( 227 S.E.2d 911); Brown v. State, 133 Ga. App. 500 ( 211 S.E.2d 438). The record fails to demonstrate a lawful basis for the subsequent search of appellant for drugs, conducted a short time after his legitimate but uneventful pat down for weapons.

  7. Bonds v. State

    188 Ga. App. 135 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 16 times
    Holding defendant's "status as a visitor does not remove her purse [found inches away] from examination, because there were indicators that she was not an innocent visitor but rather a person involved in the type of criminal activity underlying the warrant"

    See United States v. Giwa, 831 F.2d 538, 543 (B) (5th Cir. 1987). Wood v. State, 224 Ga. 121 (1) ( 160 S.E.2d 368) (1968), holds that the statute meets Fourth Amendment requirements because it does not allow the search of other persons based on their "mere presence" but authorizes only searches of such other persons as will serve one of two express limited purposes. Until the contents of the purse were disclosed, it posed a possible danger and constituted a possible container of the very items sought.

  8. Collins v. State

    370 S.E.2d 648 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 5 times

    A citizen does not, by mere presence at a suspect place, lose his constitutional right from unreasonable search of his person and his property to which he otherwise would be entitled. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (2) ( 68 SC 222, 92 LE 210); Wood v. State, 224 Ga. 121, 124 ( 160 S.E.2d 368); Hayes v. State, 141 Ga. App. 706, 708 ( 234 S.E.2d 360). However, our Code, OCGA § 17-5-28, authorizes inclusion in a search warrant of "other persons" on the premises being searched, and this Court has held that inclusion of such wording does not automatically convert an otherwise valid warrant into a general warrant.

  9. Clark v. State

    361 S.E.2d 682 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 5 times
    In Clark v. State, 184 Ga. App. 380, 382 (3) (361 S.E.2d 682) (1987), the proof offered to the magistrate showed a named individual was "selling, storing and concealing" contraband at the described location.

    OCGA § 17-5-28 (2). See Wood v. State, 224 Ga. 121 (1C) ( 160 S.E.2d 368) (1968); Campbell v. State, 139 Ga. App. 389 (3, 4) ( 228 S.E.2d 309) (1976), cert. den., 429 U.S. 1083 (1977). Cf. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (II) ( 100 SC 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238) (1979), holding that a person's mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person.

  10. Graham v. State

    171 Ga. App. 242 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 50 times
    Holding that failure to transcribe tape played for jury and properly entered into evidence as an exhibit was not reversible error

    The trial court concluded that the defendants had abandoned the gun; that Wood and Jordan had no standing; and that Graham had freely and voluntarily waived his right to have counsel present during the sheriff's questioning, and had consented to aid in the search for the gun. To support their contention that they have standing to complain about the search of the swamp and the seizure of the gun, appellants Wood and Jordan rely on Cook v. State, 134 Ga. App. 712 ( 215 S.E.2d 728) (1975); and Wood v. State, 224 Ga. 121 ( 160 S.E.2d 368) (1968), both of which rely on Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 ( 80 SC 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697) (1960), and the rule of "automatic standing," applicable to defendants charged with crimes of possession. No such charge was made against any of these appellants.